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           The punishments of Islamic criminal law and in particular, the 
notoriously severe ḥadd punishments, were never systematically justified in 
classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). However, the fiqh tradition is ripe with 
debates about ḥadd punishments, and theories of justification, while not fully 
spelt out, are often implied in the writings of Muslim jurists. In Part I of this 
thesis, three fiqh strategies for the justification of ḥadd punishments are 
described and critically evaluated: one that seeks to characterize the ḥadd 
punishments as divinely ordained, immutable “rights of God” (ch. 1), one 
that describes the purpose of ḥadd punishments as serving general as well as 
individual prevention (ch. 2), and one that stresses that to suffer ḥadd is an 
expiatory act that amends for sins and thus ensures salvation in the Hereafter 
(ch. 3). The Sunnī legal schools (madhāhib), salient representatives of which 
are studied in this dissertation, controversially discussed the meaning and 
purpose of ḥadd punishments in the context of each of these three fiqh 
discourses. 
                 Part II of this thesis proceeds to describe and discuss 
contemporary Muslim debates about the applicability and justifiability of 
ḥadd punishments today. While only few Islamic regimes currently 
implement ḥadd, the topic has a large symbolical importance because it 
exemplifies the struggle of Muslim thinkers to reconcile Islam with 
modernity. In a first step, this thesis aims to clarify to what extent 
contemporary positions echo, attack or simply sidestep classical fiqh 
positions: how, in other words, the present is connected to the traditional fiqh 
framework of the past (ch. 4). In a concluding chapter, a number of salient 
topics of debate in the contemporary ḥadd controversy are analysed within 
the cultural and political contexts in which they are located (ch. 5). 
       While classical legal doctrines about ḥadd punishments, despite the 
controversies between the madhāhib, tend to be rigid, emphasizing the 
immutable character of the criminal law norms found in the Sharīʻah, the 
periodic calls among contemporary thinkers for the implementation of ḥadd 
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0.1 Scope of this research  
This research investigates a specific area of Islamic criminal law, namely, the 
ḥadd laws and the punishments associated with them. Particular attention is 
paid to how the ḥudūd (pl. of ḥadd) are justified in the Islamic legal tradition, 
which is based on the Qurᵓān, the Sunnah and on the rules derived from 
these two sources in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).1 Ḥadd norms according to 
the Islamic tradition aim at regulating the power of Islamic governments to 
inflict punishments on individuals in order to enforce compliance with 
Islamic law (Sharīʿah). According to the majority of Sunnī jurists, ḥadd 
punishments, which are defined as “fixed, mandatory punishments (ʿuqūbāt 
muqaddara) that are based on the Qurʾān and the Sunna”,2 aim at protecting 
the interests of the general public and its core values, values that Islamic 
society regards as crucial for its stability, even if the immediate interest that 
is protected is a private one, for instance, in offences such as theft (sariqa) 
and slander (qadhf).  
                                         
1 In this research I have followed a narrow definition of ḥadd Allāh as defined in the Qurᵓān 
and Sunnah: ḥadd al-ridda (apostasy), ḥadd al-zinā (illegal sexual intercourse), ḥadd al-qadhf 
(false accusation of committing illegal sexual intercourse), ḥadd al-sariqa (theft), ḥadd al-
ḥirāba (banditry), ḥadd shurb al-khamr (consuming alcohol).  
2 Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. 53. 
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            The Islamic tradition of jurisprudence (fiqh) provides an insight into 
what Muslim society and in particular, the jurists of this society regard as its 
core values.  In this thesis, I attempt to collect and systematize the strategies 
and arguments scattered over the Islamic legal literature (uṣūl and furūʿ al-
fiqh) that jurists, both classical and modern, developed to justify ḥadd 
punishments. I critically analyse the rich and various opinions of Muslim 
jurists about the main justifications of ḥadd offences, that, is well known, are 
often severe, including both corporal (scourging, amputation and crucifixion) 
and capital penalties (stoning and beheading by sword). Furthermore, I 
compare and contrast the classical justifications of ḥadd punishments with 
the justifications and critiques voiced by modern and contemporary Muslim 
thinkers. I pay special attention to how they view the question of the current 
implementation of ḥadd punishment today. In particular, I aim to show to 
what extent modern debates about ḥadd punishments are indebted to the fiqh 
tradition and how it evaluates ḥadd punishments and their justifications 
offered for them in fiqh discourse. 
            One of the characteristics of Islamic criminal law is that it does not 
conform to the notion of law as found, for instance, in common law or civil 
law systems. Hence the problems of contemporary Muslim thinkers when 
dealing with ḥadd. The ḥudūd seem especially difficult to reconcile with 
modernity; they appear as the archaic remnants of a medieval, unenlightened 
and irrational period of human history. The ḥudūd thus represent one of the 
thorniest challenges to contemporary Islam. 
 3 
 It should be noted, however, that ḥadd law, though it may at seem a 
uniform and unequivocal set of legal formulations, is in reality the product of 
a juristic discourse that consists of a spectrum of often diverse and sometimes 
even contradictory opinions. Muslim jurists stipulate, on the basis of the 
Qurᵓān, the Prophetic tradition (ḥadīth), scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ) and 
analogical extension of the law (qiyās), what the law should be and how it 
should be implemented. However, due to the fact that these jurists and 
scholars interpret the sources (Qurᵓān and Sunnah) in many different ways, 
we find a great diversity of opinions in the various justifications of ḥadd 
punishments that are proffered in the jurisprudential tradition. Sunnī 
classical jurists were aware of this, and they developed numerous ways to 
make these legal differences manageable for those who had to apply the law, 
that is, for the most part, the Muslim judges. 
However, before entering into the Muslim legal debates about how to 
interpret, develop, circumscribe and apply ḥadd norms, it is necessary to offer 
a basic outline of the law of ḥadd: its bases in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, the 
crimes for which they are imposed, and the punishments which are 
commonly associated with them.3 By way of introduction, I shall also 
highlight some of the salient debates that have accompanied theses basic 
coordinates of ḥadd law. Following this, I will discuss the aims and objectives 
that this thesis pursues, review the relevant secondary literature, and offer 
                                         
3 Cf. Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, pp. 6-68  
 4 
some reflections on the methodology embraced in this research, before 
concluding this introduction with an overview of the chapters in this thesis. 
 
0.2 The doctrinal foundations of ḥadd offences and their 
punishments 
          In this section, I outline the basics of the legal concepts of ḥadd Allāh, 
that is, the offences (jarāᵓim) and their punishments (ʿuqūbāt) of the law of 
ḥadd, as generally agreed upon in Sunnī jurisprudence (fiqh). There are six 
ḥadd offences that appear in the jurists’ legal manuals: Apostasy (ridda), 
illegal sexual intercourse (zinā), false accusation of illegal sexual intercourse 
(qadhf), theft (sariqa), armed robbery (ḥirāba), and drinking alcohol (shurb al-
khamr). These are widely regarded as the fixed and immutable ḥadd offences. 
Other offences are sometimes in the category as well, but will not receive 
further attention in this thesis 4 
 
0.2.1 Apostasy (ridda) 
         According to the majority of Sunnī jurists, apostasy is as the act of 
releasing oneself from the Islamic religion (al-rujūʿ ʿan al-dīn al-Islāmī) by 
disbelieving in God’s existence and the Day of Judgement. Apostasy can be 
realized by uttering or performing something heretical; upholding a 
theological doctrine which negates the existence of God; rejecting the 
                                         
4 I exclude the offence of baghy as it is very much disputed as to whether it is in fact one of 
the ḥadd offences. For further reading about baghy, see Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Rebellion and 
Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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prophecy of His prophets; mocking, cursing either God or His prophets; and 
kneeling down in prayer to idols; among other things.5 The legal definition of 
the apostate (murtadd) is that he or she is the one who turns away from Islam 
(al-rujūʿ ʿan al-dīn al-Islāmī) or serves the ties with Islam (qaṭʿ al-Islām). In the 
definition of murtadd jurists refer to someone who is Muslim either by birth 
(i.e., born into a Muslim family) or by conversion (taḥawwul), and who then 
renounces Islam, irrespective of whether or not s/he subsequently embraces 
another faith.6 
             The Qurᵓānic prescriptions regarding those who commit apostasy 
differ significantly. What is important, particularly in light of the later Sunnī 
juristic development, is that although apostates are usually assigned a 
specific place in Hell, there is no explicit mention of any specific capital or 
corporal punishment to which apostates are to be subjected in this world. 
However, according to most classical jurists, apostasy is considered as one of 
the ḥadd offences punishable by capital punishment (usually by the sword). 
In support of their claim, classical jurists relied extensively on the following 
narration which is attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad and which figures in 
some of the most canonical collections of ḥadīth: “If someone changes his 
religion, then kill him.”7 
                                         
5 Wael Hallaq, “Apostasy”, Encyclopaedia of the Qurᵓān, vol. 1, p. 119. 
6 Al-Ḥusayn al-Baghawī, Al-Tahdhīb fī fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1997), vol. 7, p. 288; Muwaffaq al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdullah Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī 
(Cairo: Hijr, 1990), vol. 12, p. 264. 
7 Muḥammad Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī (Riyad: Dār al-Ishbīliya, 1970), vol. 7, p. 50; 
Muḥammad Ibn Māja, Sunan Ibn Māja (Stuttgart: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, 2000), pp. 
 6 
            According to the majority of classical jurists, the apostate is given a 
three day grace period (istitāba) to reconsider his decision. If he repents, 
there are to be no legal consequences of any kind. However, if he does not 
repent, then he is by the juristic consensus (ijmāʿ) to be executed.8 Moreover, 
free and enslaved male and female apostates receive the same punishment 
according to all schools,9 except according to the Ḥanafīs, who waive this 
punishment for free and slave women and instead replace it with 
imprisonment. This exemption is justified by the fact that the Prophet is 
reported to have disapproved of killing female apostates.10 The Ḥanafīs 
viewed this exemption as valid due to the female physical disposition, 
assuming that the female apostate could hardly be expected to cause any 
threat to the Islamic state.11 
    Modernist scholars have sometimes viewed the offence of apostasy 
and its juristic legal punishment as reflective of a post-Qurʾānic reality and 
therefore, as not covered by the explicit teachings of the Qurᵓān. In fact, 
some have opposed the execution of the apostate (murtadd) and have argued 
that the fiqh teachings are based on either insufficient evidence, or that the 
fuqahāʾ show a lack of critical awareness, given that the notion of apostasy is 
                                                                                                                     
368-369; Aḥmad Dāwūd, Sunan Abū Dāwūd (Stuttgart: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, 
2000), pp. 727-728. 
8 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, vol. 2, p. 726. 
9 Al-Baghawī, Al-Tahdhīb, vol. 7, p. 288; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 12, p. 264. 
10 Muḥammad Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya), vol. 9, p. 117.  
11 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 117-118; Rudolph Peters, “Apostasy in Islam”, Die Welt 
des Islams 17 (1976-1977), p. 5. 
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often used by political authorities and the religious establishment to suppress 
freedom of religion.12 As Wael Hallaq has noted, 
 
           If we go by what seems to be reliable information about the Prophet, 
the Qurᵓān emerges as a more accurate representation of his attitude toward 
apostasy. It is more likely that the companion of the Prophet Abū Bakr (d. 
634) was the first to be involved in putting to death a number of apostates, an 
action which was in the course of time perceived as the practice (sunna) of the 
Prophet. Later sources sanctioned this penalty and made a point of 
mentioning that the other companions approved of Abū Bakr’s action.13 
 
Indeed, the Qurʾānic attitude toward non-Muslims seems to be summed up in 
strikingly different terms: “There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the 
right path has become distinct from the wrong path” (Q 2: 256). 
 
0.2.2 Illegal sexual intercourse (zinā) 
According to the Islamic legal tradition, sexual intercourse is only permitted 
within a valid marriage. A Muslim man or woman who engages in unlawful 
sexual intercourse commits a serious sin (kabīra) (Q 25:68).14 According to 
                                         
12 Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study (Indianapolis: 
American Trust Publication, 1982), p. 56; Mohammad Kamali, “Punishment in Islamic Law: 
A Critical of the Hudud Bill of Kelantan, Malaysia”, Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 13. No. 3 
(1998), pp. 213-4; Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 277; Muhammad Shahrour, The Qurᵓān Morality and 
Critical Reason: the Essential Muhammad Shahrour, translated, edited and with an introduction 
by Andreas Christmann (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 337-8. 
13 Hallaq, “Apostasy”, p. 119.  
14 According to the Sunnī schools of law, homosexuality is usually equated to unlawful 
heterosexual intercourse. There are different opinions about considering homosexuality as 
one of ḥadd offences. Ḥanafīs did not include homosexuality in the list of ḥadd offences. They 
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the jurists, under narrowly defined circumstances, a man and a woman who 
have had illegal sexual intercourse are punished with a fixed punishment of 
either one hundred lashes scourging (jald) or by being stoned to death (rajm), 
depending on their legal status. In order to prove this offence, classical jurists 
required very strict standards of evidence; instead of the testimonies of two, 
those of four eyewitnesses are required. In addition, most schools hold that a 
confession must be made four times in four different court sessions.15 As for 
the Qurᵓān  (24:2), the only punishment prescribed for zinā is scourging one 
hundred lashes: 
 
The fornicatress and the fornicator, flog each of them with a hundred 
stripes. Let no pity withhold you in their case, in a punishment prescribed by 
Allāh, if you believe in Allāh and the Last Day. And let a party of the 
believers witness their punishment. 
 
         Muslim classical jurists’ consensus is that the general punishment for 
those unmarried ones who commit unlawful intercourse is a hundred lashes if 
they are free and fifty if they are slaves, followed, according to all schools 
except the Ḥanafīs, by banishment for a period of one year, for both men and 
women.16 In addition, women who are banished must be accompanied at 
                                                                                                                     
held that homosexuality is punished according to the judge’s discretion. Cf. Peters, Crime and 
Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 61. 
15 Muḥammad al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 2002), vol. 6, pp. 183, 
187; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 60. 
16 Al-Shāfiʻī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, pp. 182-183; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 45-46. 
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their own expense by a close male relative to watch over them.17 The Mālikīs 
held that only male adulterers are to be banished.18  
            Regarding the married adulterer and adulteress, classical jurists 
expounded on the concept of iḥṣān. Being a muḥṣan means being an adult, 
free Muslim (except in the Shāfiʿī tradition, where a non-Muslim dhimmī can 
also be muḥṣan)19 who has enjoyed legitimate sexual relations in matrimony 
(regardless of whether the marriage still continues). The prescribed penalty 
for zinā of the muḥṣan person in the fiqh tradition is stoning. This is based on 
a number of ḥadīth traditions according to which the Prophet Muḥammad 
inflicted stoning on adulteresses and adulterers.20 The most often cited 
narration attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad states that: 
 
              A Bedouin came to the Prophet and said: “O Messenger of God, I 
implore you by God to pass judgement on me in accordance with God’s 
Book… My son worked as a labourer for this man and then he fornicated 
with his wife. I was told that my son deserved to be stoned to death, so I 
ransomed him for one hundred sheep and a female slave. I then asked the 
people of knowledge and they informed me that my son deserved one 
hundred lashes and banishment for one year and that the woman deserved to 
be stoned to death.” The Prophet replied saying: “As for the female slave and 
the sheep, they must be returned to you. Your son deserves one hundred 
                                         
17 Ibrāhīm Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab fī fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 
1996), vol. 5, p. 395. 
18 Muḥammad Saḥnūn, Al-Mudawwana al-kubrā (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), vol. 6, p. 2825. 
19 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 199; Ismāʿīl Al-Muzanī, Mukhtaṣar Al-Muzanī (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 1993), vol. 9, pp. 276-277. 
20 Muḥammad Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1995), vol. 5, p. 
217; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 373; Aḥmad al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhdhakhīra fī furūʻ al-
Mālikiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), vol. 9, pp. 351-352. 
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lashes and banishment for a year. Go Unays to this man’s wife and if she 
confesses, stone her to death.” Thereupon, Unays went to the woman and she 
confessed. The Prophet ordered her to be stoned.21 
 
0.2.3 Unfounded false accusation of committing illegal sexual intercourse 
(slander, calumny, defamation) 
According to the legal tradition of fiqh, qadhf is either the explicit allegation 
(al-qadhf al-ṣarīḥ) that someone has had unlawful intercourse of any kind, or 
the denial of a person’s legitimate descent, at least if his or her mother is a 
Muslim and a free person.22 The Qurᵓān (24:4-5) stipulates that 
 
            Those who accuse honourable women but bring not four witnesses, 
scourge them [with] eighty stripes and never [afterwards] accept their 
testimony. They indeed are evildoers. Save those who afterward repent and 
make amends. God is Forgiving, Merciful. 
 
         According to most classical jurists, imposing the punishment for slander 
(qadhf) was both perceived as a claim of God (ḥaqq Allāh) and a claim of 
man (ḥaqq al-ʿabd). However, jurists disagreed as to which aspect had 
priority; for instance, the Ḥanafīs held that the claim of God was stronger 
than the claim of man. Contrary to the Ḥanafīs, the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs held 
that the claim of man had priority. 
                                         
21  Muḥammad Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻArabiyya, 1985), vol. 8, 
p. 546. 
22 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol.6, p. 277; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 76; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-
Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, pp. 398, 402-203; Muḥammad al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj ilā sharḥ al-
Minhāj (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984), vol. 7, p. 435; Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhdhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 378; 




0.2.4 Theft (sariqa) 
According to the fiqh tradition, it is under very strict conditions that a thief 
may be sentenced to amputation of the right hand. This fixed penalty is based 
on a Qurᵓānic verse which dictates that: “As for the thief, both male and 
female, cut off their hands, it is the reward of their own deeds, an exemplary 
punishment from God” (Q 5:38). The jurists defined the ḥadd offence of theft 
very narrowly. According to the majority of the Sunnī schools, it 
encompasses the following elements: the surreptitious taking away of a 
movable property with a certain minimum value (niṣāb) of 3 silver dirhams 
or one quarter of a gold dinar, which is not partially owned by the 
perpetrator nor entrusted to him, and from a place which is completely 
locked or under guard (ḥirz).23 The punishment is only applied to the Muslim 
who (1) has attained his majority (bāligh), (2) is mentally sound (ʿāqil) and 
(3) is proven to have had the intention (niyya) of stealing, that is, not having 
acted under compulsion but freely. 
           No distinction is made between freeman and slave, male or female.24 
According to the majority of classical jurists, the thief’s right hand is to be cut 
off at the wrist; the stump is held in hot oil or fire to stop the bleeding. The 
                                         
23 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 204; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 94-95; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-
Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 418; Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj ilā sharḥ al-Minhāj, vol. 7, p. 439; Al-
Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, pp. 418, 419-420; Al-Khurashī, Ḥāshiyat al-Khurashī, vol. 8, p. 
310. 
24 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 155, 160. 
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punishment is to be inflicted in public; according to some classical jurists, the 
thief is to be led around the town with the limb cut off hung round his neck.25 
 
0.2.5 Armed robbery (ḥirāba) 
According to the majority of Muslim jurists, banditry is explicitly sanctioned 
in the Qurᵓān (5:33): “The reward of those who wage war (yuḥāribūna) 
against God and His Messenger and do mischief through the land is execution 
or crucifixion, or the cutting off hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile 
from the land.” However, jurists have disputed the exact definition of the act 
of “waging war” (muḥāraba, ḥirāba), that is banditry, its terms and 
conditions.26 
             The legal implications of banditry are expounded in the fiqh 
tradition. Muslim jurists developed a complex doctrine of banditry.27 
According to the majority of Sunnī jurists, the minimum element of ḥirāba 
crime is a holdup: the showing of drawn weapons in order to frighten people 
travelling on a public road and to prevent them from continuing their 
journey.28 Jurists argued that it was essential that the assailants were superior 
in strength (that is, armed) and that the victims could not escape. The 
assailants’ attack had to be carried out with a high degree of violence, 
                                         
25 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 106; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 446; Yaḥya 
Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000) vol. 7, p. 360; Al-
Baghawī, Al-Tahdhīb, vol. 7, p. 385. 
26 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 229-30. 
27 Abou El-Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, pp. 51-2. 
28 Al-Shāfiʻī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 213; Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 229; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-
Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p.447. 
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whether in the act of murdering, stealing from, or simply terrifying people.29 
The Ḥanafīs excluded women from ḥirāba crime because they viewed women 
as not physically strong enough to commit armed robbery.30  
                According to all Sunnī schools apart from the Mālikīs, not only 
must the attackers be armed but the hold-up must take place outside the city, 
based on the presumption that in a city the public or the authority will come 
to the aid of the victims. The Shāfiʿīs agreed with this and held that an attack 
in a city constituted banditry only if the ruler did not have the effective and 
sufficient power to protect his people. The jurists further agreed that 
aggravating circumstances consist in taking the property of the victims and 
killing them. Repentance of the bandits before capture precludes their 
prosecution for banditry, but dose not exempt them from criminal 
responsibility for other crimes committed during the attack, such as homicide 
or wounding.31 
                 Banditry (ḥirāba), according to the Sunnī tradition, is envisioned 
as a collective crime  (jarīma jamāʿiyya). This means that, in the opinion of all 
schools of law except that of the Shāfiʿīs, if banditry in the sense outlined 
above is committed by one of the robbers, all are liable for the 
consequences.32 In this case, all the bandits must be sentenced to death if one 
of them committed murder. The Ḥanafīs held that if one of the bandits was 
                                         
29 Al-Baghawī, Al-Tahdhīb, vol. 7, p. 400; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 12, pp. 474-475. 
30 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 232. 
31 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, pp. 448-449; Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 7, pp. 
336-364; Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj ilā sharḥ al-Minhāj, vol. 7-8, p. 3. 
32 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 232-3. 
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not legally responsible, because of insanity, none could be convicted of the 
ḥadd crime of banditry.33 
 
0.2.6 Drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr) 
          According to the Qurᵓān, Muslims are required to refrain from drinking 
alcohol (shurb al-khamr). The relevant verse (Q 5:90) warns Muslim “O ye 
who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, idols and divining arrows are 
abominations of Satan’s handiwork. Leave it aside in order that you may 
succeed.” The penalty for wine-drinking, however, is introduced only in the 
Prophetic tradition and that of the Companions (ṣaḥāba). According to the 
ḥadīth, during the lifetime of the Prophet the punishment for drinking alcohol 
was forty lashes. However, under ʻUmar’s regime the punishment for 
consuming alcohol was increased to eighty lashes. The Shāfiʻīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs followed the Prophetic tradition and punished the drinking of 
alcohol with forty lashes.34 The Ḥanbalī Ibn Qudāma (d. 1223) argued that 
the punishment for consuming alcohol was forty lashes, based on the 
Prophetic practice (ḥujja). Ibn Qudāma argued that the punishment should 
not be determined by the example of the Companions; since their consensus 
is not valid because it does not accord with the Practice of the Prophet.35 The 
                                         
33 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, p. 304. 
34 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 281; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 458; Ibn Qudāma, 
Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 137.  
35 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 12, p. 499. 
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Ḥanafīs, however, endorsed the example of ʻUmar and increased the 
punishment to eighty lashes.36  
                                         
36 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 295. 
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0.3 Aims and objectives 
The study of Islamic jurisprudence, particularly its legal literature of Islamic 
criminal law, specifically the ḥadd laws, is promising yet at the same time, a 
demanding area of research for several reasons. 
     First, the classical tradition of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) does not 
deal with ḥadd punishments and how they are justified in an overly 
systematic fashion. Different ways of justifying the ḥadd are randomly 
scattered, or so it would seem, over the chapters on ḥadd laws. From this, 
researchers aiming to develop a global vision of the law of ḥadd have to 
assemble the contours of the juristic doctrine of ḥadd. 
Secondly, this research aims to criticize theories of justification of a 
number of ḥadd punishments, such as one finds, often in between the lines, in 
the jurists’ treaties of Islamic criminal law. Such a critical reading of the 
classical law of ḥadd has, to my knowledge, not been undertaken in any 
systematic and sustained fashion. 
Thirdly, ḥadd is one of the touchiest and most hotly debated issues 
among modern and contemporary Muslim thinkers. It encapsulates many of 
the perceived problems pitching Islamic modernism against Islamic 
traditionalism, or in fact Islam against the West, particularly with regard to 
the notion of ‘human right’. 
     In Part I of this thesis, I attempt to show that early Muslim jurists 
did not simply content themselves by stating that the ḥadd are the province 
of God entirely, in other words, that ḥadd punishments are immutably 
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imposed upon man by the sovereign decree of God in the Qurᵓān (ch. 1). On 
the contrary, as I intend to demonstrate, classical and medieval jurists 
extensively and flexibly debated ḥadd laws. In the course of their 
deliberations, they introduced numerous caveats in order to practically 
minimise the application of ḥadd punishments.37 Accordingly, this research 
shows that the classical Islamic literature on ḥadd is rich and replete in 
various justifications concerning the severity of ḥadd corporal and capital 
punishments (chs. 2 and 3).  
             By contrast and by way of comparison, in Part II (chs. 4 and 5) of 
this thesis I examine to what extent contemporary Muslim jurists, scholars 
and legislators have relied on the classical tradition of fiqh in justifying (or in 
fact, in rejecting) the ḥadd punishments as they are currently implemented in 
a number of Islamic countries (ch. 4). This examination leads me to highlight 
a number of salient issues and arguments related to the current practice of 
implementation of ḥadd punishments, which undoubtedly were not at stake 
in the time of early and classical Muslim jurists. This observation raises a 
bigger issue, namely, the contemporary applicability of Sharīʿah in general, 
and ḥadd law in particular. This research puts a spotlight on the 
commonplace presumption that ḥadd norms are immutable because they 
preserve God’s rights. This is a particularly challenging concern for 
                                         
37 Throughout Part I of this thesis I discuss the caveats related to the implementation of the 
ḥadd punishments. These caveats in recent studies of Islamic law have become known as 
“legal maxims”. This reflects settled juristic principles of law to which Muslim jurists appeal 
when confronting novel legal cases. For a discussion of juristic “legal maxims”, see Intisar A. 
Rabb, “Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: Ḥadd-Avoidance in 
Cases of Doubt”, Islamic Law and Society 17 (2010), 63-125. 
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contemporary jurists, as they must find ways to harmonize this perceived 
immutability of ḥadd norms with modernity and the idea of human rights 
(ch. 5).  
         This thesis seeks to convey a more nuanced understanding of the legal 
doctrines of ḥadd in both history and today. The Muslim discourse on ḥadd 
can tell us something about Islamic law today and can provide us with a solid 
understating of the challenges facing Muslim reformers. This, I hope, will 
contribute to the project “stimulat[ing] debate among Muslims on the 
interpretation of the fiqh sources with the aim of providing greater legitimacy 
for human rights norms.”38 With Rudolph Peters, the foremost Western expert 
on Islamic criminal law, I would like to suggest that “[w]ithin the heritage of 
classical legal doctrine, and by using methods of interpretation, it is possible 
to redefine the codes in such a way that they do not violate basic human 
rights.”39 
           Islamic criminal law as it has been traditionally understood is 
obviously in conflict with international human rights conventions in several 
areas. However, this does not mean that Islamic Sharīʿah and ḥadd laws are 
inimical to reform. Sharīʿah is not monolithic. On the contrary, this research 
suggests that the Islamic law of ḥadd is richly diverse and open to various 
interpretations. I suggest that Islamic ḥadd laws are open to further 
development and reformation. Needless to say, the way ḥadd norms ought to 
                                         
38 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 184. 
39 Ibid. 
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be interpreted in the contemporary context is not identical with the classical 
interpretations proffered in the Muslim fiqh. 
 
0.3.1 Research questions and problems 
This research surveys a wide range of classical legal text (furūʿ al-fiqh) as well 
as contemporary legal writings on ḥadd norms and the punishments 
associated with them. In Part I of this thesis, I attempt to question the juristic 
assumption about the immutability of ḥadd. To begin, were ḥadd 
punishments justified at all? As a matter of fact, they were, albeit not 
consistently and not in a systematic way. To what extent did Muslim jurists 
scrutinise the underlying purpose (the ratio legis) of ḥadd norms? Why did so 
many classical jurists shun as systematic justification of the severity of ḥadd 
laws? And with regard to those jurists who rejected all theories of 
justification, how could they argue that ḥadd norms are fixed and immutable 
– “divinely decreed” (muqaddar), as the expression has it? 
         As for questions that I pursue in Part II of this thesis, these concern a 
number of key issues that have emerged in recent debates about the 
applicability of Islamic criminal law, and in particular ḥadd punishments, 
such as, of course, its incompatibility with the universal notion of human 
rights. When we talk about the applicability of Sharīʿah and in particular its 
criminal law parts, we are often confronted with the question of whether the 
violations of human rights norms found in Sharīʿah criminal law can be 
remedied or circumvented, and what the possibilities are that the states that 
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still enact ḥadd laws (although there are few of them) will replace or amend 
these laws in order to comply with international human rights standards.40 
      In order to ground such questions in history, we must first ask: 
what is the impact of the classical views of ḥadd punishments on 
contemporary understandings, applications and justifications of ḥadd laws in 
the Islamic countries? Are the justifications of ḥadd punishments as presented 
in the classical doctrine of fiqh sufficient for contemporary calls for applying 
Islamic criminal law? Can ḥadd punishments still claim any relevance for 
today’s demands to apply Islamic (criminal) law? What new or ‘alternative’ 
strategies have contemporary Muslim scholars proposed in order to justify 
ḥadd punishments? By tackling all these questions, this research will 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the legal doctrines of ḥadd 
laws and their various justifications. 
                Throughout conducting this research, I experienced some problems 
and difficulties. First and foremost, I found that much of the focus of the 
classical jurists’ discussions in regard to ḥadd norms was on the validity and 
the effectivity of the judicial procedure of ḥadd punishments. Indeed, here is 
where the emphasis lies, much more at least than on any systematic theory of 
justification of ḥadd punishments, which – the classical jurists were quite 
aware of this – tend to be severe. Secondly, questions arose that were never 
contemplated by the early jurists. For instance, the jurists never questioned 
whether ḥadd punishments were ‘just’ or ‘unjust’. Arguably, for them, 
                                         
40 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 181. 
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punishments could only be ‘unjust’ with regard to the ‘correct’ 
implementation of ḥadd punishments, that is, when there was a failure in the 
legal procedure leading to the conviction for a ḥadd crime and the eventual 
implementation of the corresponding punishment. Such a failure could 
consist, for instance, in inflicting the punishment in the presence of legal 
doubt (shubha). What, then, was the jurists’ concept of ‘justice’ in the law? 
And how much of this classical view of ‘justice’ remains relevant today? 
While not providing a definite answer to these difficult questions, my thesis, I 
hope, will enrich the debate and thus prove useful. 
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0.4 Literature review 
For this research I have consulted a wide range of primary sources of both 
classical and modern treaties of Sunnī Islamic law. In addition, I have made 
use of works by scholars specialising in Islamic legal theory and Islamic 
substantive law, particularly in relation to the Islamic criminal law of ḥadd. 
For Part II of my research, I also included a number of Amnesty International 
reports.   
 
0.4.1 Primary sources  
I have limited my research to the legal tradition of the Sunnī schools of law.41 
Legal works on ḥadd of the four Sunnī Schools of law, namely, the Ḥanafīs, 
Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs, are examined in part I of this research. In my 
survey of Sunnī legal strategies to justify ḥadd, I have picked out from the 
fiqh literature three lines of argumentation: ḥadd as God’s right (ḥaqq Allāh), 
ḥadd as general and individual prevention (zajr, radʿ), and ḥadd as expiation 
(kaffārāt). I have devoted a chapter to each of these three approaches to the 
question.  
        Each school is represented by up to four prominent jurists of the 
classical and late classical period. From within the Ḥanafī school of law I 
                                         
41 There is no doubt that it would be worthwhile to consult the Shīʿī legal manuals on the 
justifications of ḥudūd punishments. Regrettably, however, such an investigation has proven 
beyond the scope of the present research. 
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have selected al-Sarakhsī (d. 490),42 Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563)43 and Ibn al-
Humām (d. 861/1457). Their important compendia of Ḥanafī law, the K. al-
Mabsūṭ, the K. al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq and the Fatḥ al-qadīr, have all been consulted. 
The Mālikī school of law is represented by its eponym and ‘founder’, the 
Imām Mālik (d. 179/759)44, as well as two adherents to his school: al-Qarāfī 
(d. 684/1285)45 and al-Khurashī (d. 1689). Their legal treaties are called the 
Mudawwana, the K. al-Dhakhīra fī furūʿ al-Mālikiyya and the Ḥāshiyat al-
Khurashī (d. 1689). For the Shāfiʿīs I have consulted the works of Imām al-
Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and of three adherents to his school: al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/ 
1083)46 al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277)47 and al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1595).48 From the 
Ḥanbalī School of law, Ibn Qudāma’s (d. 620/1232) al-Mughnī fī fiqh al-Imām 
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and al-Kāfī has been consulted in Part I.49  
           For Part II of this thesis, I have classified the primary sources 
according to four distinct approaches to the Islamic tradition; defining each 
of these approaches based on the attitude they bring to the classical sources 
of Islamic law (Qurᵓān, ḥadīth, consensus and fiqh).  
                                         
42 Cf. N. Calder, “al-Sarakhsī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. IX, p. 35b.  
43 Cf. J. Schacht, “Ibn Nudjaym”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. III, p. 901a.  
44 Cf. N. Cottrat, “Mālikiyya”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. vi, p. 278a. 
45 Cf. Sh. A. Jackson, “Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ḳarāfī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. ix, 
p. 435b.  
46 Cf. E. Chaumont, “al-Shīrāzī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. ix, p. 481a.  
47 Cf. W. Heffening, “al-Nawawī, Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yaḥyā b. Sharaf b. Murī”, 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. vii, p. 1041b.  
48 Cf. A. Zysow, “al-Ramlī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. viii, p. 424b. 
49 Cf. G. Makdisi, “Ibn Ḳudāma al-Maḳdisī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. iii, p. 
842b.   
 24 
               The first category of primary sources is characterized by the Salafī 
approach, where only a literal interpretation of the Qurᵓān and Sunnah is 
allowed, any other Islamic traditions being completely rejected.50 For 
example, a prominent Salafī scholar, the Pakistani al-Mawdudi, consistently 
holds that 
 
             Islam admits no sovereignty except that of God, and consequently, 
does not recognise any law giver other than Him... The aspect of the legal 
sovereignty of God is … emphasized by the Qurᵓān as pertaining to His being 
the only deity to be worshipped... [In addition to the Qurʾān] the sunnah 
constitutes the only source of divine guidance and law, as no further revealed 
guidance is to come to which it may become necessary for mankind to turn... 
It is this dispensation by Muḥammad that constitutes the supreme law which 
represents the will of God, the real sovereign.51 
 
            As for the Prophetic traditions recorded as his Sunnah, Mawdudi held 
that, next to the Qurʾān, they constitute the only source of Divine guidance 
and law. According to him, the Prophet was not merely the bearer of a 
message but also the divinely appointed leader, the ruler and teacher. The 
duty laid on him, Mawdudi argues, was to explain and illustrate the law of 
God by his words and deeds. The Sunnah is the “entire life-work of the Holy 
Prophet”; in conjunction with the Qurʾān, it “formulates and completes the 
                                         
50 Muhammad Rashid Rida (b. 1865 Ottoman Syria, d. 1935 Egypt), Al-Manar Exegesis. Cf. 
Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Politics (N.Y: Yale University, 1985); 
Abul ʿAala Mawdudi, The Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahor: Islamic Publication, 1980); 
Ibrāhim Sayyid Qutb, In the Shadow of the Qurᵓān: fī ẓilāl al-Qurᵓān (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāᵓ al-
Turāth, 1971), and Khaṣāᵓiṣ al-taṣawwur al-Islāmī wa muqawwimatuh (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 
1960). 
51 Mawdudi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, pp. 72-3. 
 25 
Supreme Law of the real Sovereign, and this Law constitutes what is called 
‘Sharīʿah’ in Islamic terminology.”52    
                    Another type of primary source used in Part II of this 
dissertation is identified as belong to the “conservative” approach toward the 
accumulated tradition of fiqh. This is an approach that values the efforts of 
the classical fuqahāʾ but which tends to stress the more conservative type of 
fiqh (basically, a fiqh that is anti-ijtihād and pro-taqlīd).53 It is exemplified by 
Mohamed S. El-Awa’s Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study (1982). 
El-Awa states that ḥadd punishments are laws that are ordained and fixed by 
God; he also suggests that very little has been said about the nature and 
purpose of Islamic criminal law. He avers that 
 
            Muslim jurists were not interested in discussing these matters as they 
saw these as the province of God alone. Since they have been prescribed in 
specific terms and are to be imposed without question, it was considered 
unnecessary to say much about the purposes they served or the reasons for 
which they were prescribed.54 
 
This statement, however, is misleading. As this thesis shows, jurists intensely 
debated ḥadd and their punishments, despite the fact that they regarded them 
as the province of God.  
                                         
52 Ibid., p. 74. 
53 Muḥammad Oqla, Niẓām al-Islam: al-ʿIbāda wa-al-ʿUqūba: “The Islamic System: the Worship 
and the Punishment” (Amman: Maktabat al-Risāla, 1986); Muḥammad Qadrī, Islamic Penal 
System and Philosophy (Lahore: Minhaj al-Qurᵓān Publication, 1995); El-Awa, Punishment in 
Islamic Law.  
54 El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, pp. 23-4. 
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                 Next come the representatives of what can be called the 
“traditionalist” approach, which view fiqh in a positive light and stresses its 
potential for renewal (pro-ijtihād, anti-taqlīd).55 I selected a number of 
prominent scholars who have written on Islamic criminal law, theory and 
practice. Examples of this approach are the two prominent Egyptian scholars 
Muḥammad Abū Zahra (b. 1898) and ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿŪda (d. 1954), and the 
America-based Egyptian Khaled Abou El Fadl (b.1963). 
          Muḥammad Abū Zahra was a renowned Egyptian Azharī jurist and a 
member of the Azharī Islamic Research Council. His 2006 textbook al-Jarīma 
wa-l-ʿuqūba fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī (“Crime and Punishment in Islamic 
Jurisprudence”),56 consists of two volumes; the first deals with crimes as 
defined by the classical jurists (ḥadd, qiṣāṣ57 and taʿzīr58 offences), the second 
with the corresponding punishments. I classified Abū Zahra as a traditionalist 
jurist who has a favourable view of the fiqh tradition. He makes extensive 
references in his book to the four Sunnī schools of law. ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿŪda’s 
2005 monograph al-Tashrīʿ al-jināᵓī al-Islāmī muqāranan bi-l-qānūn al-waḍʿī 
                                         
55 Yusuf Qaraḍāwī, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (London: Al-Birr Foundation), 
2003); Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Al-Jarīma wa-l-ʿuqūba fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī: “Crime and 
Punishment in Islamic Jurisprudence” (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 2006); ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿŪda, Al-
Tashrīʿ al-jināᵓī al-Islāmī muqāranan bi-l-qānūn al-waḍʿī: “The Islamic Criminal Legislation in 
Comparison to Man-Made Law” (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIllmiyya, 2005); Khaled Abou El-
Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), 
and Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law. 
56 Cf. Abū Zahra, Al-Jarīma wa-l-ʿuqūba fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī. 
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Edition, vol. x, p. 405b. 
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(“The Islamic Criminal Legislation in Comparison to Man-Made Law”)59 also 
consists of two volumes. He argues that Islamic criminal law serves 
deterrence much more than any secular, man-made law.  
            Khaled Abou El-Fadl is one of the outstanding legal thinkers in 
contemporary Islam. His methodology, though aimed at reforming the 
Islamic tradition, is markedly traditionalist. One can see this in his optimistic 
espousal of (certain strands within) the fiqh tradition. For Abou El Fadl, 
Islamic revelation came to announce God’s purpose for humanity in a specific 
sociocultural context, while he also insists on the “interactive dynamic 
between revelation, human reflection upon nature and creation, and human 
perception of socio-historical experience.”60 
 Finally, for Part II of this thesis, I draw on primary sources that can be 
characterized as belong to the “modernist” strand in Islamic thought.61 
Prominent examples of modernist thinkers, all of whom see the tradition of 
fiqh highly critical and advocated a direct return to Islam sources, are Ṣubḥī 
al-Maḥmaṣānī (1906-1986), Fazlur Raḥmān (1919-1988), Muḥammad 
Shahrour (b. 1938) and Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962). 
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0.4.2 Secondary sources 
Historical-critical scholarship on Islamic criminal law is an underdeveloped 
area of academic research, and this dissertation therefore cannot rely on a 
great number of previous studies. However, a number of scholars have 
contributed to the field of inquiry, usually expressing negative views. An 
important early contributor to the Western study of Islamic law, Joseph 
Schacht (d. 1969) was of the opinion that Islam has no criminal law of note, 
that is, that the criminal law elements of the fiqh tradition lacked a coherent 
theory of crime and punishment.62 In his judgement, no “general principles” 
were developed in Islamic criminal law.63 Noel J. Coulson seems to have 
shared many of Schacht’s views, but nonetheless was slightly more positive in 
his assessment, acknowledging the “systematic” character of Islamic legal 
thought. He suggested that the Islamic jurisprudence is the process of 
intellectual activity which ascertains and discovers the terms of the divine 
will and transforms them into a system of legally enforceable rights and 
duties. However, according to Coulson, “within these strict terms of 
reference… tensions and conflicts… arise.”64 In regard to Islamic criminal 
law, Coulson opined that these “tensions and conflicts” were especially 
                                         
62 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 202. 
63 Ibid., p. 187. 
64 Noel J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), p. 2.  
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acute.65 This thesis argues against both Schacht’s and Coulson’s 
understanding of Islamic law as an un-systematic law that accumulated 
randomly in the course of time. 
          Rudolph Peters is the author of the first full survey monograph 
devoted to Islamic criminal law, published over 50 years after Schacht’s 
debatable characterization.66 For part II of this thesis, I constantly consulted 
Peter’s account of crime and punishment in the contemporary debate about 
the applicability of Islamic criminal law today. Peters surveys a number of 
Islamic countries where Islamic law has been applied uninterruptedly, for 
example, Saudi Arabia. In addition, he surveys the Islamic countries and 
states where Islamic criminal law was re-introduced, for example, Iran, 
Sudan, Nigeria’s Zamfara state.67 Furthermore, Peters provides an overview of 
the Muslim jurists’ theory of criminal law and the practice from the sixteenth 
to the twenty-first century. 
             Though not in the form of monographs, a number of other scholars, 
in both east and west, have contributed to the study of Islamic criminal law. 
Mohamed Kamali in, “Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of the Hudud 
Bill of Kelantan” argues that ḥadd in the Qurᵓān is meant to clarify the 
separation between the permissible and prohibited and that the classical 
jurists replaced separation with the idea of fixed punishments. According to 
Kamali, ḥadd Allāh is a broad Qurᵓānic concept which is neither confined to 
                                         
65 Noel J. Coulson, “The State and the Individual in Islamic Law”, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly; vol. 6, Issue 1., (Jan. 1957), p. 49-60.  
66 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law. 
67 Cf. Ibid., p. 142 to 153. 
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punishments nor to a legal framework but provides a comprehensive set of 
guidelines on moral, legal, and religious themes.68 Kamali also accuses the 
early and classical jurists of following a course whereby the broad and 
comprehensive concept of ḥadd is reduced to mean an exactly quantified, 
mandatory and invariable punishment. As he suggests, “the conventional fiqh 
approach to the formulation of the underlying policy toward the hudud has 
failed to be adequately reflective of the Qurᵓānic guidance on this subject”.69 
           Asifa Quraishi’s “Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of 
Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive Perspective” is a critique of the rape laws 
of Pakistan from an Islamic point of view which is careful to include women’s 
perspectives in the analysis. The main thrust of Quraishi’s article concerns the 
inherent gender egalitarianism in Islam that is often ignored by Muslim 
academics, courts and legislatures. This is evident in the example of her 
study, Pakistan, where cultural patriarchy has often determined the 
application of certain Islamic laws, resulting in the very injustice which the 
Qurᵓān so vehemently condemns.70  
                Abdel Salam Sidahmed suggests that in principle Islamic law treats 
men and women on an equal footing with regard to criminal offences under 
the Sharīʻah.71 In my view, this is basically true in the case of the Qurᵓān. 
                                         
68 Kamali, “Punishment in Islamic Law”, p. 204.  
69 Ibid., p. 203. 
70 Asifa Quraishi, “Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Laws of Pakistan from a Woman-
Sensitive Perspective”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 18, p. 287. 
71 Abdel Salam Sidahmed, “Problems in Contemporary Applications of Islamic Criminal law 
Sanctions: the Penalty for Adultery in Relation to Women”, British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies vol. 28, No. 2,  (No., 2001). 
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However, the jurists did not produce an equitable treatment between men 
and women, especially in their discussions of crimes of illegal sexual 
intercourse and apostasy. However, as will be shown in the course of this 
thesis, it is this Islamic jurisprudence which still guides the implementation 
of Sharīʻah in contemporary Muslim societies. 
          Syed Hossein Serajzadeh explains the lower crime rate in Islamic 
countries by referring it to the Islamic criminal law system. Having become 
part of the general moral system, Serajzadeh argues, Islamic criminal law has 
significant influence on the individual and social consciousness of Muslims, 
even when it is not enforced in practice. This influence may act as a 
constraint that inhibits crime and consequently contributes to the low crime 
rate in Islamic societies.72  
               Writing with the eye of an historian of Islamic legal doctrine, 
Robert Gleave argues that the focus of much classical Sunnī juristic 
discussion on iqāmat al-ḥadd (the implementation of the ḥadd punishment) is 
on offering broad reflections about the legitimacy of political rule, rather 
than on the actual prosecution of crime and implementation of punishments. 
Ḥadd punishments, in his view, have never been of great important in legal 
practice. In the course of this research, I have sought to shed some light on 
the jurists’ lack of systematization of the justifications of ḥadd punishments. 
Gleave’s suggestion offers an explanation: the jurists were not interested in 
thinking through the procedural details of ḥadd punishments. As Gleave 
                                         
72  Syed Hossein Serajzadeh, “Islam and Crime: The Moral Community of Muslims”, Journal 
of Arabic and Islamic Studies 4 (2001-2002), p. 127. 
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points out, ḥadd punishments, in the writings of the jurists, seem highly 
ritualistic, as if the jurists simply refuse to subject them to the usual processes 
of legal reasoning. This ritualism serves both religious and more overtly 
political purposes. This is indicated not only by the detailed stipulations 
regarding the punitive ‘ritual’ (the size of the stone, the exact characteristics 
of the whip etc.), but more fundamentally by the idea that the victim of ḥadd 
crime is God rather than the individual, and that the performance of the ḥadd 
is a form of expiation for the punished individual.73 
               A recent contribution to the study of Islamic law, Anver M. Emon’s 
Islamic Natural Law Theories (2010), applies the theory of natural law to 
Islam. Natural law, Emon holds, is able to identify conditions and principles 
of practical right-mindedness, of what is good and proper among men and in 
individual conduct. He applies the natural law theory as a framework of 
analysis as well as an evaluative basis by which to distinguish good conduct 
from bad conduct. Emon argues that, in the religious context, one should not 
be surprised to find that theology and legal philosophy are not separate 
disciplines; on the contrary, they influence each other.74 While different legal 
traditions come to the topic of natural law from different conceptual vantage 
points, one point they all seem to share is a concern for the ontological 
authority of reason in law. In this perspective, Islamic law, and by extension 
Islamic criminal law, is not entirely alien to the idea of natural human rights. 
                                         
73 Robert Gleave, “Public Violence, State Legitimacy: the Iqāmat al-Ḥadd and the Sacred 
State”, p. 256-75. 
74 Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 7. 
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Indeed, in a separate article, Emon extends the theory of natural law into the 
legal conception of God’s rights in ḥadd laws.75 He shows how Sunnī jurists 
primarily from the 2nd/8th to the 10th/16th centuries used the conceptual 
heuristic of the “rights of God” and the “rights of individuals” (ḥuqūq Allāh, 
and ḥuqūq al-ʻibād) as an interpretive mechanism to frame their naturalistic 
assumptions and apply them in legal analysis to create and distribute rights, 
duties, and public commitments. 
                Focusing her attention on the caveats that the fuqahāʾ developed to 
preclude an indiscriminate implementation of the ḥadd punishments, Intisar 
A. Rabb examines the legal maxim “avoid the ḥadd punishments by strength 
of doubt”. She argues that as soon as the jurists began to use this maxim, 
which is not found in either Qurʾān or the Sunnah, a significant shift in 
claims to the legal authority and the asserted scope of judicial discretion 
occurred, as jurists debated whether and how to resolve legal and factual 
doubt. This, according to Intisar, was largely motivated by the behaviour of 
the political authorities who had exercised wide discretion over criminal 
matters and used it to benefit the elite. To resist such attempts of 
authoritarianism, many jurists promoted an egalitarian “jurisprudence of 
doubt”, by insisting on criminal liability for high-status offenders and 
                                         
75 Anver Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq al-ʻIbād: A Legal Heuristic for a Natural Rights 
Regime”, Islamic Law and Society 13,3 (2006). 
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heightening claims of the authoritativeness of the ḥadd maxim by declaring it 
to be a ḥadīth.76 
         Like Rabb’s article, Christian Lange Justice, Punishment and the Medieval 
Muslim Imagination (2008) examines the attempts of the fuqahāʾ to 
circumscribe the application of ḥadd in Sunnī law. Lange lays out the 
differences in Ḥanafī and Shāfiʻī conceptions of the permissibility of 
analogical reasoning (qiyās) in the law of ḥadd.77 He presents the factors that 
prevented the Ḥanafī jurists from accepting analogical reasoning in ḥadd. 
Lange’s analysis is restricted to the debate of Muslim jurists in the “late-
classical” period of Islamic law under reign of the Seljuq dynasty (5th/11-
6th/12th c.). In this research, namely Chapter 3, I take this debate in a 
different direction, by focussing on debates between the Ḥanafīs and the 
other schools about whether ḥadd punishments can serve as expiatory acts 
(kaffārāt). 
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0.5 Research Methodology 
This research proposes to investigate the classical tradition of Muslim jurists’ 
teachings about ḥadd and in particular, whether and how they sought to 
justify them. The goal of the research is to elucidate the difference and 
variation in the jurists’ legal opinions and to critically compare these 
traditional teachings to modern attitudes toward ḥadd. 
        Throughout this research, I carry out legal discourse analysis, offering a 
comprehensive and detailed reading and explanation of how fiqh 
conceptualizes the law of ḥadd. This involves a careful reconstruction of legal 
doctrines that are often highly complex, and paying close attention to the 
differences between the legal schools (madhāhib). A big challenge is to find 
an adequate vocabulary in English to capture these doctrines. 
Methodologically speaking, however, this thesis does not merely 
reproduce the legal ‘insider’ position of Muslim jurists, whether classical or 
modern. As suggested by Kevin Reinhart in a recent discussion of method in 
the study of Islamic law, scholars should not simply mimic the traditional 
discourse of the fuqahāʾ, but apply the methods of historical-critical studies to 
the fiqh tradition.78 I understand this to mean that that scholars of Islamic law 
must seek to apply concepts and categorizations to Islamic law that may not 
be found, at least explicitly, in the tradition itself. The most important way in 
                                         
78 Kevin Reinhart, “Law”, in Key themes for the study of Islam, ed. J. Elias (Oxford: Oneworld, 
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which this dissertation seeks to implement Reinhart’s suggestion is to 
distinguish between three different theories of justification: a theory of 
deterrence (both individual and general), a theory of expiation, and a theory 
of ḥadd as a sacred obligation (a muqaddar norm, as the jurists say). 
Secondly, I also take critical aim at the classical doctrines by pointing out 
some of their internal inconsistencies. None of the classical (and indeed few 
of the modern authors) have approached the Islamic law of ḥadd in such a 
way – a fact which has often forced me to be a bit speculative in uncovering, 
often in between the lines, the purposes that the jurists and legal thinkers 
attribute to ḥadd punishments. 
           Finally, Part II of this thesis takes a general interest in the 
questions and approaches developed in the postcolonial study of Islam, in 
particular the question how traditional knowledge, such as is imbedded in 
the classical ḥadd doctrine, is accepted and/or rejected by thinkers writing in 
the context of the postcolonial age, marked as it is by an increased 
interaction between east and west, and by the impact of Western ideas and 
forms of government on the Islamic world. In sum, the methods embraced in 




0.6 Chapters outline 
This research consists of two main parts. Part I concentrates on the classical 
tradition of Muslim jurists’ theories about the religious and socio-political 
justifications of ḥadd punishments. This encompasses three main chapters. In 
Chapter 1 I examine some of the basic classical assumptions about the 
concept of ḥadd Allāh, lit. “God’s boundary”. For many jurists, the severe 
corporal and capital punishments of ḥadd were required because ḥadd norms 
were simply the province of God as “things decreed (muqaddarāt)” by Him. 
Ḥadd, in this light, appears as the immutable right of God, which must not be 
questioned in terms of purpose, wisdom (ḥikma) or logic. However, in the 
absence of any specific indication in the Qurᵓān that ḥadd punishments are a 
‘fixed’ right of God, I attempt in this chapter to describe a process that takes 
place simultaneously among the jurists, namely, a process of rationalisation 
of both Islamic law and Islamic theology. Jurists in fact discussed the ability 
of man to discern God’s intention in giving humankind the gift of revelation. 
    In this context, I discuss the tradition of legal thought about “rights” 
in Islamic law (ḥuqūq). Etymologically, the term ḥaqq signifies both an 
obligation on one person and a claim of right on another. Classical jurists 
created different categories of rights and applied different rules to each 
category. I argue in this chapter that early Muslim jurists established various 
legal rules that were already founded in their understanding of the Islamic 
values of dignity and honour, particularly in the light of their significance for 
individuals and society as a whole. Furthermore, this chapter examines the 
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jurists’ efforts in balancing the competing interests of social and individual 
interests. I also argue that the classical jurists attempted to ensure that ḥadd 
laws as a criminal system upheld and, when necessary, balance both society’s 
needs (for example, by ensuring social stability) and private interests (for 
example, those of protecting the honour and dignity of the individual). 
Despite the fact that early jurists’ insisted, on a theoretical level, on the 
immutability of the ḥadd law, I demonstrate that early Muslim jurists did not 
hesitate to set and create rules and caveats, often with little connection to 
Qurᵓānic or Prophetic precedents, to avoid a broad implementation of ḥadd 
punishments. 
              In Chapter 2, I examine the discourse of certain jurists who justify 
ḥadd punishments by claiming that they serve general deterrence (zajr) and 
individual deterrence (radʿ). I argue that Sunnī jurists characterise ḥadd 
punishments as deterrents (zawājir) particularly when they seek to justify the 
most severe ḥadd punishments, that is, capital and severe corporal 
punishments. I highlight that the classical jurists regularly debate God’s 
purpose behind legislating these severe punishments. The majority of these 
jurists agree that God’s ultimate aim is to evacuate the earth from obscene 
and indecent acts forbidden in revelation. 
        However, as I suggest, Muslim jurists’ assumptions about ḥadd 
punishments – that is, that they always deter people from (re-)committing the 
crime – was not realistic but often inaccurate. One does not even have to rely 
on ‘modern’ criminal law theories about the deterring power of punishment. 
In fact, the classical Muslim jurists themselves were involved in endless 
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dispute about this – which shows that they were well aware of the fragility of 
arguments about deterrence. One can see this in their discussions about 
repeated ḥadd offences (are they to be punished repeatedly?) and the overlap 
of various ḥadd offences (which offence must be punished?). I argue that the 
jurists themselves had an inkling of the inability of ḥadd punishments to 
achieve individual prevention. 
      It is true, however, that such an inkling was never systematically 
pursued by the jurists or turned into a fully developed argument. There is no 
sustained single attempt to question the inefficacy of ḥadd punishment and 
whether it functions as a deterrent for ḥadd offenders. Deterrence is 
questioned in the context of khilāf, or disagreement between the legal 
schools, but is never doubted as such. Theories of deterrence will vary 
depending on whether schools follow a direct literal interpretation of the 
Qurᵓān and the Prophetic Sunnah, or whether they take other sources of legal 
norms into consideration, such as consensus (ijmāʿ), analogical extension 
(qiyās), or the commonweal (al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma). 
              Chapter 3 examines the justification of ḥadd punishments as 
expiatory acts to amend and atone for the committed ḥadd offences. Although 
this particular justification is probably the most widespread conventional 
justification for the ḥadd punishment it was, however, the least discussed 
among Sunnī jurists. This may be due to the inclusion of both the ḥudūd and 
the kaffārāt among the muqaddarāt, that is, the “divinely ordained norms”. I 
demonstrate throughout the chapter that ḥadd punishments and kaffārāt were 
viewed in close conceptual proximity to each other and that the notion of 
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ḥadd law was conveyed as the sanctioned law that is imposed (muqaddar) 
upon humankind by the sovereign decree of God. 
                 Part II of the research consists of two chapters. It is devoted to 
examining modern and current debates about the implementability of ḥadd 
punishments. In Chapter 4 I examine a number of trends within contemporary 
Muslim thought and attempt to show how representatives of each of these 
trends position themselves vis-à-vis traditional legal doctrines regarding the 
ḥadd punishments. While the question as to how contemporary thinkers 
relate to traditional Islamic jurisprudence is of great importance, Chapter 5 
discusses how new emphases and foci in the legal debate, largely unrelated to 
the traditional knowledge produced in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), have 
vehemently emerged in recent debates on the implementation of ḥadd laws. I 
survey the countries where Islamic criminal law is enacted and implemented. 
This survey includes recent examples of ḥadd corporal and capital 
punishments carried out in these countries, examples that are often reported 
by Amnesty International and other human rights organisations. 
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Ch. 1: Ḥadd punishments as God’s rights (Ḥaqq Allāh) 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter serves to introduce basic juristic concepts in the legal 
doctrine of ḥadd, in particular the notion that ḥadd punishments are either a 
“right of God” (ḥaqq Allāh) or a “right of the individual” (ḥaqq al-ādamī), or 
indeed both, sometimes to equal, and sometimes to differently weighed 
degrees. Throughout this endeavour to systematise fiqh strategies for the 
justification of ḥadd punishments, a key theme is the juristic assumption that 
ḥadd punishments must be seen as things once and for all determined, or 
decreed by God (muqaddara), representing His absolute sovereignty in 
forbidding and permitting acts in the Qurᵓān, and His absolute “right” to be 
obeyed. A basic juristic justification of ḥadd punishments consists in declaring 
ḥadd ordinances to be norms that are decreed or “divinely ordained” by God 
(muqaddarāt), that is, fixed and immutable norms. But did this mean that 
there was no scope for legal reasoning at all in the law of ḥadd? After all, 
Muslim jurists held that the ultimate purpose of this Divine law is to maintain 
religion, life, offspring, reason and property – did this assumption not apply 
to ḥadd?  
  While in this chapter I emphasize justifications of ḥadd punishment 
as the right of God (ḥaqq Allāh), I also wish to draw attention to the fact that 
Islamic law is not ‘totalitarian’ in the sense that, for example, the rights of 
God always override the rights of the individual. As I show, in many instances 
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the opposite is in fact the case. I also wish to introduce the basic concept of 
the intentionality of the Law and of God’s purpose in legislating it, because it 
serves as an important backdrop, not only to the rest of this chapter, but to 
the whole thesis. The chapter’s structure and objectives are as follows. 
First, I briefly introduce the historical debate on how early and late 
Muslim classical jurists viewed the aims and the objectives of the Divine Law 
of Sharīʻah. Thus, the concept of maṣlaḥa (the common good) will be dealt 
with as a legal principle. Due to the fact that classical jurists treated ḥadd 
punishments as a province of the law that is uniquely under the control of 
God, the reference to the jurists’ legal dispute about God’s purpose in 
revealing the law (His ratio legis) and whether this is discernible through 
revelation or reason is of great importance to this endeavour. The tension 
between God’s absolute power in decreeing His law and the human need to 
interpret and ‘think through’ the law prompts many questions: To what 
degree does the law of ḥadd depend on an exact knowledge of God’s intention 
in revealing the law? To what extent can God’s intention be known, in order 
that we can determine His rights? What did Muslim theologians think about 
the concept of “God’s limits or boundaries”? Does this concept reveal itself to 
have different meanings in theology and law? Were the rights of God 
comprehensible to Muslim jurists? Can ḥadd punishments be set aside or 
become modified but God’s intension still be fulfilled? Do ḥadd punishments 
hold intrinsic value in themselves? Can God’s rights be rationalised from both 
a theological and law perspective? 
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          Secondly, after elaborating on the ways in which early Muslim 
theologians and jurists responded to the dilemma of the human capacity in 
comprehending the ratio legis of the divine norms, I examine the juristic 
justification of ḥadd punishments as the rights of God. I exemplify this 
through an analysis of a selected number of ḥadd offences and punishments, 
all of which are justified as rights belonging to God. Finally, I discuss a 
number of juristic exceptions: cases in which Muslim jurists make the ḥadd 
punishment inoperative, regardless of the fact that they consistently held that 
ḥadd punishments are “decreed” by God and that the punishment is 
immutable and fixed. 
 
1.2 The Maqāṣid al-Sharīʻah and the concept of Maṣlaḥa 
According to the majority of Muslim Sunnī jurists, God has objectives 
in legislating His law, the Sharīʻah. God’s law is a law which encompasses 
aims and purposes (maqāṣid, sg. maqṣad); if this law is correctly 
implemented, these aims and purposes will be achieved. These laws, 
according to the jurists’ manuals, are to bring about the maṣlaḥa (public 
interest, or commonweal) of humankind: “the laws were instituted only for 
the benefit of the believers in this world and the next”.79 The concept of 
maṣlaḥa has a central importance in the legal debate about the purpose of 
God’s legislation. Generally speaking, maṣlaḥa encompasses the welfare and 
                                         
79 Cf. Robert Gleave, “Maqāṣidal Sharīʿah (a)”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. xii, 
p. 569b. 
 44 
commonweal of Muslims, the “general good” or the “public interest”.80 The 
majority of Muslim jurists held that anything that helps to avert harm (ḍarar) 
and furthers human welfare (manfaʿa) is equated with maṣlaḥa. 
Gleave indicates that, when one claims that the Sharīʻah has maqāṣid, 
or is all about maqāṣid, one is making a statement concerning the rational 
nature of the Sharīʻah: that God intends to bring about a certain state of 
affairs by instituting a particular law, and that this relationship between the 
law and the law’s larger aims, or purposes, is discernible by human reason.81 
According to Khadduri, the Mālikī scholar Anas b. Mālik (d. 179/795) is 
reputed to have been the first jurist to make decisions directly on the basis of 
maṣlaḥa “through the use of istiṣlāḥ or al-maṣlaḥa al-mursala.”82 However, he 
also suggests that “no clear evidence… has yet come to light indicating that 
Mālik had used maṣlaḥa as a concept of law”,83 which indicates that the use 
of maṣlaḥa as a legal institution was only introduced at a later point in time. 
Similarly, Opwis relates that rulings based on considerations of maṣlaḥa or 
the social good are found in legal writings as old as the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th 
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kharāj) was imposed on it […] the caliph came to the conclusion that the interests of the 
community as a whole would be better served if the Sawād were brought under the state 
control would, he argued, bring about greater welfare and utility for the believers.” Cf. 
Madjid Khadduri, “Maṣlaḥa”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. vi, p. 738b. 
83 Khadduri, “Maṣlaḥa”, p. 738b. 
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century.84 Gleave argues that the concept of maqāṣid originated in attempts of 
early Muslim theologians to rationalise both theology and law, particularly 
the Muʿtazilī attempts to rationalise the divine message. He argues that 
 
[t]he doctrine of maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah has its roots in early Muslim 
attempts to rationalise both theology and law. In terms of the theology, the 
ideas of the Muʿtazilīs undoubtedly influenced the emergence of the maqāṣid 
doctrine. The Muʿtazilī doctrines that God’s decrees are subject to, rather 
than the origin of, the ideas of good and evil ultimately resulted in an 
assertion that God is compelled to act in the interests of humankind. His law 
must be of benefit to his creation, for it was not, His qualities of justice and 
goodness would be compromised.85 
 
The breakthrough for the concept of maṣlaḥa in the history of Islamic 
legal theory, according to Opwis, came in the late 5th/11th century when the 
Shāfiʿī jurist Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) “defined 
maṣlaḥa in a tangible manner”.86 In al-Mustaṣfā fī ʿilm al-uṣūl, al-Ghazālī 
approached a definition of the aims of the Lawgiver by exploring the term 
maṣlaḥa. He writes: 
 
         Maṣlaḥa is about bringing about benefit (manfaʿa) or averting 
harm (maḍarra). What I mean by maṣlaḥa is everything that preserves the 
intention of the Law, and the intention of the Law for people is five-fold: 
preservation of people’s religion (dīn), life (nafs), reason (ʿaql), offspring 
                                         
84 Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory”, p. 187. 
85 Gleave, “Maḳāṣid al-Sharīʿah”, p. 569b. 
86 Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Legal Theory”, p. 188. 
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(nasl) and property (māl). The contrary is regarded as corruption (mafsada) 
and to prevent this is required for maṣlaḥa.87 
 
Al-Ghazālī argued that God’s purpose in revealing the Divine Law is to 
preserve for mankind the five essential elements of their well being, namely, 
religion, human life intellect, offspring and property. These five essential 
elements are considered “necessities” (ḍarūriyyat); they must be protected in 
order to achieve maṣlaḥa. It is relevant for our concept that al-Ghazālī 
includes ḥadd punishments among the examples of this: killing the apostate 
and the ḥadd punishments for drinking alcohol, adultery, slander, theft and 
banditry.88 Opwis argues that al-Ghazālī’s conception of maṣlaḥa as the 
purpose of God’s law and linking it to the preservation of five tangible 
criteria was a significant development. This is because, as Opwis argues, his 
theory of maṣlaḥa reconciled two intellectual approaches in Islamic thought 
toward moral knowledge, the rationalist and the subjectivist position. The 
rationalist position had held that humans could understand the rationality of 
Sharīʿah norms, while the subjectivist position had argued that their 
rationality was only accessible to the mind of God Himself.89 
        The Mālikī uṣūlī scholars Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) 
and al-Shāṭibī (790/1388), two important late-medieval theorists of 
                                         
87 Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl (Cairo: Al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amiriyya, 1904), 
p. 287. 
88 Al-Ghazālī, Mustaṣfā, pp. 287-8. 
89 Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Legal Theory”, p. 188. 
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maṣlaḥa,90 proposed when writing about the maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah that “the 
obligations entailed by the law are intended for the purpose of fulfilling its 
objectives among human beings.”91 In reference to the Lawgiver, the term 
‘wisdom’, or ‘wise purpose’ (ḥikmah) is used synonymously with the term 
intention (qaṣd), even though “jurisprudents tend to use the term ‘wise 
purpose’ more frequently than the term ‘intention’”.92 For al-Shāṭibī, these 
objectives of the Law fall under one of three categories: essentials, exigencies, 
and embellishments.93 With regard to the essential objectives or interests 
these are basically al-Ghazālī’s ḍarūriyyāt and consist of the following: 
religion, human life, progeny, material wealth and human reason. Every 
religion prescribes a means of preserving these five entities.94 The five 
aforementioned essential interests are viewed as the foundations of all 
worldly interest. Thus, the whole aim of Islamic legislation is to promote the 
                                         
90 Maribel Fierro, “al-Shāṭibī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. ix, p. 364a. 
91 Ahmad al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic 
Law (London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005), p. 108. 
92 Al-Raysuni proposes that “the natural sphere for attention to the objectives of Islamic law 
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laying foundations”. Cf. Ahmad Al-Raysuni, Imam Al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objectives 
and Intents of Islamic Law, p. 2.  
93 Ibid, p. 108.  
94 Al-Raysuni writes: “Islamic law undertakes to preserve essential interests, as well as others, 
in two complimentary ways. The first of these is by preserving their existence, that is, by 
legislating that which will bring them into being, then perpetuating and nurturing their 
existence. The second of these ways is by protecting them from annihilation, that is, by 
preventing that which would lead to their disappearance, destruction or neutralization, be it 
a presently existing reality or something which is anticipated”. Cf. Ibid., p. 109 
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welfare of the believers, and is profoundly embedded in preserving the five 
essentials: religion, human life, progeny, material wealth and human reason. 
 It is noteworthy that the theory of maṣlaḥa as the ultimate ‘source’ of 
the Law allows for a certain flexibility in how the Law is applied. For 
example, the Ḥanbalī jurist al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) wrote that “all rules 
derived from analogy are susceptible to change and development if the aims 
of the Lawgiver are not fulfilled.”95 Accordingly, the law as presented by the 
proponents of the theory of maṣlaḥa can be changed and adapted to changing 
circumstances through the use of analogical reasoning. 
Maṣlaḥa is the unchanging ‘purpose’ (qaṣd) of God; by extension, it is 
His will and His ‘right’ that the objectives of the law, especially the five 
essentials, are at all times protected. As the example of al-Ghazālī illustrates, 
the jurists would often see ḥadd punishments as being in complete harmony 
with their understanding of the Lawgiver’s objectives that are at the centre of 
the theory of the maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah. In fact to Muslim jurists, the ḥadd 
punishments seemed to have a direct and privileged connection with the 
“highest objectives” of God. This theme will be further explored later in this 
thesis, including in the sections devoted to contemporary legal discourses on 
ḥadd. 
 
1.3 The concept of rights (al-ḥuqūq) in the Islamic Legal Tradition 
                                         
95 Cf. Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Legal Theory”, p. 195. On al-Ṭūfī’s biography, see 
W. P. Heinrichs, “Al-Ṭufī” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. x, p. 588a. 
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Etymologically, the term ḥaqq (pl. ḥuqūq) refers to something 
incumbent upon one to undertake. The Arabic expression: “there is a ḥaqq on 
you to do s.th.” (ḥaqq ʿalayka an tafʿala shayʾ) means: “you are obliged to do 
s.th.” (wajaba ʿalayka). Consequently, ḥaqq refers to a duty, either toward an 
individual or the community. According to the jurists, in some cases, the 
interest may be a private one; in others it may be a public one. However, 
ḥaqq signifies both an obligation toward one person and a claim or right vis-
à-vis another.96 
      The concepts of ḥaqq Allāh and ḥaqq al-ʿibād are not Qurᵓānic or 
Prophetic concepts, rather they are concepts coined by early Muslim jurists.  
Emon argues that Muslim jurists used the expression “ḥaqq Allāh” to refer to 
the well-being of society, that is, as a shortcut for communal, ‘public’ interest. 
This right of the community must be upheld by the imam or ruler, given his 
power over society. As Emon states, “[i]n light of this juristic usage, the 
phrase ‘rights of God’ is used here as a term of art to represent the social 
good that must be effectuated by the imām.”97 
Emon is conscious of the fact that ḥaqq signifies both an obligation 
and a claim or right. However, he objects to the translation of ḥuqūq Allāh as 
“rights of God” as this translation, he argues, is inappropriate and relatively 
inaccurate. His rejection rests on the Sunnī jurists who held that, 
                                         
96 Muḥammad Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1992), vol. 10, pp. 50-1; Wehr, 
Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, pp. 191-2.  
97 Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq Al-ʿIbād”, p. 329.  
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theologically speaking; God does not litigate, and is free from any need.98 The 
theoretical significance of the ḥaqq Allāh vs. ḥaqq al-ʿibād distinction, Emon 
argues, is best understood in light of a context peculiar to jurists, namely the 
context of legal arguments, reasoning, and analysis. He argues that “jurists 
were embedded in a social context; but they were also products of a specific 
legal education and training. This legal context gave them a language and 
conceptual grammar that serve as a window to their understanding of the 
legal enterprise itself.”99  
    According to the Islamic legal theory of ḥuqūq, the general theory of 
“rights” is subdivided into three categories, each category having its own 
exclusive legal implications. These categories are as follows: (1) the absolute 
right belonging to God (ḥaqq Allāh), (2) the individual’s right (ḥaqq khāliṣ lil-
ʿabd), (3) a mixed right of God and the individual (ḥaqq mukhtalaf fīh). 
According to the majority of the four Sunnī schools of law, God’s right is 
interpreted as His explicit commands and prohibitions in the Qurᵓān and the 
Sunnah. Sunnī jurists held that “the punishment for the forbidden deeds 
committed by people is a right that belongs to God (al-jazāᵓ ʿalā al-afʿāl al-
muḥarrama min al-ʿibād yakūnu ḥaqqan li-Allāh)”.100 Since God legislated the 
forbidden deeds in the Qurᵓān, their punishments are projected to be His 
exclusive rights. 
                                         
98 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 7. 
99 Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq Al-ʿIbād”, p. 334. 
100  Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 155. 
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As to the individual’s right in ḥadd laws, the individual’s interests are 
limited mainly to retaliation (qiṣāṣ) and in the false accusation of committing 
illegal sexual intercourse (qadhf). While not all of God’s rights have an 
element of an individual right in them, the classical jurists advocated that in 
every individual’s right there is a right of God (wa mā min ḥaqq lil-ʿabd ila wa 
fihi ḥaqq li Allāh).101 The mixed right, the third category, is when God’s right 
and the individual’s interest are in conflict, for example, in the case of 
brigandage (ḥirāba). 
According to the four Sunnī schools of law, ḥadd offences are those for 
which the violator (muʿtadī) is subjected to a fixed punishment, which is 
required to satisfy a right of God (ʿuqūba muqaddara wājiba ḥaqqan li-
Allāh).102 The jurists also included rules and norms that uphold purely public 
interests, “to rid the world from transgression and abominations” (ikhlāᵓ al-
arḍ ʿan al-maʿāṣī wa al-fawāḥish), ending up by identifying them as ḥuqūq 
Allāh.103 Accordingly, the rights of God represented those public interests that 
primarily served the public well-being (for example, security, stability and 
order). Moreover, these interests, according to the classical jurists, were 
legislated with the aim of ridding the world of corruption (ikhlāᵓ al-arḍ min 
al-mafāsid) and to maintain a higher degree of security and order. 
Furthermore, a right of God represents the public interest because the given 
                                         
101 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 394. 
102 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 155; Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 3; Al-Shīrāzī, 
al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 444. 
103 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 8. 
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role to the Muslim ruler by allowing him to impose duties on individuals and 
the ruling authority. As Emon argues, “ḥuqūq Allāh/ḥuqūq al-ʿibād debates 
manifest an early regime of Islamic natural rights that illustrates the priority 
of neither the right nor the good, but rather the good and the right are 
symbiotically related.”104 
    In order to show how these general ideas are applied in the law, I 
turn to the juristic treatment of a number of specific ḥadd offences and the 
punishments that are associated with them, namely, the ḥadd of theft 
(sariqa), of false accusation of illegal sexual intercourse (qadhf), and of 
banditry (ḥirāba). 
 
1.3.1 The example of the punishment for sariqa 
   In this this section I examine the justification of the ḥadd 
punishment for theft (sariqa) as it is developed in classical fiqh writings. The 
stress here is on the idea that this punishment is a right that belongs to God. 
The general fiqh rule is that once ḥadd offences, with the exception of qadhf, 
reach the Islamic judge (qāḍī), the nature of the right changes from being 
purely a private right to being public;105 this is in consideration of the role of 
the Muslim ruler and the institutions of his authority to effectuate the public 
good. 
  The Sunnī jurists’ view that ḥadd is a right or a claim of God (ḥaqq 
Allāh) has a number of doctrinal and procedural consequences that I want to 
                                         
104 Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq al-ʿIbād”, pp. 327-8. 
105 Ibid., p. 344 
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describe briefly before focusing in on theft proper. First, this concerns the 
nature of the prosecution of the crime. In reference to the offence of zinā, 
Sunnī jurists held that the penalty for illegal sexual relations is purely a right 
of God. Now, nobody can claim to ‘represent’ God and litigate in His stead for 
‘His’ right to be satisfied. Therefore, the ruling authority may not actively 
prosecute the offence; it can initiate the charges against those who have 
engaged in illegal sex only in case of confession or once four witnesses report 
the case to the judge. Obviously, the interest underlying the zinā punishment 
was seen by the jurists not to involve any private interests. Instead, the aim is 
to uphold the common good.106 
Secondly, ḥadd punishments as rights of God cannot be pardoned once 
the offence is brought before the judge, for nobody can assume to speak in 
God’s name in the matter.107 For instance, the Ḥanafī Ibn Nujaym held that 
the ḥadd punishment is never to be waived, especially when the Islamic 
authority has been notified about the committed offence (al-ḥadd la yuqbal al-
isqāṭ muṭlaqan baʿda thubūti sababihi ʿinda al-ḥākim wa ʿalā hadhā yubnā ʿala 
ʿadam jawāz al-shafāʿa fīh).108 According to Ibn Nujaym,  “ḥadd is a 
punishment determined by God (al-ḥadd ʿuqūba muqaddara li-Allāh); 
therefore, pardoning is completely inadmissible (li-dhālika lā yaṣluḥu fīhi al-
                                         
106 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 284-5. 
107 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 463; Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 3; Al-Shīrāzī, 
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108 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 3. 
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ʿafw).”109 This is based on a ḥadīth according to which the Prophet 
condemned the Companion ʾUsāma’s intervention in a theft offence 
committed by a woman.110 
        Thirdly, once the judgment is passed, the Islamic ruler (imām) 
has a special involvement in carrying out the punishment. In reference to the 
ḥadd of illegal sexual intercourse, the consensus of the jurists is that the zinā 
punishment is a right belonging to God; from this follows that the Muslim 
ruler is the only person entitled to inflict the punishment (al-aṣl tafwīḍ al-
ḥadd ilā al-imām li-annahu ḥaqq li-Allāh).111 The exclusive prerogative (and 
duty) of the Muslim ruler to inflict the ḥadd punishment was seen by jurists 
as an important characteristic of the law of ḥadd. One senses here that the 
idea of the right of God is closely tied in with the notion of the public 
interest, which the ruler is obliged to uphold. Similarly, the capital 
punishment for apostasy and the corporal punishment for theft are only to be 
implemented by the Muslim ruler (la yumlikuhā ilā al-imām).112 
       A final relevant characteristic of the ḥadd rules regarding theft is 
that the ḥadd punishment for theft can only be based on two different kinds 
of evidence. This first kind is that two just witnesses testify that the thief has 
stolen an object which neither belonged to him nor had been entrusted to 
him. The victim’s presence in the process of adjudication is required to 
                                         
109 Ibid., p. 3. 
110  Aḥmad Al-Nasāᵓī, Sunan al-Nasāᵓī (Stuttgart: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, 2000), vol. 
2, p. 796. 
111 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 388. 
112 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 51; Al-Shīrāzī, al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 388. 
 55 
validate the witnesses’ testimony and avoid any doubts about the ownership 
of the stolen object.113 The second way is for the thief to confess of 
committing the theft. This confession is directly in the presence of the judge, 
and the owner of the stolen property does not have to be present for it.114 
 
1.3.1.1 The Ḥanafī view 
According to the fuqahāʾ, amputation for theft is stipulated in the 
Qurᵓānic verse that reads: “regarding the male and female thieves, cut their 
hands as punishment for what they did as a warning from God” (Q 5:38). The 
consensus among the Ḥanafī jurists is that if a thief retains possession of the 
stolen good, he is not only subjected to amputation but must also return the 
stolen property to its owner (idhā quṭiʿa fa-kānat al-sariqa bāqiya ruddat ilā 
mālikiha).115 The corporal punishment for theft that is stipulated in the 
Qurᵓān and practiced by the Prophet according to the Sunnah is the 
amputation of the right hand. The Ḥanafīs held that the amputation of the 
right hand for theft was a punishment for having invoked a pure right of God, 
an offence so serious that the ruling authority must redress it regardless of 
the victim’s wishes.116 This position is endorsed by a ḥadīth according to 
                                         
113 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 122. 
114 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6. p. 214. 
115 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 113. 
116  In this section I focus on the juristic discussion of the offence of theft in as much as it is 
dealt with and redressed by the Islamic authority. In other words, I have examined the 
justification of the ḥadd punishment for theft as a ‘pure’ right of God, not as the ‘mixed right’ 
where the private right of an individual is violated simultaneously with ‘God’s right’. A 
detailed discussion of the private right to compensation (ghurm or ḍamān) in theft cases, 
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which the Prophet said: “Excuse the ḥudūd among yourselves, but whatever 
ḥadd reaches me I must fulfil.”117 In other words, if individuals wish to forego 
their right to bring evidence for a ḥadd offence before the judge they are free 
to do so. But once the accusation has reached the judge, he is obliged to act 
upon it, examine the evidence and pass judgment. The jurists stress time and 
again that victims of ḥadd crimes must file a petition to the Islamic authority 
to seek redress if they wish the offence to be prosecuted.118  
All Sunni schools of law held the juristic opinion that if the stolen 
property remains with the thief, his right hand is amputated and he must 
return the stolen property. However, unlike the other schools of law, the 
Ḥanafīs argued that if the stolen property is destroyed (talifat) before the 
thief is brought to justice, the thief is not subjected to compensation in 
addition to amputation. Instead, the thief is liable only to amputation for 
violating a right belonging to God.119 The Ḥanafīs based their position on a 
ḥadīth according to which the Prophet said that “if the thief’s hand is 
amputated he is not to pay compensation (idhā quṭiʿat yad al-sāriq lam 
yughram)”.120 Ḥanafī jurists held that the Qurᵓān (5:38) requires only one 
punishment, that is, the amputation for the right hand. For them, to impose 
liability for compensation in addition to the amputation not only contravenes 
                                                                                                                     
including in cases where the stolen property is consumed or otherwise destroyed, is offered 
by Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq al-ʿIbād”, pp. 358-72. 
117 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, vol. 2, p. 731. 
118 Al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 171; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 122. 
119 Al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, pp. 185, 186. 
120 Ibid., p. 186. 
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the Qurᵓānic stipulation of a single punishment, but also violates the ḥadīth 
tradition that asserts that no compensation is due from a thief who has 
suffered amputation.121 This may reflect the Ḥanafīs’ reluctance to speculate 
about the things decreed by God (muqaddarāt). As the Ḥanafīs stressed, the 
muqaddarāt in the law are “things whose purpose cannot be apprehended in 
order to infer judgments (lā yumkinu taʿaqqulu l-maʿnā li-l-taqdīr)".122 As in 
other areas of the law of ḥadd, the Ḥanafīs here advocate a reduced and more 
lenient approach to the ḥadd punishments. 
     Pursuing a similar line of caution, the Ḥanafīs regarded the issue of 
compensation as marred by doubt. In legal terminology, there is “legal 
doubt” (shubha) in claiming there must be compensation in addition to the 
corporal punishment. However, according to a well-established legal maxim 
(qāʿida), legal doubt invalidates ḥadd.123 To explain their position in greater 
detail, they acknowledged that the theft offence violates both the right of 
God and the private right of the individual. Where the stolen goods remain in 
the thief’s hand, the thief must return them to the owner in fulfillment of the 
private right, while suffering the amputation satisfies the right of God. The 
Qurᵓānic verse stipulates amputation as the only punishment for theft; using 
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the term jazāʾ linguistically refers to the completion or sufficiency of an act 
(mā yajibu li-Allāh fa-tamāmuhu bi al-istifāᵓ fa-lā yajibu al-ḍamān li-l-ʿabd).124 
 
 
1.3.1.2 The Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī view 
The Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs argued that the thief is subjected, even if 
the stolen object has been destroyed, to both amputation and to 
compensation (wa-in atlafa al-silʿa quṭiʿa wa-yaḍman qīmatahā idhā fātat).125 
This argument rests on the fact that the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs judged that two 
interests are violated in the act of theft (sariqa), and that both must be 
vindicated. The Shāfiʿī jurist al-Shīrāzī argued that satisfying the public 
interest by inflicting the ḥadd punishment does not abrogate the requirement 
for the satisfaction of the private right by compensating the victim when the 
property is destroyed (al-ḍamān yajibu li-ḥaqq al-ādamī wa-l-qaṭʿ yajibu li-Allāh 
fa-lā yamnaʿu aḥaduhumā al-ākhar).126  
The Shāfiʿīs held that the punishment of amputation (qaṭʿ al-yad) 
fulfils the right of God because theft violates the sanctity of Sharīʿah (li-hatki 
ḥurmat al-sharʿ). Compensation, on the other hand, is a private right and is 
required because of the loss incurred by the owner’s property (li-ihlāk mālihi). 
Accordingly, satisfying one right does not necessarily negate the other.127 
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Likewise, the Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Qudāma argued that both the right of God 
and the private right are at stake in the crime of theft. For Ibn Qudāma, if the 
stolen property remains in the thief’s possession, he is required to return it. 
Compensation is required when the property is destroyed.128 Amputation and 
compensation constitute fulfilment of two rights that are both legitimate 
rights for the two right holders (God and the victim), so it is permissible to 
unite them (fa-jāza ijtimāʿuhumā).129 To negate one because of the other 
would endanger the public interest in deterring theft through ḥadd liability, 
and the individual’s security in his possession and ownership. 
 The Mālikīs advocated a middle position. First of all, they supported 
the requirement that the victim of theft must petition at the judge’s court, 
that is, the judge may not prosecute the crime by himself. This procedure 
aims to achieve balance between the victim’s right to privately satisfy his 
own interests with the ruler’s need to uphold order and security as part of the 
public good.130 With regard to how much punishment the thief must receive, 
the Mālikīs shared the Ḥanafīs’ concern that where the property in question is 
destroyed, the thief may suffer two punishments for a single underlying 
offence. To avoid penalizing the thief twice, especially when the Qurᵓān 
ordains only one punishment, that is the amputation of the right hand, they 
struck a balance between a dual and single liability scheme. They argued that 
a thief is subjected to amputation but his liability to compensate depends on 
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whether he is capable of paying the amount to the victim. In case the thief 
suffers from economic hardship between the time he steals the property and 
the time his hand is amputated, he is not liable to pay any compensation. If, 
however, he is wealthy enough to afford compensating the victim, he must 
do so.131 
The Mālikīs add that if the thief was impoverished between the time of 
the theft and the amputation but becomes wealthy thereafter, he is still not 
liable for compensation (la yalzam al-taʿwīḍ idhā aysara baʿda al-ʿadam, li-anna 
l-ʿadam asqaṭahā ʿanhu).132 The economic hardship from the time of the 
infraction to the punishment’s phase negates any and all liability to 
remunerate the victim. 
 
1.3.2 Man’s rights (ḥuqūq al-ʿibād): The example of the punishment for 
qadhf. 
The punishment for false accusation of committing illegal sexual 
intercourse (qadhf) is set forth in Qurʾān 24:4-5: 
 
And those who level a charge against chaste women and do not bring 
four witnesses, whip them eighty lashes and do not accept their testimony 
ever, for they are corrupt; except for those who repent thereafter and act 
righteously. Indeed God is Forgiving and Merciful. 
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Sunnī jurists agreed that the punishment for false accusation of illegal 
sexual relations (qadhf) is eighty lashes, as stipulated in the Qurᵓān. However, 
they intensely contested whether the punishment for qadhf is intended to 
uphold a right exclusive to God or a private right belonging to the Muslim 
individual.133 As Emon remarks, “much of the debate about the purpose of the 
qadhf punishment concerns the good that it satisfies.”134 The notion that ḥadd 
for qadhf is an immutable right of God that simply must be implemented is 
not very prominent in fiqh writings. Mostly, the good (manfaʿa) of the qadhf 
punishment is described by Muslim jurists either as the presumed deterrent 
effect (zajr) of the actual punishment (al-maqṣūd min sharʿ al-zawājir ikhlā al-
ʿālam ʿan al-fasād);135 or as the retributive effect for an attack on the 
individual’s personal dignity and honour (ḥaqq al-ʿabd shuriʿa li dafʿ al-ʿār ʿan 
al-maqdhūf).136 The legal schools weigh these two factors differently, 
however. 
 
1.3.2.1   The Shāfiʻī and Ḥanbalī view 
Shāfiʻīs and Ḥanbalīs held that in the offence of false accusation of 
committing illegal sex, the individual’s right of protecting his honour (ʿirḍ) 
and dignity (karāma) is primarily at stake.137 They consistently argued that 
the punishment for qadhf vindicates the individual’s honour and dignity, thus 
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emphasizing the notion of the individual’s right (ḥaqq al-ʿabd). However, they 
also acknowledged that in cases of qadhf the rights of God and a private right 
of an individual are intertwined.138 
Generally speaking, the emphasis on the impact of qadhf on the public 
or personal interest depends on how jurists defined the primary purpose of 
the qadhf punishment. The juristic debate about whether the ḥadd for qadhf 
involves mostly a right of God or a private right has also consequences for 
the determination of the right to plead the qadhf case before the Islamic 
ruler. The victim’s right (ḥaqq al-maqdhūf) to initiate the qadhf case 
(muṭālaba) and to have it prosecuted are said to depend on which interests 
weigh heavier. The Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs held that when an individual 
right is mostly at issue, the victims will have a greater flexibility in whether 
and how they press their claim against the person who has slandered them.139  
The Shāfiʻīs argued that the Muslim ruler (imām) has no right to apply 
the qadhf punishment if the injured victim did not raise the qadhf issue and 
voice his desire for redress.140 For the jurists to require the individual’s 
petition (muṭālaba) reflects their view that a personal right is primarily at 
stake in qadhf; otherwise, the judge could reach a judgment on his own 
initiative as, for example, in a zinā offence. 
While the Shāfiʿīs at times also acknowledge that qadhf infringes on 
both a private right and a right of God, they were inclined to view that in 
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most qadhf cases the private right is paramount. One way of expressing this 
idea is to say that the right of the individual is prevailing (ghālib); thus, the 
victim must file a petition and he is entitled to waive his right to 
compensation if he wishes to do so. Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs relied on a ḥadīth 
according to which a man named Abū Ḍamḍam pardoned his accuser and 
waived the punishment for qadhf; the Prophet is reported to have asked, 
urging people to emulate Abū Ḍamḍam: “Is it that difficult for any of you 
[the Companions] to be like Abū Ḍamḍam and say I gave up my honour as a 
charity (taṣaddaqtu bi ʿirḍī)?”141 Al-Shīrāzī remarks on this particular ḥadīth: 
“Giving up the right to one’s honour can only be achieved through 
forgiveness (wa-l-taṣadduq bi-l-ʿirḍ lā yakūnu illā bi-l-ʿafw).”142  Ḥanbalī jurists 
adopted a view similar to the Shāfiʿīs. Their position about qadhf is that the 
interest at stake is a private interest, especially given that redress can be 
waived by the victim, as in the case of talionic punishment, which is widely 
regarded as an individual right (wa-lanā annahu ḥaqqun la yustawfā illā baʿda 
muṭālabat al-ādamī bi-stīfāᵓihi fa-saqaṭa bi ʿafwihi ka-l-qiṣāṣ).143  
 
1.3.2.2 The Ḥanafī view 
The Ḥanafīs held that the more qadhf reflects a right of God (for them 
this is tantamount to the common good), the less discretion the victim will 
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have in vindicating the wrong.144 In contrast to the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs, 
the Ḥanafīs usually stressed that qadhf represents a right of God. This was the 
dominant view among the Ḥanafī jurists, who did not allow the injured party 
to waive the claim.145 They claimed that the ḥadd of qadhf is a claim of God. 
However, they required the victim to file a petition. This requirement seems 
confusing and could reveal a certain inconsistency in the Ḥanafīs’ logic. 
The point the Ḥanafīs raised was this: If qadhf infringes on a right of 
God, surely the forgiveness of the victim negate God’s right and undermine 
the public welfare? Jurists consistently attempted to identify and define the 
underlying purposes of qadhf and the issue of whether it predominantly 
preserves the interests of the public society or the private rights of the 
individual. But to what degree and in what sense does qadhf infringe upon a 
right of God? The Ḥanafīs regarded the qadhf punishment as of benefit to the 
public interest because in their view, through its deterrent effect, it rids the 
world of evil. In this context, the qadhf punishment invokes a right of God 
since it does not pertain to any one person, but is in the general interest of 
the whole society. This equation between the general interest of society and 
God’s interest is, as Emon has suggested, a characteristic of Ḥanafī thought. 
He writes that “[t]he public interest that is corroborated by the social good of 
the society and the effect of the punishment by deterring people from the evil 
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that may adversely affect the common welfare was greatly emphasized in the 
Ḥanafī doctrine.146 
 
1.3.2.3 The Mālikī view 
In this question, the Mālikīs were the only school that consistently 
attempted to take a middle position, balancing between the competing 
interests of God and of the individual by issuing specific rules that ultimately 
aimed at satisfying the genuine needs of both the social good and private 
interests. The Mālikī jurists held that qadhf touches upon both a public 
interest and a private one; it is a mixed interest, where a right of God and a 
personal right are intertwined. Mālikī jurists argued that the redress for qadhf 
is contingent on the victim filing a petition (lā yaqūmu bi-l-ḥadd illā l-
maqdhūf).147 But once the injured petitions for redress, he can no longer 
waive his rights.148 This may convey that before the petition is filed to the 
judge, the individual right of the plaintiff outweighs the right of God/the 
public, while after the petition, the opposite is true, and as such the ruling 
authority must carry out the punishment without hesitation. 
As mentioned, the jurists debated whether the accused could forgive 
the culprit. The Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs, who considered the punishment for 
qadhf to be based first and foremost on a private right, granted the individual 
the discretion to waive his right, both before and after filing a petition to the 
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legal authority to grant him satisfaction. The Ḥanafīs, on the other hand, 
emphasized that the punishment of qadhf served a right of God, conceived as 
the imperative to protect social cohesion. Mālikī jurists, however, attempted 
to strike a balance between these two positions, by distinguishing between 
pre-petition and post-petition situation. Once the accusation is brought before 
the judge the individual is denied the right to waive the punishment; the 
punishment is then carried out for the public interest as a right of God.149 
The Mālikīs’ hesitation in choosing one or other option, aiming to 
adhere to a middle position, can also be seen in the fact that they make an 
exception to the rule that the plaintiff cannot waive his right after lodging his 
complaint before the judge. The plaintiff has this right if he promises that in 
the future he will avoid further public attention and practice sitr, that is, 
“covering-up” of the perceived sins of others.150 The Mālikīs do not specify 
the ways in which the judge should regard the avoidance of further public 
attention. In other words, the judge is completely free to decide what would 
cause avoidance of further public attention. This position suggests that the 
basic intrinsic value of dignity predominantly attaches to the individual’s 
right; thus, it cannot be redressed except with his express desire and intent.  
The consensus of the majority of the Muslim jurists, except the 
Ḥanafīs, was that the punishment for qadhf upheld both public and private 
interests. It was only the jurists of the Ḥanafī and to a lesser extent, the 
Mālikī school of law, who focused on the deterrent effect of the ḥadd 
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punishment for qadhf, which they viewed as satisfying a right of God (ḥaqq 
Allāh).  But this is not the dominant position. As Emon notes, “the debate on 
qadhf among the four Sunnī schools of law suggests that background concepts 
like dignity, however defined, affected how jurists constructed rules of 
law.”151 I am inclined to agree with Emon that the dignity and the honour of 
the individual were dominant in the mind of the Muslim jurists; they saw the 
protection of dignity and honour as the underlying purpose of the ḥadd of 
qadhf. Therefore, they endorsed rules that empowered the victim, such as the 
exclusive power to lodge a petition, the power to wave the punishment (in 
some cases even after the proceedings have already started), and heritability 
of the individual right. In sum, therefore, the classical doctrine of the ḥadd 
for qadhf lends support to the view of Khaled Abou El Fadl that the individual 
in Islamic law is not at all times and not entirely subjected to “God’s right”, 
but that the rights of the human individual can in many instances override 
God’s right.152 As Emon remarks, 
 
[t]his debate is not simply a technical question of pleading and 
practice. Rather, the rules of pleading and practice are the legal means for 
manifesting fundamental juristic commitments to the value of dignity as 
reflected in the nature of individuals and the social good [...] the larger 
debate on ḥuqūq Allāh/ḥuqūq al-ʿibād arguably promotes a vision of society.153  
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1.3.3 The Mixed Rights (ḥuqūq mukhtalaṭa): The example of the 
punishment for ḥirāba 
Since not all ḥadd norms can be neatly divided into either the rights of 
God or individual rights, classical jurists created a third category of mixed 
interests or rights (ḥuqūq mujtamiʿa, ḥuqūq mukhtalaṭa), in which both public 
and private interests were at stake. As we have seen in the last section, the 
ḥadd of qadhf was considered by some jurists, that is, the Mālikīs (and to 
some extent, the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs), as precisely this kind of “mixed 
right”. The ḥadd of banditry (ḥirāba) is another case in point. When a bandit 
engages in a ḥirāba crime, and is thereafter apprehended by the authorities, 
the Sunnī legal tradition provides varying types of redress depending on an 
assessment of the preponderant interest, whether public (ḥaqq Allāh) or 
private (ḥaqq al-ʿibād). According to the four Sunnī schools of law, this mixed 
category contains two subcategories of mixed claims of rights, one in which 
the right of God is dominant (ghālib), the other in which the individual right 
weighs heavier.154 
         The ḥirāba offence, as discussed in the Sunnī writings, is an 
example of a crime where the rights of God and the private rights of the 
individual are equally intertwined. A question often raised in the juristic 
debate about ḥirāba is how to identify and priorities the different interests 
embedded in the rules concerning banditry, where the private rights often 
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seem to conflict with the right of God. Sunnī jurists tended in some cases to 
argue that the public interest was more paramount and, therefore, the private 
right or interest of the victim was ignored, particularly when denying the 
victim the right to forgive (ʿafw) the culprit. However, in different instances, 
jurists were more inclined to value the private interest and regard it as the 
paramount element, as for example, in the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī view of the 
qadhf offence. 
        All Sunnī jurists held that, if bandits (muḥāribūn) repented of 
their crime prior to being captured, the punishments listed in the ḥirāba verse 
satisfying the rights of God all become void.155 This juristic position rests on 
the Qurᵓānic verse (5:34), which stipulates that those who repent prior to 
capture are forgiven any liability for the punishment.  The juristic debate 
about ḥirāba often began by speculating on various hypothetical scenarios of 
the crime. The jurists then attempted to balance the rights of God and the 
rights of individuals, specifically whenever a conflict between the rights of 
God and the individual occurred. The four Sunnī schools of law 
acknowledged that, in the case of the ḥirāba offence, a serious conflict arises 
between the demands of a right of God (ḥaqq Allāh) and a private right of the 
individual (ḥaqq al-ʿabd). The challenge for the jurists was to resolve these 
conflicts in an effective manner, and in particular, to maintain “conceptual 
coherence with their views concerning sariqa and qadhf”.156 
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1.3.3.1 The Ḥanafī view 
The Ḥanafīs consistently held that, if bandits repent of their crimes 
prior to being captured, the punishments of ḥirāba as listed in the Qurᵓān are 
no longer to be applied. However, all private rights of the victims of the 
ḥirāba crime are preserved, including, for example, the right to retaliation 
(qiṣāṣ).157 If, however, the bandits are captured before they repent, the 
Ḥanafīs’ position on conflicted rights is that the punishments for the rights of 
God are to be inflicted and not to be waived for the individual’s right.158 For 
instance, al-Sarakhsī held that if bandits committed murder, the punishment 
for banditry was inflicted, but the victims’ heirs could not pursue their rights 
under the aspect of retaliation (qiṣāṣ). Neither could the victims press for any 
individual rights to compensation for injuries sustained, nor could they 
forgive the offender because this would have denied a right of God (wa-ʿafw 
al-awliyāᵓ fī dhālik bāṭil li-anna hadhā ḥadd yuqām li-Allāh).”159 
    Al-Sarakhsī regarded the right to compensation for injuries as 
invalid once the punishment for banditry has been inflicted. However, in 
cases where the punishment is dropped for some juristic reason, such as 
repentance, then the individual is entitled to pursue his private claims. For 
instance, when the bandits steal property and injure the victims, their hands 
and feet are amputated from opposite ends; this is to satisfy the right of God 
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that is injured by the banditry offence, while the individuals’ rights are 
dismissed entirely. Obviously, the Ḥanafīs allowed the bandits to be only 
liable to the rights of God. Liability for banditry punishment and liability for 
compensation cannot coexist (lā yajtamiʿān). Therefore, God’s right is always 
the priority and the judge must fulfil the right of God through application of 
the ḥadd penalty, and the individual rights are dismissed. 
    The Ḥanafīs discussed three different hypothetical scenarios where 
the rights of God and the rights of the individual are both at stake. The first 
scenario is where there is no capital punishment involved in the committed 
offences. The example presented in the Ḥanafī fiqh is where the culprit 
commits illegal sexual intercourse, theft, false accusation of committing 
illegal sexual intercourse and injuries someone’s eye. All these rights are to 
be fulfilled and punishments should proceed in the order of severity.160 The 
second scenario is where the rights of God are combined and mixed and 
where capital punishment is involved. All God’s corporal punishments of 
ḥadd punishments become void and capital punishment is to be inflicted. For 
instance, when the ḥadd punishment for zinā offence overlaps with ḥirāba, 
the latter negates the former.161  
  The final and the most complex scenario is where the rights of God 
and the rights of individuals combine and are mixed. In this scenario the 
private right is prioritised, but only according to the rule of first-come-first-
serve. Suppose someone commits murder in ḥirāba. The punishment for 
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murder is retaliation, that is, the right of an individual. But execution for the 
ḥirāba crime is required as God’s right. The proposed solution in such a 
conflict of rights is that, if the murder was committed first and ḥirāba 
committed second, satisfying the private right of retaliation is prioritised 
(qadama al-qiṣāṣ li-taᵓakkud ḥaqq al-ādamī) and execution for committing 
ḥirāba, that is, the right of God, is abandoned. However, in case where the 
bandit commits banditry first and murder second, the private right is 
abandoned. In both cases, a private right is touched upon. Whether it 
excludes a right of God or not depends on whether it is injured first-in-
time.162  Suppose someone is sentenced to both stoning for committing illegal 
sexual intercourse (a right of God) and execution as retaliation for murder (a 
private right). In this hypothetical scenario the Hanafis prioritised the 
retaliation punishment.163 But only if the murder was committed before the 
illegal sexual intercourse. Jurists argued that the judicial authorities must 
rely on a first-in-time rule to determine which right to vindicate. 
 
1.3.3.2 The Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī view 
Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs held a similar position, arguing that God’s rights 
are abandoned if the bandits repent prior to capture. However, private rights 
(restoration of the lost property and/or retaliation for suffered injuries) are 
not abandoned, and only the holder of the right can waive his/her rights. For 
instance, if the bandit commits ḥirāba and repents prior to capture but has 
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killed and injured, he is accountable for the individuals’ rights.164 According 
to the prominent Shāfiʿī jurist al-Muzanī, all ḥirāba crimes prior to capture 
become void in such a case, but private rights of the individuals do not (lā 
tasquṭ ḥuqūq al-ādamiyyīn). The Shāfiʿīs held that God’s rights do not negate 
the individuals’ rights of seeking redress, in particular in injuries (lā yamnaʿ 
ḥaqq Allāh ḥaqq al-ādamiyyīn fī al-jirāḥ).165 
         The Ḥanbalīs argued that, if bandits repent prior to capture, the 
rights of God become void but private rights, for example, qiṣāṣ and 
compensation, do not. Whether liability for another ḥadd offence committed 
in the course of banditry is dropped was a matter of contentious debate 
among the Ḥanbalīs. What is clear is that even if all ḥadd liability dropped, 
liability for private rights remained intact unless the right holder waived his 
right.166 Against the Ḥanafīs, Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs consistently emphasised 
private rights over the rights of God. They held that private rights cannot be 
forgiven by the judge because they are premised on conditions of scarcity 
(taḍayyuq) and paucity (shuḥḥ) and, as such, cannot be ignored without 
causing the individual to suffer: “the rights of people cannot become void 
except by the right holder’s consent because they are built on scarcity and 
paucity (mabnī ʿalā al-ḍīq wa-l-shuḥḥ), unlike the right of God.”167 The idea 
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here is that God, given that He is all-powerful, is in need of nothing; the 
waiving of His “right” cannot possibly harm Him. But humans are weak and 
needy, and rely on the assurance that their rights will be satisfied. 
Accordingly, the juristic general principle here is that the individual’s 
right always prevails over the right of God.168 Individuals are viewed as being 
less capable of bearing the cost of injuries than the public at large. The rule 
here is that the private rights (ḥuqūq al-ʿibād) take priority when they are in 
conflict with God’s rights. 
Suppose that bandits are liable to punishment qua God’s right and, 
therefore, must have their right hands and left feet amputated, and the same 
bandits also happen to be liable for violating private rights by either cutting 
off someone’s hand and foot, and are thereby condemned to have their own 
right hands amputated according to the law of retaliation (qiṣāṣ). This 
conflict exists between what the right of God requires and what the private 
right demands through the victim’s (or his/her heir’s) right to qiṣās or 
compensation. Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī jurists prioritised the individual’s rights 
over God’s right. They suggested that God’s rights can easily be abrogated in 
favour of the individual’s rights, because God is far beyond such needs. God’s 
right in the sense of public interest, furthermore, is so wide-ranging and 
vague that the cost of abrogating a right of God has little factual impact, 
                                         
168 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 7: al-aṣl fī ijtimāʿ ḥaqqihi taʿālā wa-ḥaqq al-ādamī 
taghlīb al-thānī li-kawnihi mabnī ʿalā al-taḍayyuq. 
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since it is evenly distributed across society and thus not burdensome to 
individuals.169  
   Another balancing scheme is posited by al-Shīrāzī. He argued that a 
conflict of rights arises if a bandit both steals and amputates someone’s right 
hand and left foot. In reference to the banditry crime, the bandit who steals 
suffers amputation of his right hand and left foot for violating a right of God. 
But under the law of retaliation, he must lose the same limbs in function of 
the private rights of his victim. If one right is satisfied, the other is not. In 
line with the other Shāfiʿīs, al-Shīrāzī judges that the ruling authority must 
apply the individual retaliation penalty because of the general emphasis 
placed on the individual right (ḥaqq al-ʿabd). Al-Shīrāzī suggests, however, 
that when the private rights are fulfilled, the rights of God are not necessarily 
abrogated. Rather would the bandit also lose his left hand and right foot to 
satisfy the rights of God.170 The punishment here is inflicted for stealing in an 
act of banditry. Thus, the amputation of the right hand and left foot for a 
right belongs to God. Meanwhile, the amputation of the right hand is 
required, according to al-Shīrāzī, for retaliation (qiṣāṣ) the liability arising out 
of the individual’s injury sustained by the victim, that is, the private right. 
Emon argues that “[t]he point for al-Shīrāzī, though, is to balance the 
interests posed by competing and distinct sets of rights, while prioritizing 
                                         
169 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 134; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 452.  
170 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 452. 
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private rights given the presumed greater need for individuals to have their 
rights satisfied.”171  
  The Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs were not willing to negate individual rights 
over God’s rights and vice versa, holding instead that when both rights 
conflict, a proper balance of interests must be achieved if possible. However, 
in the Shāfiʿīs’ and Ḥanbalīs’ debate about conflicting rights, one can clearly 
see that, if satisfying the private right conflicts with upholding God’s right, 
the former is to take priority.172 Both schools of law provide two examples of 
such a conflict. The first is when someone commits apostasy and murder and 
is therefore subjected to capital punishment for both offences. The second 
concerns a thief who is subjected to having his right hand amputated for theft 
(that is, a right belonging to God) and to amputation of the right hand for 
retaliation for cutting off someone’s right hand (a private right).  In such 
cases, the private right of qiṣāṣ takes priority over the right of God.173  
However, the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs did not ignore public interests. 
For instance, if the private right involves property interests and the right of 
God involves amputation or execution, the private rights should be enforced 
first and take priority, but the right of God is also to be satisfied.174 If there is 
no execution or amputation involved under either a private right or a right of 
                                         
171 Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq al-ʿIbād”, p. 383. 
172 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 133.  
173 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 133, Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 452. 
174 Ibid. 
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God, the right of God should be satisfied first.175 Both rules concern the order 
of satisfying rights, but do not necessarily involve the abrogation of rights.  
However, if both rights involve the same sort of punishment, that is 
capital punishment or the same corporal punishment, the private right is still 
prioritised (logically, but not practically). Further explanation of this point is 
afforded by the example of a thief who steals a guarded property. This crime 
demands amputation of the right hand to satisfy the right of God and 
compensation to vindicate the private right. In this conflict, Shāfiʿīs and 
Ḥanbalīs proposed that the victim be compensated before the thief has his 
right hand amputated.176 When both rights require physical punishment of 
the offender, the purpose underlying the right of God (that is, deterrence) is 
upheld implicitly by the satisfaction of the private right. However, when 
there is no execution or amputation under either a private right or right of 
God, the right of God should be satisfied first.177 Both rules concern the order 
in which rights are to be satisfied, but do not involve the abrogation of any 
right. 
 
1.3.3.3 The Mālikī view 
Mālikī jurists shared a similar argument with the Shāfiʿīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs: the bandit who repents prior to capture is not subjected to the 
penalties of ḥirāba, but is required to compensate the victims for injuries and 
                                         
175 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 10. 
176 Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 7, p. 372. 
177 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 132. 
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damaged properties.178 They held that only the ḥadd punishments specified in 
the ḥirāba verse become void with repentance prior to capture. By 
comparison, in instances of committing illegal sexual intercourse (zinā), 
consuming alcohol (shurb al-khamr) and false accusation of committing illegal 
sexual intercourse (qadhf), both the rights of God and private rights remain 
intact.179 
However, the Mālikīs held that not all private rights are to be satisfied 
in all cases. This rests on their position about the mixed right of God and 
individuals. As al-Qarāfī puts it, “when God’s rights and the individuals’ 
rights overlap the punishment for God’s right is what comes first because it 
cannot be pardoned (wa in ijtamaʿ ḥadd Allāh wa-ḥadd al-ʿibād budiᵓa bi-ḥadd 
Allāh li-taʿadhdhur al-ʿafw fīhi)”.180 For instance, if murdering and stealing is 
committed in act of ḥirāba, the culprit should be punished with a capital 
punishment for murdering, unless the victim’s heirs waived the punishment. 
In this case he is to be punished with amputation and must compensate.181 
For instance, they argued that if the punishment for ḥirāba was inflicted, then 
at least in the case of a stolen property, the bandit must compensate the 
victim if it is possible for him to do so. If not, the liability for compensation 
becomes void and the victim’s private rights are sacrificed. Mālikīs tended to 
                                         
178 Ṣaḥnūn, Al-Mudawwana, vol. 6, p. 2889. 
179 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 130. 
180 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 470; Ṣaḥnūn, Al-Mudawwana, vol. 6, p. 2890. 
181 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 470. 
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negate the liability for private rights in specific conditions, aiming to protect 
the culprits from potential multiple liabilities.  
   In the case of the ḥirāba offence, Sunnī jurists sought to balance 
competing interests that benefitted both society and the individual. In the 
debates of the fuqahāʾ their schools’ respective attitude toward government 
play a vital role when it comes to prioritising the various interests, in 
particular when these are in conflict. For the Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs, the 
public interest was paramount, therefore, they leaned toward protecting the 
social good, which they saw best upheld by government. The Shāfiʿīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs held that the individual interests, for example property and physical 
injury, are paramount. Society as a whole, they argued, could afford to bear 
and spread the cost of violations of the social good better than the individual 
could, given the individual’s fragility. The Ḥanafīs consistently prioritised the 
rights of God over private rights. The Shāfiʾīs and the Ḥanbalīs emphasised 
private rights over the rights of God. The Mālikīs attempted to strike a 
balance between the different rights. 
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1.4 Dismissing God’s Rights (waiving the punishment) 
Although Muslim classical jurists insisted on declaring ḥadd 
punishments to be the immutable law of God and on claiming that the 
offence, once brought to the judge, must be punished, they defined a plethora 
of exceptions, that is, possibilities for avoiding the ḥadd punishment. 
According to the Sunnī tradition, God’s rights can in fact be waived under 
specific conditions discussed in the fiqh writings. 
In this section, I focus on two cases widely discussed in the writings of 
Muslim jurists. The first case is the dispute about waiving God’s right when it 
conflicts with another of His rights. For instance, suppose a person is seeking 
immunity (amān) from the Muslim ruler and is subsequently given the status 
of immunity seeker (mustaᵓmin). If the immunity seeker commits any of the 
ḥadd offences while he is enjoying Muslim protection, Sunnī jurists debated 
whether the punishment must become void on the basis of “conflicted rights” 
or whether the punishment must be inflicted irrespective of the refugee’s 
status. The second case deals with waiving the rights of God on the basis of 
doubt (shubha). This case is debated in the legal tradition in three subsidiary 
scenarios that relate to ḥadd lapsing, retraction of confession and repentance.   
 
1.4.1 Conflicts of Rights (la yajūz istīfāᵓ mā yakūn fihī tafwīt li ḥaqq 
Allāh) 
Among Sunnī jurists, the Ḥanafīs argued that God’s rights in ḥadd 
punishments ought to be waived for a higher principle, to preserve a higher 
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right of God. When God’s rights are in conflict, Sunnī jurists debated whether 
the right consisting in ḥadd punishment was to be satisfied or abrogated. For 
instance, suppose that a ḥadd offence was committed by a male refuge seeker 
(mustaᵓmin)182 while he is under Islamic protection.183 The Ḥanafīs held that 
the basis rule for such a case is that if God’s right conflicts with a higher right 
of His (in this case, to protect the refuge seeker) the latter negates the former. 
For instance, the Ḥanafīs argued that if a Muslim or dhimmī man committed 
illegal sexual intercourse (zinā) with a female refuge seeker (mustaᵓmina) the 
punishment applied only to the Muslim or to the dhimmī and the mustaᵓmina 
was not to be punished.184 
(There is also the case of a female Muslim who commits illegal sexual 
intercourse with a mustaᵓmin. In this scenario, the Ḥanafīs strangely waived 
the punishment for both of them, the Muslim woman and the mustaʾmin. Al-
Sarakhsī justified his position on this particular scenario by arguing that 
“ḥadd is waived in this case because she [the female Muslim] allowed herself 
to commit zinā with someone whose offence is not counted as a ḥadd crime, 
as in the case of an underage person or a madman (lā ḥadd ʿalayhā li-annahā 
mā kānat nafsuhā min fāʿil lā yalzam al-ḥadd bi-fiʿlihi fa-huwa ka-l-tamkīn mina 
                                         
182 Since it is impossible to translate the term mustaᵓmin with one English word that conveys 
the equivalent meaning, I have opted to use the Arabic term throughout. 
183 I would like to indicate that there has not been any serious research that tackles the issue 
of the mustaʾmin and their rights under the Islamic criminal law especially in relation to how 
this particular law may apply to the non-Muslims’ immunity seekers as well as tourists in the 
Muslim countries where the law of Islamic ḥadd is currently implemented.  
184 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 64. 
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al-ṣabī aw al-majnūn)”.185 The Ḥanafīs regarded the mustaʾmin who committed 
zinā with a Muslim woman as having no liability, just like an immature or 
insane person. 
Ḥanafīs justified their position by arguing that “the ḥadd punishment 
does not apply to the mustaʾmin for the reason that his safety ought to be 
protected (la yuqām ʿalayhi al-ḥadd li-wujūb tablīgh maᵓmanihi)”.186 This is 
because “to guard the safety of the mustaᵓmin … is a duty and a right of God”. 
Therefore, by inflicting the punishments on them God’s right will not be 
fulfilled or achieved. The rule, according to the Ḥanafīs, is that the judge 
must not apply the ḥadd punishment in the case of mustaʾmin committing 
ḥadd offence because the latter is under the Islamic protection, that is, the 
privilege given to the mustaʾmin in the Islam  (la yajūz istifāᵓ mā yakūn fihī 
tafwīt mā huwa ḥaqq li-Allāh khāliṣ).187  
        However, within the Ḥanafī school there was a measure of 
disagreement about the criminal liability of the mustaʾmin. For example, the 
Ḥanafīs debated this point in the context of banditry. Abu Ḥanīfa’s pupil Abū 
Yusūf held that the banditry punishment applies to both the dhimmī and the 
mustaᵓmin and that both are liable for their banditry crimes.188 Some of the 
later Ḥanafīs followed his opinion. In reference to the offence of theft 
committed by the mustaᵓmin, Ibn Nujaym argued that “it is a ḥadd offence 
                                         
185 Ibid, p. 64. 
186 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 64; Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, pp. 63-4.  
187 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 63-4. 
188 Ibid., vol. 9, p.157. 
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and it ought to be implemented (wa-lanā annahu ḥadd yuṭālab bihi).189 By 
contrast, Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī held that all ḥadd offences, 
even though they are regarded as God’s right, are not applied to the refuge 
seeker (al-mustaᵓmin lā tuqām ʿalayhi al-ḥadd allatī hiya li-Allāh khāliṣa ka-ḥadd 
al-zinā wa-l-sariqa wa-qaṭʿ al-ṭarīq).190  
  Against the Ḥanafī followers of Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Shaybānī, the 
Shāfiʿīs, Ḥanbalīs and Mālikīs held that the refuge seeker is liable for his 
actions including ḥadd offences. Al-Shāfiʻī rejected the Ḥanafīs’ special 
treatment of the mustaᵓmin and responded by saying: “the ḥadd applies to the 
male and female mustaᵓmin similar to the dhimmī because as long as they are 
in our land they are held accountable for their ḥadd offences, except for the 
offence of drinking alcohol.”191 The Shāfiʿīs held that, as long as the refuge 
seeker is liable to retaliation (qiṣāṣ) and qadhf, then the mustaᵓmin is liable for 
committing other ḥadd offences as well. Otherwise, if the punishment of ḥadd 
is waived Muslims in general are weakened (al-istikhfāf bi-l-Muslimīn).192 The 
Shāfiʿīs further argued that mustaʾmins are not given the sought-for protection 
in order that this results in disregard for the Muslims. The ḥadd for drinking 
alcohol is not included, as this is not forbidden in the mustaʾmins’ faith. 
     The Ḥanbalīs seconded the Shāfiʿīs’ position and rejected the 
avoidance of ḥadd punishment when committed by the mustaᵓmin. They 
                                         
189 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 9, p. 112. 
190 Ibid., p. 63. 
191 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 63, 64. 
192 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 199. 
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argued that the Islamic rules and legislation were valid for the mustaᵓmin: “If 
a ḥarbī enters our territory as a mustaʾmin and then if he commits theft, he 
must suffer amputation… for the norms of Islam apply to him (al-ḥarbī idhā 
dakhala ilaynā mustaᵓminan fa-saraqa fa-innahu yuqṭaʿ [...] liᵓanna aḥkām al-
islām jāriya ʿalayhi)”.193 
In sum, the jurists controversially discussed the principle that a right 
of God dismisses another of His right. In the case of istiʾmān, only (some of) 
the Ḥanafīs were ready to prioritize it over the right of God for ḥadd 
punishment, but the debate shows that the fiqh tradition offers avenues to 
weigh the pros and cons of ḥadd punishments and, in some cases, to dismiss 
them for ‘the higher interest’. 
 
1.4.2 Dismissing God’s rights on the basis of doubt (shubha) 
According to Rowson, shubha (pl. shubuhāt) literally means 
“resemblance”. It is a term that developed two distinct technical meanings. 
The first meaning refers to the term in theology and philosophy, where it 
indicates a false or specious argument that resembles a valid one. The second 
meaning, as Rowson explains, is the technical legal term: “legal doubt”, or 
“ambiguity”. Shubha here concerns, for example, a licit act that resembles an 
illicit one. Shubha in this sense is relevant primarily to the law of ḥadd.194 
All Sunnī schools of law unanimously agreed on waiving ḥadd 
punishments in cases of doubts. In fact, the avoidance of ḥadd punishments in 
                                         
193 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 111-2. 
194 E.K. Rowson, “Shubha”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. ix, p. 492. 
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cases of doubt (shubha) is known as one of the “Islamic legal maxims”, which 
Intisar A. Rabb has labeled as “substantive canons of construction”.  Rabb 
explains that according to the “ḥadd maxim … judges are to avoid imposing 
ḥadd and other sanctions when beset by doubts as to the scope of the law or 
the sufficiency of the evidence (idraᵓū l-ḥadd bi-l-shubuhāt).” She argues that 
jurists of all periods reference this maxim widely.195 
However, jurists debated the causes and conditions of legal doubt and 
therefore their legal implications for the implementation of ḥadd 
punishments. In the following section, I discuss three subsidiary scenarios of 
doubt cases found in the writings of Muslim Sunnī jurists. 
 
1.4.2.1 Ḥadd lapsing (tasquṭ al-ḥadd bi al-taqādum) 
One of the general principles about avoiding the ḥadd punishment in 
cases of doubt is the lapsing of the ḥadd offence. The Ḥanafī jurist Ibn 
Nujaym stated that the ḥadd punishments, which are rights of God, lapse 
when the crime is not brought before the judge at the time when it occurs 
                                         
195 See Rabb, “Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction”, pp. 63-125. 
Fierro has explored the origin and diffusion of the idea that shubha invalidates ḥadd 
punishment, and how it was transformed into a Prophetic saying that was employed mainly 
by the Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs but rejected by the Ḥanbalīs and the Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm. Fierro’s 
main argument about the historical development of the Prophetic saying of avoiding the 
ḥadd punishment in cases of doubt is that there was a tension between two equally 
compelling needs in the early Islamic period. On the one hand, the desire to avoid as much 
as possible imposition of the severe ḥadd punishments; on the other hand, the fact that such 
avoidance usually played in favour of the rich and the powerful. Cf. Fierro, “Idraᵓū l-ḥadd bi-
l-shubuhāt: when lawful violence meets doubt”. 
 86 
(tabṭul al-ḥadd bi-l-taqādum).196 An example presented in the Ḥanafī writings 
is where a group of bandits is brought before the judge. The judge thinks that 
the bandits are to compensate for the stolen property and he allows the heirs 
to claim the compensation, but does not condemn the bandits to suffer 
additional ḥadd punishment. Then, after some time, the bandits are brought 
before a different judge. This judge, the Ḥanafīs argued, is not to inflict the 
ḥadd punishments. This is because the crime lapses when it is not notified to 
the judge at the time it occurs (li-taqādum al-ʿahd wa-inʿidām al-khaṣm).197 Al-
Sarakhsī categorized this scenario under shubha for the reason that in the 
case where there is a lapse of ḥadd offence there is a possibility of having the 
culprit repented from his offence. Al-Sarakhsī espoused a narration attributed 
to the Companion ʿAlī where he is reported to have dismissed the ḥadd 
punishment of a bandit named: Ḥārith bin Yazīd who is reported to have 
committed ḥirāba and his offence was considered as a lapsed crime because 
the latter is believed to have travelled to Baṣra without being prosecuted for 
his ḥirāba offence. According to al Sarakhsī, ʿAlī wrote a letter to the ruler of 
Baṣra asking the latter to dismiss the ḥadd punishment of Ḥārith bin Yazīd.198 
 
14.2.2 Retraction of confession (al-rujūʿ ʿan al-ᵓiqrār) 
Sunnī jurists discussed the effect of confessions and subsequent 
retractions on the culprits’ liability for their ḥadd offences. The majority of 
                                         
196 Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 23. 
197 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 239. 
198 Ibid., p. 240. 
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Sunnī jurists held that confession (iqrār) is the only evidence against the 
culprit that can be retracted. They debated, however, whether it makes a 
difference whether the confession concerns a crime that affects public 
interests or private interests. For instance, in the jurists’ debate about 
confession in a zinā offence, the retraction of a zinā confession voids ḥadd 
liability. According to the four Sunnī schools of laws, zinā is a pure right of 
God (ḥaqq Allāh), but when it is initiated to the judge only on the basis of a 
voluntary confession then legal doubt (shubha) arises once the confession is 
retracted. Jurists requested that no one can oppose the accused party in this 
case; the presence of ambiguity causes the ḥadd punishment to become 
void.199  
 The juristic debate on the issue of ambiguity and its legal implications 
is important if we want to understand the justifications behind either the 
implementation or the avoidance of ḥadd punishments. The jurists’ debate 
about avoiding the ḥadd punishment in cases of doubt rests on a ḥadīth 
according to which the Prophet urged his followers to “avoid applying the 
ḥadd where there is ambiguity (idraᵓū al-ḥadd bi l-shubuhāt).” Obviously, 
Sunnī jurists relied on this particular Prophetic narration in their legal debate 
and embraced it as a general principle. This led them to be extremely 
cautious with regard to the implementation of ḥadd punishment: the judge 
must avoid the ḥadd punishments where ambiguity exists.200 
                                         
199 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 12. 
200 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 119; Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, p. 237; Al-
Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 186. 
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 Sunnī jurists agreed that the retraction is valid even though it 
abrogates a right of God. This applies to all ḥadd offences except qadhf.201 In 
cases of infringement upon pure rights of God (in particular in cases of illegal 
sexual intercourse, apostasy and consuming alcohol), retraction of 
confessions is permitted.202 Confession to any of these acts is considered 
sufficient to initiate prosecution. Since these crimes infringe upon pure rights 
of God, the confessor is allowed to retract his confession and subsequently 
negate his liability on the basis of shubha.     
  Interestingly, according to the majority of the four Sunnī schools of 
laws, the imām/ruler is encouraged to ask the culprit to retract his 
confession. Ibn Qudāma stated that “there is no harm in asking the thief to 
retract his confession, and this is the opinion of the majority of jurists (la 
baᵓsa bi-talqīn al-sāriq li-yarjaʿa ʿan iqrārihi wa-hādhā qawl ʿāmmat al-
fuqahāᵓ)”.203 The Ḥanafīs shared a similar position to the Ḥanbalīs, holding 
that “the ruler (imām) is recommended to avoid the ḥadd punishment and is 
recommended to ask the confessor to retract his confession (al-imām mandūb 
ilā al-iḥtiyāl li-darᵓ al-ḥadd wa-talqīn al-muqirr al-rujūʿ)”.204 
The general fiqh rule regarding confession of the ḥadd offence is that it 
must be upheld by the culprit until the punishment is inflicted. This general 
                                         
201 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 64, 119.  
202 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 350: wa yuqbal al-rujūʿ fī jamīʿ ḥuqūq Allāh mina al-sariqa 
wa-shurb al-khamr w-al-ḥirāba idhā atā bi-ʿudhr wa-in lam yaᵓti bihi yukhtalaf fīhi: in ijtamaʿ 
ḥaqq Allāh wa ḥaqq al-ādamī fī al-iqrār lazimahu ḥaqq al-ādamī wa-in atā fī ḥaqq Allāh bi-ʻudhr 
qubila, wa-illā, ḥudd. 
203  Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 120. 
204 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 168. 
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rule rests on the story of one Māʻiz b. Mālik, a contemporary of the Prophet, 
who confessed four times that he had committed unlawful intercourse and 
refused to retract his confession. While stoning was being inflicted on him he 
tried to escape but failed. The Prophet is reported to have said, “Have you 
not left him [time] to repent and for God to forgive him (a-lā taraktumūhu 
yatūbu fa-yatūbu Allāh ʿalayihi)?” Ibn Qudāma commented on this ḥadīth: 
“This example [of Māʿiz] is the clearest evidence that it is acceptable for a 
confessor to retract his confession, because his confession is a doubt and the 
ḥadd punishment are averted by strength of legal doubt (fa-fī hādhā awḍaḥ al-
dalāᵓil annahu yuqbal rujūʿuhu, wa li-anna rujūʿahu shubha w-al-ḥudūd tudraᵓ bi-
l-shubhāt)”.205 
As for instances of mixed rights, that is, cases in which both a right of 
God and a personal right are at stake, the situation is somewhat more 
complicated. In the ḥadd punishment for theft, amputation vindicates a right 
of God, and compensation satisfies a private right. Jurists generally agreed 
that the punishment of amputation becomes void in case of retraction of 
confession. The Ḥanbalīs held that, since amputation is a distinct and 
distinguishable punishment, it must become void because it reflects a right of 
God. Ibn Qudāma noted that the Prophet offered retraction of confession for 
ḥadd offences on different occasions, for instance, the Prophet offered 
                                         
205 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 64. 
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retraction to a thief when saying to him “I do not think that you committed 
sariqa (mā akhāluka saraqta)”.206  
    The Ḥanbalīs insisted on considering the theft punishment to be a 
right of God; theft can be proven by a voluntary confession and, therefore, 
can be retracted like the offence of zinā.207 The Ḥanbalīs regarded the 
retraction as legal doubt (shubha), and thus “ḥadd is averted on the strength 
of doubts”: amputation in such a case is invalid (yabṭul).208 This argument, 
according to the Ḥanbalīs, is consistently applied to all ḥadd offences, except 
the offence of qadhf. Ḥanafī jurists held that if the confessor retracts his 
confession, whether before the infliction of the ḥadd or during the infliction 
of the punishment, is to be set free (in rajaʿa ʿan iqrārih qabla al-ḥadd aw fī 
wasaṭihi khalā sabīluh).209 Ibn Nujaym argued that the retraction of the 
confession, especially when it is not falsified, constitutes shubha because the 
retraction could be true like the confession made to the ruler. 
    But what about the private right that is injured in theft offences? 
Suppose a case of theft is proved only on the basis of confession. What 
happens if the thief recants? In this case, the accused’s liability to compensate 
the victim remains. The Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs consistently held that because 
it is intimately associated with an individual right that is not affected by a 
                                         
206 Ibid., p. 119. 
207 Ibid., p. 119: li-annahu ḥadd Allāh thabuta bi-l-iʿtirāf faqubila rujūʿuhu ka-ḥadd al-zinā. 
208 Ibid., p. 119. 
209 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 12. 
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retraction, corporal liability for theft remains.210 Thus, retraction of 
confession only negates the punishment due as the right belonging to God; 
however, its effect to negate the individual’s right is a matter of contention 
among Sunnī jurists. 
 
1.4.2.3 Repentance (tawba) 
Repentance after committing ḥadd offences was vehemently debated 
among Sunnī jurists. Jurists held two opposing positions about the 
effectiveness of repentance in negating the punishment, especially when 
repentance occurs after the ḥadd offence is brought before the judiciary. The 
Ḥanbalī Ibn Qudāma and the Shāfiʿī al-Shīrāzī explained that in the case of 
confession after committing the ḥadd crime there are two basic views. The 
first one, supported by the Ḥanbalīs, is that the ḥadd punishment becomes 
void on the basis of the Qurᵓān 5:38211 and the Prophetic ḥadīth that 
“whoever repents from the sin is like someone who never sinned (al-tāᵓib min 
al-dhanb ka-man lā dhanba lahu).”212 Ibn Qudāma concludes from this 
particular ḥadīth that “who does not sin should not to be punished”.213 
Ḥanbalīs regarded all ḥadd punishments that are viewed as God’s right to 
become void whenever repentance occurs. 
                                         
210 Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 7, p. 355, Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 119-120.  
211 “And (as for) the male thief and the female thief, cut off (from the wrist joint) their (right) 
hands as a recompense for that which they committed, a punishment by way of example 
from Allah. And Allah is all-powerful, all-wise.” 
212 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 130; Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 453.  
213 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 130. 
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        The Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs and one of the Shāfiʿīs held that ḥadd 
punishment does not become void because of repentance, except in cases of 
ḥirāba.  Their position about repentance rests on the Qurᵓānic verses of zinā 
and sariqa, where repentance is not explicitly mentioned. They also adduced 
Prophetic traditions according to which the Prophet inflicted the 
punishments, even where repentance had occurred, as in the cases of Māʿiz 
and al-Ghāmidiyya. Even though Māʿiz and al-Ghāmidiyya confessed their 
crimes and showed repentance, the Prophet nevertheless carried out the 
stoning punishment. The Ḥanafī Ibn Nujaym argued that “if the ḥadd offence 
is proven to the imām the ḥadd punishment must be inflicted and repentance 
does not negate the punishment.”214 The Ḥanafīs’ position on repentance is 
that repentance serves as an act of atonement for the culprit and obviates 
punishment in the hereafter (al-tawba lā tusqiṭu al-ḥadd fī al-dunyā).215 I will 
return to the concept of kaffāra (expiation) in ch. 3 of this thesis. 
                                         
214 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 5. 




In conclusion, Sunnī jurists attempted to rationalise the law, but they 
restricted their ability to do so by allowing reason to operate only within the 
limits of revelation, that is, within the textual framework of the Qurᵓān and 
the sound Sunnah.216 In order for them to argue that God’s intention could be 
known through His revelation to humankind, they had to set up general and 
broad principles of interpretation, and to be willing to speculate about the 
underlying purposes of the law even when explicit textual support could not 
be adduced from scripture directly. Only this allowed them the flexibility 
required to apply their reasoning to legal questions of all kinds. As Coulson 
observes, “[e]quity and the public interest were … seen as the purpose of 
Allāh which it was the task of jurisprudence to implement in the absence of 
any more specific indication in the Qur’an or the Sunna.”217 
This questioning attitude of the jurists, their willingness to go beyond 
the narrow textual framework set by the Islamic revelation, indicates that 
they did not let themselves be impeded by the notion that the ḥadd 
punishments were ‘simply’ the “rights of God”, to be implemented at all cost. 
As this chapter has shown, their deliberations are far more variegated and 
nuanced. In fact, the idea of “God’s rights” at times appears rhetorical. The 
                                         
216 Cf. Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens: Georgia University Press, 1998), pp. 
24-37.  
217 Noel J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago-London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 7. 
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jurists did not consider juristic reasoning about God’s ulterior purpose behind 
His legislation, which they believed had been given to humankind in order to 
preserve the five essentials, particularly difficult or problematic. They all, 
with few exceptions, agreed on these basic assumptions. What was 
problematic for Muslim jurists was how to determine, balance and justify the 
interests at stake, especially when those interests were in conflict. This is 
clear throughout the juristic debate regarding ḥadd punishments. 
         For instance, when the jurists debated whether the theft 
punishment satisfies a right of God or an individual right, it was the 
balancing of the interests that posed a challenge, and then the ways in which 
the punishment should satisfy the violated right. As Emon remarks, legal 
reasoning in the law of ḥadd “proved particularly difficult when the public 
interest conflicted with the needs of private parties.”218 Emon views the 
jurists’ distinction between the right of God and the private right of the 
individual as an interpretive mechanism to frame their naturalistic 
assumptions and apply them in legal analysis to create and distribute rights, 
duties, and public commitments.219  
  In this chapter, I set out with the intention to trace legal debates 
about ḥadd punishments conceived as a right that belongs to God. Except in 
the qadhf offence, the jurists sharply distinguished between God’s rights and 
the individual’s interests, and it appears that they applied this distinction in 
order to establish legal rules that reflected their (pre-)understanding of the 
                                         
218 Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq al-ʿIbād”, p. 327. 
219 Ibid., p. 225. 
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Islamic values of dignity and honour, both with regard to the significance of 
such values for individuals and for society as a whole.220 This finding broadly 
confirms Emon’s view that fiqh discourse on ḥadd is characterized by a 
remarkable degree of intellectual autonomy. However, I argued that Muslim 
jurists labeled ḥudud offences and their punishments as God’s rights because 
they did not want to allow a flexible law that is accessible for human to 
mitigate or dismiss without a juristic reference.221  
        In sum, the jurists’ distinction between the right of God and the 
individual’s right allowed them to ensure that the Sharīʿah as a rule of law 
upholds and, when necessary, balances both society’s needs (the common 
good which is presumed to represent God’s right) and private interests such 
as the honour and dignity of the individual. The Sunnī jurists insisted on a 
certain immutability of ḥadd punishments as norms that are “divinely 
ordained” (muqaddar), especially once the crime was brought before the 
judicial authorities. However, this did not prevent them from developing a 
wide arsenal of rules and exceptions that could often help to circumvent the 
implementation of the ḥadd punishments. 
 
 
                                         
220 Ibid., p. 358. 
221 Emon has argued against my argument where he indicates that the jurists embraced 
values and assumptions that echo the modern Western notion of ‘natural rights’. As he 
writes, the jurists established a “natural rights regime”, they “did not resort to scriptural text 
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presumptions about human nature and the social good, formed in terms of the ḥuqūq 




Chapter 2: Ḥadd punishments as general prevention (zajr) and 
individual prevention (radʿ) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I discussed the jurists’ justification of ḥadd 
norms and the punishments associated with them as the right belonging to 
God (ḥaqq Allāh), and I elaborated on a number of examples from within the 
jurists’ debate about the conflicts of rights between the rights of God and 
those of the individual. I argued that, despite the fact that the jurists treated 
ḥadd punishments as the immutable law of God the jurists made certain 
exceptions where ḥadd punishments become inoperative.  In chapter two, I 
examined the justification of ḥadd punishments as deterrents, that is, legal 
actions aimed to deter generally and individually. 
Obviously, ḥadd offences and the capital and corporal punishments 
associated with them occupy a central place in the Islamic legal tradition. 
Classical jurists were responsible for establishing the final form of rules about 
the implementations of ḥadd punishments (iqāmat l-ḥudūd). Based on the 
Qurᵓān and the Prophetic tradition (sunnah), jurists defined ḥadd offences 
and regarded their punishments as fixed, immutable and eternally mandatory 
(ʿuqūbāt muqaddara). However, the Qurᵓān remains equivocal about the 
precise definition of ḥadd offences and the ways in which the punishments 
should be inflicted. For this reason, a unanimous recourse to the Prophetic 
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and ṣaḥāba traditions was the foundational source of law for classical jurists 
to establish a firm set of rules about ḥadd punishments. Therefore, classical 
jurists played a major role in shaping the final form of ḥadd laws and their 
punitive practices. For example, they defined ḥadd offences as entirely or 
predominantly the violation of God’s claim (ḥaqq Allāh). This was sometimes 
equated with violation of the public interest (al-maṣlaḥa l-ʿāmma). 
Undoubtedly, this inevitably led classical jurists to treat ḥadd punishments as 
the fixed (al-thābit) law of God. 
This chapter aims, first, to examine one of the main juristic 
justifications of ḥadd Allāh, that is, general and individual prevention (zajr 
and radʿ). I will examine the justification of ḥadd punishments as general 
prevention by paying particular attention to the punishments of stoning 
(rajm) and crucifixion (ṣalb). As for individual prevention, the punishments of 
flogging (jald), amputating (qaṭʿ) and banishment (nafy) will be analysed and 
used as illustration. Secondly, I propose two case studies about ḥadd 
punishments as disputed in the fiqh tradition because these were thought by 
some jurists to be ineffective. Finally, I propose a brief discussion related to 
the uncertainty of the justification of ḥadd punishments as effectuating 
general and individual prevention, and this discussion will then be further 
explored in chapter three, that is, when I will turn to the issue of whether to 
suffer a ḥadd punishment is an act of expiation (kaffāra).  
 
2.2 Fiqh debates about ḥadd punishments as general prevention (zajr) 
and individual prevention (radʿ) 
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In this section, I examine the jurists’ concepts of zajr and radʿ, concepts 
which were proposed in the tradition of jurisprudence (fiqh) and were later 
deployed by Muslims jurists to justify ḥadd punishments, particularly in view 
of the severity of these punishments. According to the Sunnī legal tradition, 
ḥadd punishments were perceived as to generally and individually deter 
Muslims from committing ḥadd offences. For example, the Mālikī jurist al-
Qarāfī held that deterrence is a basic Islamic rule of law (al-zawājir min 
qawāʿid al-sharʿ).222 It is important to stress that the juristic concepts of zajr 
and radʿ as proposed in their classical writings are not systematically distinct 
from each other and that they are almost synonymous. 
In this section I refer to the concept zajr in relation to instances in the 
legal discourse where classical jurists justified ḥadd punishments by claiming 
that they prevent the general public (al-ʿāmma) from committing the same 
crime. As for the concept of radʿ, I refer to it where ḥadd punishments are 
justified as to prevent the individual (radʿ) from re-committing the offence. I 
examine the jurists’ justification of ḥadd punishments as deterrents by 
critically analysing a number of ḥadd offences and by discussing the 
implications of their punishments in the fiqh tradition. Classical jurists tended 
to argue that capital punishments deter the general public from committing 
“obscene” crimes (fawāḥish), and that corporal punishments prevent and 
deter the offenders from re-committing a similar offence. I also examine two 
                                         
222 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra fī furūʻ al-Mālikiyya, vol. 12, p. 260. 
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case studies found in the fiqh writings where jurists discuss the perceived 
ineffectiveness of ḥadd punishments as deterrent tools. 
 
2.2.1 General prevention (zajr)  
Semantically, zajr denotes forced prevention and suppression (of 
customs, abuse, crimes). The adjective of zajr is zājir which, if taken as a 
noun, means handicap, impediment; its plural is zawājir which encompasses 
the meaning of restriction and limitation.223 As to the concept of radʿ, the 
dictionary defines this as “to keep, prevent from”. The adjective of radʿ is 
rādiʿ (pl. rawādiʿ) which, if taken as a noun, means deterrent, impediment, 
obstacle, handicap, restriction, and limitation.224 In the next section, we will 
also come across the term tashhīr in the juristic discussion of the procedures 
of ḥadd implementations. Tashhīr can be translated as the act of “making a 
person becoming well known, notorious, and of ill repute”.225 
  Ḥadd offences and ḥadd punishments are defined in the jurists’ 
manuals as the limits of God (ḥudūd Allāh), and ḥadd punishments are 
portrayed and justified as to generally prevent Muslims from committing any 
of the offences and, more generally, of all obscene acts (fawāḥish) forbidden 
in revelation.226 According to all Sunnī schools of law, the principle purpose 
of the institution of ḥadd norms (tashrīʿ l-ḥudūd) and of ḥadd punishments is 
                                         
223  Wehr, Arabic English Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 373. 
224  Ibid., p. 335. 
225  Ibid., p. 490. 
226  Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 41-42; Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 4; Ibn al-
Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, pp. 312, 325. 
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to deter (zajr) the public from acts that are potentially harmful to humanity 
(shuriʿat li-maṣlaḥat al-ʿibād).227 Therefore, in pursuance of this objective, 
classical jurists argued that the fixed punishments of ḥudūd Allāh must be 
inflicted publicly, to achieve a high degree of publicity. There is no single 
occasion where classical jurists do not present ḥadd punishments and their 
deterrent effect (zajr) as the main underlying purpose (ratio legis) behind 
Islamic criminal law, not only of ḥudūd, but also of qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr. This is 
because, according to Muslim jurists, the threat of punishment in the 
hereafter does not sufficiently and effectively deter people from committing 
forbidden offences. Thus, ḥadd punishments are conceived as a vital necessity 
to balance actions in this world. 
Sunnī jurists proposed in their introductions about ḥadd punishments 
the definition of zajr, which they developed and considered as the ratio legis 
(ʿilla) behind the legislation of ḥadd. It can be observed that zajr as defined in 
the jurists’ writings entails general and individual prevention. Again, let it be 
stressed that there is a manifest overlap between zajr and radʿ in the juristic 
presentation of the justifications of ḥadd punishments. A number of classical 
jurists proposed the dual combination of ḥadd as zajr and radʿ. According to 
Ibn al-Humām, “ḥadd punishments are to prevent and to deter” (al-ḥudūd 
mawāniʿ qabl l-fiʿl zawājir baʿdahu).”228 
                                         
227 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 4 
228  Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 4; Al-Kāndahlawī, Awjaz al-masālik ilā Muwaṭṭaᵓ 
Mālik, vol. 15, p. 225. 
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In my view, jurists from early to classical times developed a narrow 
concept of ḥadd punishments and their implications for two reasons: on the 
one hand, they wanted to circumscribe the applicability of ḥadd punishments; 
on the other hand, they allowed them only in as much as they served to 
generally deter people from committing forbidden offences. Parallel to this 
process, the legal concept of tashhīr (ignominious, parading)229 was first 
introduced and later developed by jurists to justify and describe the purposes 
behind legal punishment more generally speaking.230 Tashhīr, according to 
fiqh tradition, aims to publicly destroy the inviolability (ḥurma) and dignity 
(karāma) of the culprit. The Ḥanafīs extensively discussed the concept of 
tashhīr and insisted on its vital role in deterring the Muslim public from 
committing forbidden offences. As the influential late-classical Ḥanafī Ibn al-
Humām put it, “the principle of ḥadd law is to make someone well-
known/notorious (al-ḥadd muṭlaqan mabnī ʿala l-tashhīr), in order to achieve 
public deterrence (zajran li-l-ʿāmma)”231. Both Ibn al-Humām and Ibn Nujaym 
argued that the punishment for illegal sexual intercourse (ḥadd al-zinā), that 
is, stoning (rajm), is based on the principle of tashhīr; however, tashhīr is 
emphasised more if the culprit is male.232 Accordingly, the practice of 
                                         
229 Lange remarks on the concept of tashhīr stating that: “Tashhīr was a multidimensional and 
multifunctional punishment that deserves to be recognised as being of central importance to 
the development of Islamic punitive practices in premodern times”. Cf. Lange, Justice, 
Punishment and the Medieval Imagination, pp. 226-243. 
230  Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, p. 222. 
231 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, p. 220; Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 16. 
232 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, 5, p. 222; Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 16. 
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ignominious punishment in Islamic law aims, first, to deter the general public 
(zajr) from committing ḥadd offences. Secondly, it aims to humiliate and 
disgrace the culprit.233 The characteristic of individual prevention (radʿ) in 
capital punishments, that is, stoning and crucifixion, is less emphasised in the 
juristic discussion. In other words, the humiliation and disgrace of the culprit 
are not meant to deter the culprit and this is because the latter is put to death 
by the capital punishment, which means that he will not have the chance to 
be deterred from committing the same offence again. 
The Mālikī jurist Al-Qarāfī held that all ḥadd punishments must be 
implemented equally in public (al-ḥudūd kulluhā tuʿlanu wa-l-nās fīhā kulluhā 
sawāᵓ).”234 As a further illustration of this point, I have examined examples of 
capital punishments where general deterrence is presumed and where the 
aspect of tashhīr is emphasized. The examples as presented in the fiqh 
tradition are the punishments of stoning (rajm) and crucifixion (ṣalb). 
 
2.2.1.1 Stoning (rajm) 
The jurists’ understanding of the implementations of ḥadd punishments 
(iqāmat l-ḥudūd) is manifest in their arguments where ḥadd punishment is 
based on inflicting the ḥadd punishment as publicly as possible (mabnā l-
ḥudūd ʿalā l-tashhīr). According to the Sunnī schools of law, it is the consensus 
of Muslim jurists that stoning (rajm) is the Sunnah of the Prophet Muḥammad 
and that it is the practice of the community where the companions of the 
                                         
233 Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 7, p. 316. 
234 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 12, p. 87. 
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Prophet were reported to have stoned offenders of zinā offences. As the fiqh 
tradition indicates, the punishment of zinā must in all cases follow the 
example of the stoning which took place during the lifetime of the Prophet 
Muḥammad. For instance, the Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Qudāma described the 
process of inflicting the punishment as follows: “if the offence of zinā is 
committed by a free man, then he is to stand while the stones are being 
thrown over him. This is the procedure whether the offence was proven 
either by four witnesses or by confession.”235 
 
This injunction, that the male culprit is to stand, underscores the 
public character of the punishment: that jurists thus made sure that even 
spectators on the fringe would witness the punishment inflicted. 
Furthermore, jurists argued that it is essentially from the Sunnah 
practice that the Muslim public witnesses the punishment in great numbers. 
In the Qurᵓān one finds the principle: “Let a group of believers witness their 
punishment” (Q 24:2). But this is not all: the public must not only witness 
but also take an active role in participating in the actual process of stoning. 
According to a Prophetic tradition, if four eyewitnesses confirmed the zinā 
offence, the crowd must surround the adulterer or adulteress and initiate the 
stoning. If the offence is proven by confession, then the ruler (ḥākim) is to 
                                         
235 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 40. 
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initiate the stoning process, and then the Muslim public is instructed to 
continue stoning the culprit until she/he dies.236 
The Shāfiʿīs, for example al-Shīrāzī, held that it is not compulsory for 
the imām to attend or participate in the stoning process because the Prophet 
was never reported to have attended or participated in this process.237 One 
can observe that, in the jurists’ writings about the implementation of ḥadd 
punishment, the process of stoning is discussed in great detail. Furthermore, 
Muslim classical jurists were even specific in their description of the type of 
stones that should be used, as well as the ways in which the stones should be 
thrown throughout the process of stoning. Thus, several Sunnī jurists state 
that 
 
stoning to death is administered by a crowd, throwing stones at the 
adulterer or adulteress with intentionally aiming to ultimately kill him or her. 
The stones must not be too small or too large: if they are too small it may 
take too long to kill the condemned and if they are too large, he or she may 
die too soon. The right size is that of a stone that fills a hand.238 
 
Sunni jurists agreed that the stoning punishment is intended to cause 
death (l-rajm itlāf).239 Thus the participants are recommended to directly aim 
at killing the culprit (wa-yustaḥabbu li-kulli man rajama an yaqṣida qatlahu li-
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annahu al-maqṣūd).240 The Ḥanafī jurist Ibn al-Humām understood this 
recommendation as a means of “making it easy” (taysīr) for the culprit, that 
is, not to suffer for long. 
Jurists proposed that tashhīr in stoning punishment functions as a 
caution message to the Muslim public. Thus, tashhīr was to function as an 
effective reminder to the Muslim society at large for their duties to keep 
distant from forbidden and obscene acts, that is, the ḥadd offences. 
Furthermore, jurists discussed the possibility that the adulterer may attempt 
to escape stoning. For instance, al-Shīrāzī held that if the offence was 
witnessed then the punishment must be carried out; however, if it was by 
confession then the adulterer must be let to escape the punishment.241 
 
2.2.1.2 Crucifixion (ṣalb) 
The traditional interpretation of Q 5:33 is that it prescribes crucifixion 
as one of the four possible punishments for brigandage.242 The majority of 
classical jurists held that the ruler (imām) has no right to waive crucifixion 
because its tashhīr character makes people reflect on the crime (al-maqṣūd bihi 
al-ishhār li-yaʿtabira ghayruh), thus teaching them to desist from it.243 The 
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Shāfiʿī al-Baghawī argued that “crucifixion (al-ṣalb) happens so that people 
may learn a lesson (li-l-iʿtibār) and for zajr.”244 
    According to fiqh tradition, jurists from the early tradition disputed 
the exact way of crucifying the bandit. The Ḥanafīs, for instance, held that 
the bandit (muḥārib) was to be left crucified for three days before being 
beheaded by sword and that this would be his only disgrace (taḥqīq maʿna al-
khizy). The crucifixion is viewed as an opportunity for the Muslim public to 
witness the punishment as a caution (li-yaʿtabira bihi ghayruh), especially for 
those who may themselves have the intention of pursuing such a grave 
offence.245 The Shāfʿī al-Ramlī is more specific about the place in which the 
crucifixion must take place, namely that it must be “where the incident of 
ḥirāba took place.”246 Al-Ramlī appears to reason that crucifixion would have 
its maximum deterring effect if carried out before the eyes of the community 
in whose midst brigandage had been committed. Al-Ramlī further argued that 
“the crucified bandit is to be held [on the cross] for a minimum period that 
deters people.”247 Similarly, Ibn Qudāma holds that the crucified bandit is to 
be left crucified for the period of the time which it takes to achieve tashhīr 
(idhā ishtahara unzila).”248 
The majority of Sunnī jurists agree that the crucifixion has to be before 
the execution, “so that public humiliation is really achieved” (li-taḥqīq maʿnā 
                                         
244 Al-Baghawī, Al-Tahdhīb, vol. 7, p. 402. 
245 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 158. 
246 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat Al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 6.  
247 Ibid, p. 8. 
248 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 12, p. 479. 
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al-khizy fī ḥaqqih).”249 There is a debate in the juristic writing about whether 
it is also allowable or recommended to crucify the bandit after he is executed. 
Apparently, this practice was prevalent in Arabia but was later found to be 
condemned in the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah. According to the Prophetic 
tradition, the culprit’s body after execution must be respected and treated in 
accordance with the teachings of Islam, which forbid mutilation (muthla).  
 
2.2.2 When ḥadd punishments function both as general (zajr) and 
individual (radʿ) deterrents 
It has been suggested that ḥadd punishments, as presented in the fiqh 
tradition, have the dual impact of both general and individual deterrence.250 
According to the majority of Muslim jurists, all corporal punishments of the 
ḥadd type, for example, scourging, amputation, and banishment are delivered 
with the intent of having a deterrent effect on both the public and the 
culprits.251 The purpose of ḥadd punishment, that is, general prevention, is 
only achieved by allowing the general public to witness and participate, for 
instance, in the case of stoning, in the punishment inflicted. According to the 
Sunnī jurists, individual deterrence is achieved by the suffering and pain 
caused to offenders while the punishment is being inflicted. This also 
involves a rehabilitation aspect which attempts to make the offender 
reluctant to re-commit the same offence. Rehabilitation, according to jurists, 
                                         
249 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 158. 
250 Cf. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 29. 
251 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, p. 218. 
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is achieved by not re-committing the same offence, and is equal to repenting 
from the sin committed. According to the jurists, the punishments of flogging, 
amputations and banishments have the dual impact of both general and 
individual prevention. In the following sections, I will provide an explanation 
of this claim in each area of flogging, amputation and banishment.  
 
2.2.2.1 Flogging:  
The consensus of Muslim jurists is that the punishment for committing 
adultery for non-married offenders is one hundred scourges. This is viewed as 
a non-fatal punishment (al-ḥadd zājir lā-mutlif) which is presumed to deter 
(zajr) both the public and the offenders.252 A closer examination of the 
process of inflicting scourging is found in the narration attributed to the 
companion ʿAlī, where he is reported to have ordered the culprit’s clothes to 
be taken off in order to make sure that the scourging was painful.253 To 
support the jurists’ claim that the corporal punishments are meant to prevent 
(radʿ) the culprit from re-committing the offence, jurists extensively cited the 
narration attributed to ʿAlī which requested Muslims to “avoid dangerous 
spots such as the head and the genital areas.”254 The aspect of tashhīr is again 
evident in the process of flogging. The jurists specify the process of flogging 
in the following terms: 
                                         
252Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 392. 
253 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 5, p. 218; Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 15; Al-
Shāfiʻī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 201. 
254 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 392. 
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Men are as a rule flogged while standing, whereas women are whipped 
while seated. Men are stripped to the waist (except when they are flogged for 
calumny), unlike women, who may leave their clothes on. However, furs and 
leather clothing are removed, as they would protect the offender against the 
pain. […] It is commendable to carry out the punishment in public. The 
blows must be equally distributed over the body, with the exception of 
dangerous spots such as the head and the genital area.255 
 
 
Moreover, jurists of the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools of law set out a 
number of rules to make sure that the flogging punishment is inflicted fairly 
and in proportion to the offence, that is whether illegal sexual intercourse 
(zinā), calumny (qadhf) or drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr). In fact they 
regard this way of inflicting the penalty as compulsory: 
 
Flogging has to be administered by a leather whip. The executioner, in 
administering the lashes, may not raise his hand above his head to the extent 
that the armpit is visible. The force with which the lashes are administered 
varies with the crime: flogging for unlawful intercourse must be more painful 
than flogging for drinking alcohol. Flogging for drinking alcohol may, 
therefore, also be inflicted by palm leaves, twined cloth or shoes.256 
 
 
Furthermore, jurists also debated the severity of the scourging and 
whether all the offences that are punished with scourging share the same 
                                         
255 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 16. 
256 Al-Shāfiʻī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 282; Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 15; Ibn Qudāma, 
Al-Mughnī, vol. 12, p. 510. 
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severity of scourging. For instance, Ibn Qudāma held that the severest 
scourging (ashadd al-ḍarb) in ḥadd punishments is the scourging for illegal 
sexual intercourse, then the scourging for qadhf, and finally the scourging for 
consuming alcohol.257 Mālik, on the other hand, viewed the severity of 
scourging to be the same because the Qurᵓān is ambiguous about the severity 
of scourging.258 The Ḥanafīs went further and argued that scourging of taʿzīr 
is the severest, then the scourging for illegal sexual intercourse, then 
consuming alcohol and, finally, the scourging for qadhf. Ḥanafīs argued that 
God specifies the scourging of adultery as the verse stipulates “... scourge ye 
each one of them [with] a hundred stripes. And let not pity for the twain 
withhold you from obedience to God” (Q 24:2). It could be inferred from this 
discussion that the severity of the scourging is intended to cause pain and the 
graver the sin the more will the scourging be severe. 
Clearly, the debate about what was the highest possible severity of the 
ḥadd scourging would indicate that even the jurists themselves are divided 
about the gravity of the ḥadd sins. In other words, jurists never agreed about 
the exact degree of gravity of the ḥadd offences; for example, would illegal 
sexual intercourse be graver than drinking alcohol? The Qurᵓān does not 
specify the degree of obscenity of each ḥadd crime, even though all ḥadd 
offences are forbidden in the Qurᵓān, and most of their punishments are 
prescribed in the Qurᵓān, apart from stoning and banishment. Only God, 
according to the majority of Muslim jurists, knows the exact degree of the 
                                         
257 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 12, p. 511. 
258 Saḥnūn, Al-Mudawwana, vol. 6, p. 2835. 
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sinfulness of each ḥadd crime. After all, ḥadd punishments are treated as the 
things “decreed by God”, and only God has the right to prohibit things, as He 
is the Creator of everything. The debate about the human ability to discern 
God’s intention behind Qurᵓānic legislation is deeply rooted in the early 
history of Islamic theology (Cf. ch. 3).  
 
2.2.2.2 Amputation (qaṭʿ)  
Muslim Jurists applied a similar explanation to the theft offence. In 
general, the zajr aspect of the punishment is stressed. According to al-Shīrāzī, 
it is from the Sunnah principle that the thief’s right hand should be tied 
round his neck and he is required to walk around the crowd aiming to 
provide an example in order to deter people from committing the same 
offence.259  The four Sunnī schools of law argued that “cutting off the hand 
aims to deter and not to destruct (al-ḥadd zājir lā mutlif).”260 
In certain instances, however, the radʿ aspect also enters into the 
picture. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) argued that 
 
the amputation of the hand is more of a deterrent (zajr) than execution  
(qatl) [...] as if people always see the amputated culprit this will remind them 
of his crime, and thus they will be deterred. Contrary to the amputation, 
execution could be forgotten, therefore, the amputation is more of a deterrent 
                                         
259 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, p. 446. 
260 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 167. 
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to the culprit and the public (fa-yakūnu hadhā ashaddu tankīlan lahu wa-li-
amthāli).261 
 
Ibn Qudāma provided a similar view about the amputation of the hand 
and its deterrent effect on both the individual and the public. He stated that 
“the thief’s right hand is to be cut off and tied round his neck for radʿ and 
zajr.”262 Similarly, the purpose of amputation is constantly advocated in the 
jurists’ writings in the following terms: “the cutting off the right hand is 
meant as a deterrent (al-qaṭʿ shuriʿa zājiran) and not to destroy (mutlifan).”263 
There is a tendency in the jurists’ dispute about ḥadd punishments as 
an individual deterrence to argue that there is the possibility for 
rehabilitation. Arguably, classical jurists assumed that the pain caused by 
flogging or amputating of the hand will inevitably rehabilitate the offender 
and thereby deter him from committing the crime again. Thus rehabilitation, 
as classical jurists conceived it, is fulfilled when the deterrent effect of ḥadd 
punishment is achieved. This means that, if the offence is not re-committed 
by the offender, ultimately his rehabilitation is achieved and he is again to be 
considered as a healthy member of the society and as a person who has been 
brought back to the straight path. According to the majority of Muslim 
jurists, individual deterrence (radʿ) is achieved when the person experiences 
the pain while the punishment is being inflicted. 
                                         
261 Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Tafsīr Al-kabīr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000), vol. 4, p. 
69. 
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There are two kinds of pain in the view of jurists: physical and 
psychological. The jurists to justify the severity of ḥadd punishments deploy 
both. The former is experienced in each penalty, and the latter is fulfilled by 
way of tashhīr. Punishment like stoning, scourging and amputation primarily 
aim to cause as much pain as is needed in order to deter the culprit from 
reoffending, thus converting him back into an obedient Muslim. Therefore, 
tashhīr is fulfilled by all means of punishment. For instance, theft punishment 
is presented in the fiqh tradition as combining physical and psychological 
effects on the culprit: the painful moment when the hand is being cut off, as 
well as the psychological pain of walking around the town with the 
amputated hand hanging round the neck. Last but not least, life with an 
amputated hand is assumed to constantly remind the culprit of the 
punishment awaiting him if he should re-commit the same offence in the 
future.  
 
2.2.2.3 Banishment (nafy ʿan al-arḍ, taghrīb) 
The only punishment that has a fully developed aspect of radʿ is the 
punishment of banishment. According to the Islamic tradition, banishment is 
the penalty for the ḥadd offences of fornication (zinā) and banditry 
(ḥirāba).264 The majority of jurists replace the banishment punishment in 
banditry crimes with imprisonment until the culprit shows repentance and 
                                         
264 Q, 5:33, and the ḥadīth tradition of Unays.  
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remorse.265 As for fornication committed by a fornicator who is not muḥṣan, 
banishment for a year was a complementary punishment according to all 
Sunnī schools except the Ḥanafīs.266 The Mālikīs approved it, but only for 
men, since banishment for women meant that they were forced to live far 
from their male relatives which could, therefore, lead to a life of 
debauchery.267 The Mālikīs held that banishment was a real deportation, but 
applied it only to male bandits.268  The Shāfiʿīs required that a woman who 
was sentenced to a one-year banishment must be accompanied, at her own 
expense, by a close male relative to stay with her and watch over her.269 
Furthermore, the punishment of taghrīb was justified as it was “aimed to 
torture the offender by expelling him away from home and family.”270 The 
banishment penalty shows, more clearly perhaps than most other ḥadd 
punishments, that individual deterrence and reformation of the offender was 
an important aspect in the law of ḥadd. Banishment did nothing to achieve 
general prevention; its main use and purpose was to reform the offender. 
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2.2.3 When ḥadd punishment is not a deterrent 
The fiqh tradition knows of many problematic areas concerning the 
actual process of applying ḥadd punishments. The first issue here is the 
repetition of a ḥadd offence, for example when theft is committed three times 
or more, in particular after the offender has been previously punished. The 
four Sunnī schools of law show an awareness of the inescapable conclusion 
that in cases where the offender re-commits the theft crime, the previous 
punishment has not functioned as a deterrent preventing the culprit from re-
committing theft. In this section, I limit my examination to the offence of 
theft, for the reason that jurists expanded their discussion in the context of 
this particular offence. The second issue I want to investigate is what 
happens, according to the jurists, when ḥadd offences overlap (tadākhul l-
ḥudūd), either with the same offence or with different ḥadd offences. Sunnī 
jurists were in general more inclined to dispute that each case has different 
legal implications, as I will show below in more detail. 
 
2.2.3.1 Repetition of ḥadd offences  
According to the Sunnī jurists, there are cases reported in the Ṣaḥāba 
tradition where theft was committed several times. Sunnī jurists agreed that 
after the first incident of theft the punishment is, as prescribed in the Qurᵓān, 
to amputate the thief’s right hand. However, they disputed the legal 
implications of the repetition of the theft offence after the second incident. 
Naturally, the classical jurists were confronted with cases where theft had 
been committed for a second, third and fourth time. In this case the jurists 
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faced the problem of determining a punishment for each of these offences: 
Should there be cross-amputation? That is, should amputation of the right 
hand (for the first instance of theft) be followed by amputation of the left 
foot (for the second instance), amputation of the left hand (for the third 
instance), and amputation of the right foot (for the fourth instance)? But 
jurists also had to consider the case of a thief committing as many as five 
theft offences. Should a different punishment be used? 
According to the Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs and the Ḥanafī al-Kāsānī, the culprit 
was to be punished for each theft offence he committed. This argument they 
based on qiyās.271 The ḥadd punishment for theft is a pure (khāliṣ) right of 
God, and since the offence can be repeated, the punishment is repeatable 
too.272 The Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs held that, in the third incident of theft, the 
thief’s left hand is to be cut off and in the fourth incident the left foot is to be 
cut off.  If theft is committed a fifth time, the thief is to be sent to prison.273 
The Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs also relied on a narration according to which the 
companions Abū Bakr and ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb said that “if the thief commits 
the offence for the third time his left hand should be cut off, and if he 
commits the offence for the fourth time his right foot to be cut off. In case he 
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commits the same offence for the fifth time he is to be sent to prison as 
(taʿzīr).”274 
The Ḥanafīs al-Sarakhsī, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and the Ḥanbalī Ibn Qudāma limited 
the theft punishment only to the second offence. They held that, in the first 
incident of committing theft, the thief’s right hand was to be cut off and in 
the second incident his left foot was to be cut off (cutting off the left foot is 
based on qiyās to the punishment for ḥirāba).275 In the case where there was a 
third incident of a theft offence, the thief was to be sent to prison as taʿzīr. 
The imprisonment would last until the thief repented and showed genuine 
remorse.276 The Ḥanafīs’ objection to the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs’ verdict was 
based on another narration, traced back to the Companion ʿAlī. He is 
reported to have been requested to judge a thief with an amputated hand and 
foot for committing theft for the third time. ʿAlī is reported to have consulted 
the other Companions about the punishment. The Companions are reported 
to have advised him to execute the thief. ʿAlī responded that he was not to be 
executed, nor were his left hand and right foot to be cut off, since this would 
make it impossible for him to feed and clean himself.277 
Obviously, the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs’ consensus was based on Abū Bakr 
and ʿUmar’s narration and ignored ʿAlī’s narration. Thus, they could argue 
that the Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs had gone against a well-established (thābit) 
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Sunnah of the Companions. The Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs claimed that the 
story about ʿAlī was not an established (thābit) narration. The Ḥanafīs 
responded to the Shāfiʿīs by arguing that “by repeating the punishment and 
extending it to the left hand and right foot this will undoubtedly lead to 
consume (yastahlik) the thief’s ability for his basic needs”.278 Al-Shāfiʿī 
responded to the Ḥanafīs by reasoning that 
 
        their claim the ḥadd punishment must be prevented from being 
applied if [the offence is] repeated is baseless because ḥadd punishments are 
not preventable for the reason you [Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs] assumed. Since 
the thief still has the ability to steal the ḥadd of God is not to be prevented or 
waived from being implemented (wa-inna l-yad wa-l-rijl hiya mawāḍiʿ al-ḥadd 
... fa-matā kāna al-mawḍiʿ qāᵓiman ḥudda ʿalayhi).279 
 
Since the Qurᵓān and the Prophetic ḥadīth are silent about the 
repetition of the ḥadd offence, jurists based their reasoning about this 
problem on ṣaḥāba tradition and qiyās.  This led them to extend the 
amputation punishment to the left hand and the feet.  As the jurists argued, 
the principal aim of the ḥadd legislation, in particular the theft punishment, 
was to deter the thief from re-committing the same offence. Where the 
offence was re-committed several times, jurists argued that the re-
implementation of ḥadd punishment prevented the thief from using his hands 
or feet to steal again. By this, individual deterrence was achieved.280 The 
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Shāfiʿī al-Baghawī (d.516/1122) explained the purpose of extending the 
punishments in the repeated offence in these words:  
 
         When the amputation of the thief’s left foot does not serve as a 
deterrent after the second incident of theft (inna al-sāriq lammā lam yanzajir 
bi-qaṭʿi rijlihi al-yusrā fī-l-marra al-thāniya) then it has become known to us 
that the criminal is obsessed by this crime (ʿulima anna al-ijrām mutamakkin 
min nafsih). In this situation the amputation of the left hand serves to destroy 
his ability to seize [objects] illegally (ḥattā tafāwat ʿalayhi manfaʿat al-baṭsh). 
In the fourth incident of theft it is known to us that the punishment did not 
deter the thief. However, it is then appropriate to amputate his right foot in 
order to destroy his ability to walk, because theft relies on the ability to seize 
illegally and to walk (ʿulima annahu lam yanzajir fa-nāsaba qaṭʿ rijlihi al-yumnā 
ḥattā tafāwat ʿalayhi manfaʿat al-mashy, fa-inna al-sariqa innamā takūnu bi-l-
baṭsh wa al-mashy).281 
 
The Ḥanafī al-Jaṣāṣṣ, on the other hand, held that the implementation 
of ḥadd punishment in the second incident of theft, that is, amputation of the 
left foot was a scholarly consensus.  But he also pointed out that no 
consensus existed regarding the third and fourth incidents of theft. Thus, for 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ, if the jurists’ consensus was not established there ought to be no 
further amputation (lam yajuz qaṭʿuhu mā ʿadam al-ittifāq).282 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also 
rejected applying qiyās to justify the amputation of the third and the fourth 
extremity, in accordance with the Ḥanafī rejection of qiyās in the law of ḥadd 
(la yajūz ithbāt l-ḥudūd bi-l-qiyās). 
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Arguably, the fault of the jurists, and particularly of the Shāfiʿīs and 
Mālikīs, lay in regarding the hands and feet of the thief as the only 
instruments (al-āla) which can be used to commit the offence.283 If someone 
wants to commit theft, it could be said that he is going to use whatever 
means are necessary to steal, from forming the intention (niyya), using his 
power to reason (ʿaql) to plan, to finally executing the plan and using his 
whole body including his hands and feet to steal and move away from the 
place where the goods are kept. The jurists’ understanding seems overly 
mechanical and not very interested in what could be called the psychology of 
theft, including considerations about the deterring effects of punishment on 
the thief. 
The Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs seem to lean in this ‘mechanical’ direction 
even more heavily than the Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs. The Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs 
judged the repeated offender strictly on the basis of what was apparent, and 
on qiyās – for them, theft was theft, and the punishment for theft was 
amputation. The Ḥanafīs (with some exceptions, such as al-Kāsānī) and the 
Ḥanbalīs, on the other hand, seem to suggest that, if a thief was not reformed 
by having one hand and one foot cut off, to amputate more members of his 
body would not lead to the desired result either, that is, to individual 
deterrence. In such a case, it is preferable, in fact nothing remains to be done, 
but to lock the thief away in prison. Therefore, one can argue that the 
Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs paid greater attention to the potential of ḥadd to 
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“reform” the criminal; individual deterrence (radʿ), in their view, had a more 
important role to play in explaining and justifying punishment than it had 
among the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs. 
 
2.2.3.2 Overlap of ḥadd offences (tadākhul or ijtimāʿ al-ḥadd) 
Classical jurists extensively discussed the issue regarding the overlap 
of ḥadd offences (tadākhul al-ḥudūd). According to the jurists’ writings, the 
overlap between ḥadd offences occurs in three scenarios, each of these 
scenarios having its own legal regulations, and consequently having different 
legal implications. These scenarios are as follows: 
 
(1) A single ḥadd offence where several parties are injured: 
The example given for this scenario is the offence of the false 
accusation of committing illegal sexual intercourse (qadhf). The Ḥanafī jurists 
in this particular scenario speculated that the culprit accused one person or a 
group of people several times on one occasion. If one of the falsely accused 
brings the case to the judge the accuser is to be punished only once with 
eighty lashes. In the case where the other accused parties decide to bring the 
case before the judge, the ḥadd should not be applied. This is because, if one 
of the accused brought the case to the judge, it would not be as if all the 
injured parties brought the case to the judge (ḥuḍūr baʿḍihim li-l-khuṣūma ka-
ḥuḍūr kullihim fa-lā yuḥadd thāniyan).284 According to Ibn al-Humām, ḥadd 
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punishment is due whenever the offence is proved, once the ḥadd crime is 
brought before the judge, and when it is proven thereafter. One ḥadd 
punishment is enough to achieve the ḥadd purpose, that is, zajr. The numbers 
of the qadhf accusations occurring at one time would be punished with only 
one ḥadd punishment of eighty lashes.285 
         The Mālikīs held a similar argument to that of the Ḥanafīs and 
regarded that “one ḥadd punishment is sufficient, even if the culprit were to 
accuse a group of people in different places (idhā kararra al-qadhf li-wāḥid aw 
li-jamāʻa fī majlis aw-majālis fa-laysa ʿalayhi ilā ḥadd wāḥid).”286 The Mālikīs’ 
position about the overlap of ḥadd offences distinguishes between whether 
the injured right was a right of God or a right of the individual. Where the 
transgression occurred against a right which belonged to God, that is, illegal 
sexual intercourse, theft, apostasy, banditry, and drinking alcohol, all ḥadd 
offences would be amenable to overlap. In other words, if the aforementioned 
offences were committed by the culprit the culprit would suffer capital 
punishment for apostasy, the remaining punishments being dismissed.287 On 
the other hand, where the transgressed right belonged to the individual, that 
is, where it is a right of qiṣāṣ, the culprit’s offences did not overlap and the 
culprit would be punished for his offences.288  
       Ḥanafī jurists justified this by arguing that the intended purpose 
(maqṣūd) of applying ḥadd was to deter (zajr) and that deterrence would be 
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286 Al-Khurashī, Ḥāshiyat al-Khurashī, vol. vol. 8, p. 302. 
287 Ibid, vol. 8, p. 302. 
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achieved and fulfilled only by applying the punishment for one ḥadd offence. 
If the ḥadd punishment was to be implemented two or three times, the 
probability (iḥtimāliyya) would be that there is no benefit (ʿadam al-fāᵓida) in 
applying the ḥadd punishment. However, the ḥadd must not be implemented 
if it were not going to benefit and achieve its primary aim, that is, deterrence 
(la yajūzu iqāmat al-ḥadd maʿa iḥtimāl ʿadam al-fāᵓida).289 
Contrary to the Ḥanafīs, the Shāfiʿīs held that when a free man falsely 
accuses a group of people of having committed illegal sexual intercourse or if 
he denigrates their lineage, his punishment should be one ḥadd punishment 
of eighty lashes for each of the group. Hence, he would be punished with the 
first ḥadd and then, after a while, punished for the rest of his accusations.290 
Al-Shīrāzī argued that the punishment for qadhf was inflicted to protect the 
people’s reputation (dafʿ al-ʿār). If someone accused a number of people of 
qadhf in one utterance, he was to be punished with eighty lashes for every 
single person that he had accused.291 Here, emphasis is more on the 
individual’s right, since the ḥadd punishment of qadhf was inflicted for 
transgressing against the rights of individuals. Where ḥadd punishments are 
regarded as God’s rights and the offences have been committed several times 
or overlapped, one punishment would be sufficient to deter the culprit. This 
is the scenario is presented in the Shāfiʿīs’ writings: if an unmarried adulterer 
                                         
289 Al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāᵓiʿ, vol. 9, p. 248. 
290 Al-Baghawī, Al-Tahdhīb, vol. 7, p. 404. 
291 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, p. 412. 
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commits adultery several times he is to be punished with only one ḥadd 
punishment.292  
 
(2) Several ḥadd offences of a different kind of offences, one of which 
is punished with capital punishment 
A scenario presented in the Ḥanafīs’ furūʿ goes as follows. Suppose a 
person confessed that he had committed illegal sexual intercourse as well as 
theft, that he had drank alcohol, falsely accused someone of committing 
illegal sexual intercourse, and made someone lose his eyesight. The Ḥanafī 
jurist Ibn al-Humām held that the retaliation for qiṣāṣ for the injured eye was 
to the first to be pursued. After the culprit had recovered from the retaliation 
punishment, that is the removal of one of his eyes, the culprit was to be 
scourged eighty stripes for the qadh offence. Then the Muslim ruler would 
choose between either carrying out the ḥadd punishment for theft or the 
illegal sexual intercourse, both offences being God’s rights.  Then the Muslim 
ruler would punish the culprit with forty lashes for drinking alcohol. In the 
case where the culprit was married (muḥṣan), the order of the punishments 
changes as follows: retaliation (qiṣāṣ), eighty lashes for qadhf, and stoning for 
the illegal sexual intercourse. In this scenario, the punishments of theft and 
drinking alcohol would be dismissed. This was because according to the 
general theory about ḥadd overlap in the Ḥanafī doctrine, whenever a capital 
punishment overlaps with a corporal ḥadd punishment, the latter is dismissed 
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and the former is inflicted (wa matā ijtamaʿat ḥudūd Allāh li-ḥaqq Allāh wa fīhā 
qatl nafs qutila wa-turika mā siwā dhālika).293 Ibn al-Humām argued that 
capital punishment in this scenario was sufficient to deter (zajr) and the 
general deterrence would be achieved. Further, Ibn al-Humām argued that 
there would be no benefit in applying corporal punishments and that capital 
punishment was sufficient to deter the public; thus, the judge should not 
worry himself about inflicting other corporal punishments when a capital 
offence overlaps with other ḥadd corporal offences.294 The Mālikīs agreed 
with the Ḥanafīs and viewed that whenever ḥadd offences overlapped and 
there was a capital punishment, the former was to be inflicted and all the 
corporal punishments of ḥadd dismissed, except in the case of qadhf where 
the culprit was to be scourged with eighty stripes and then executed.295 
Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs agreed that, if an individual’s right overlapped 
with God’s right, the former was to be vindicated first and then the latter. 
 
(3) Several ḥadd offences of a different kind, none of which is 
punished with capital punishment 
In this scenario jurists speculated about overlapping ḥadd offences of a 
different kind, none punishable with capital punishment. For instance, an 
unmarried man consumes alcohol, fornicates and steals. According to the 
Shāfiʿīs, the judge was to start with the less severe punishment of ḥadd 
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(qudima al-akhaff fa-l-akhaff). In this scenario the punishment of consuming 
alcohol would first be inflicted, that is, eighty lashes. Then punishment of the 
illegal sexual intercourse, that is, one hundred lashes would be inflicted. 
Finally, the punishment of theft, that is, the amputation of the right hand, 
would be inflicted.296 The Shāfiʿīs held that it was an obligation to treat the 
overlapping ḥadd punishments in this sequence, starting with the less severe 
and ending with the most severe. All the overlapping ḥadd corporal 
punishments should be implemented.  
The Mālikīs added to this scenario ḥadd offences that overlap with 
qiṣāṣ injuries. For instance, a culprit commits theft and injures a victim’s right 
hand by amputating it. In this scenario God’s right and the individual’s right 
are to be vindicated. The jurists’ debate about whether, in this scenario, one 
must amputate the right hand to satisfy God’s right for committing theft, or 
to fulfil the law of retaliation (qiṣāṣ). The Mālikīs held that God’s right must 
be vindicated because there was no pardoning in ḥadd offences, especially 
once the case was brought before the judge.297 
 Furthermore, if the offender committed several offences which did not 
entail capital punishment, he would be punished for each offence, starting 
with the least severe and ending with the severest punishment. Ibn Qudāma 
states that 
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Allāh li-taʿadhdhuri al-ʿafw fīhi. 
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if an offender drank alcohol, then falsely accused a woman, then 
fornicated and finally stole money, the jurists agreed that he is to be first 
punished with either 40 lashes for consuming alcohol, then he is to be 
punished with 80 lashes for his false accusation, unless the accuser forgives 
him. Then the offender is to be lashed for his fornication with 100 lashes. The 
final punishment is to amputate his right hand for his theft offence.298  
  
 
2.2.3.3 The uncertainty of ḥadd justification as a deterrent       
The fiqh tradition proposes a variety of justifications for ḥadd 
punishments. There are three main juristic justifications presented in the 
writings of Muslim jurists. However, these justifications are not 
systematically presented, instead, ḥadd punishments are variously justified 
whenever the context happens to invite this. The first justification proposed 
in the juristic tradition, the one I have discussed in the preceding chapter is 
that ḥadd punishments serve to satisfy a right of God. The second justification 
is that ḥadd punishment serves as a deterrent tool to the general public and 
the individual. Arguably, Sunnī jurists characterised ḥadd punishments as 
deterrents (zawājir) particularly when they sought to justify the severity of 
ḥadd punishments, that is, in order to justify capital and corporal 
punishments. Sunnī jurists proposed that God’s ultimate purpose behind 
legislating ḥadd punishments was “to rid the earth of obscene and indecent 
acts, and that is only provided through the zajr effect of ḥadd 
                                         
298 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 75. 
 128 
punishments.”299 Generally, jurists insisted on associating the severity of ḥadd 
punishments with the deterrence effect of these punishments. Consequently, 
whenever jurists explained the procedure and the process of inflicting the 
severe punishments they justified this severity by arguing that it served the 
main purpose of ḥadd punishments, namely, to deter people and individuals 
from exceeding the limits prescribed by God in the revealed law. For 
instance, the penalty for zinā offence is defined as ḥadd because it prevents 
the public from committing the crime again. Ḥadd punishments are perceived 
as establishing or drawing the line between the permissible (ḥalāl) and the 
forbidden (ḥarām). Thus, some of the punishments deter others (zajr) from 
committing the forbidden offences and some deter (radʿ) from a re-
committing of the crime. 
    In fact, there is a great deal of uncertainty among the jurists as to 
how to describe the function and purpose of ḥadd punishments. The jurists’ 
uncertainty in justifying the severity of ḥadd punishments as deterrents, for 
example, in theft (sariqa) and banditry (ḥirāba), is arguably related to the 
nature of the Qurᵓānic verses which address these offences. As to the theft 
offence, one verse states that “as for the male thief and the female thief, cut 
off their hands as a recompense (jazāᵓ) for that which they committed, a 
punishment by of example (nakāl) from God.”300 The verse explicitly 
addresses the justification of the theft punishment as recompense (jazāᵓ); in 
other words, retaliation is the justification most prominently mentioned in 
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the Qurʾān for amputating the thief’s right hand. Similarly, the punishment 
for banditry is addressed in the Qurᵓānic verse which stipulates that “the 
recompense of those who wage war against God and His Messenger and do 
mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their 
hands and their feet be cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the 
land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the 
Hereafter.”301 Al-Sarakhsī commented on these two verses by stating that 
“each verse addresses the punishment, as God refers to the first as 
recompense (nakāl) and the second as disgrace (khizy). Therefore, each 
penalty is addressed as the forbidden acts of either theft or banditry and each 
of them is a right of God.”302 
      The third and most widespread justification of ḥadd punishments 
among Muslims was the depiction of the ḥadd punishment as an expiatory act 
(kaffāra) serving to expiate the culprit from punishment in the hereafter. The 
justification of ḥadd punishments to serve as an expiatory act will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
                                         
301 Q 5:33. 




2.3 Deterrence and the immutability of ḥadd in fiqh 
 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that much of the focus of Sunnī 
juristic discussion regarding the ḥudūd Allāh and how to implement the 
punishments that are associated with these norms is on the validity and the 
effectivity of the judicial procedure of ḥadd punishments. Here is where the 
emphasis lies, much more at least than on systematic justification of capital 
and corporal ḥadd punishments.303  
The classical jurists, in their discussion of ḥadd punishments as serving 
the aim of individual deterrence, all tended to assume that corporal 
punishments (e.g. scourging, amputating and imprisonment) deter culprits 
from re-committing their crimes. However, this assumption cannot be said to 
have been exact or realistic. This is already shown by the very fact that the 
jurists themselves were involved in an endless dispute about the repetition of 
ḥadd offences and the overlap of various ḥadd offences: this suggests that the 
jurists themselves had an inkling of the inability of ḥadd punishments to 
achieve individual prevention. However, this inkling is never systematically 
pursued by the jurists or turned into a fully developed argument. There is no 
sustained single attempt to question the inefficiency of the ḥadd punishment 
and whether it functions as a deterrent for offenders. This is particularly 
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obvious in relation to the theft punishment, because jurists speculated that 
the thief may commit the theft offence and that the punishment was not a 
deterrent. 
Likewise, the jurists never questioned whether ḥadd punishments are 
‘just’ or ‘unjust’. Punishments could only be ‘unjust’ with regard to the 
procedural details of their implementation, that is, when there was a failure 
in ḥadd procedure. For example, a major concern of the jurists revolved 
around how the legislator or the judge could re-implement the same 
punishment. Where this was necessary and there was a shortage of limbs for 
amputation they did not hesitate to legislate imprisonment (ḥabs) as the final 
option. The law in such cases does not provide for the offender. To some 
degree, the culprit’s destiny is in his own hands: he needs to repent and show 
remorse in order to be set free. But in sum, one cannot but agree with El-Awa 
that the Islamic law of ḥadd punishments, at least as presented in the fiqh 
tradition, “cares very little for the criminal and his reform.”304 
In reference to ḥadd punishments serving as general prevention (zajr), 
Sunnī jurists proposed that ḥadd punishments served the primary aim of 
deterring the Muslim public from committing acts considered obscene by 
tradition. This is evident throughout the jurists’ debate regarding the ways in 
which ḥadd punishments should be implemented. Although the Qurᵓānic 
verse recommends that people witness the punishment of scourging for 
fornication, the verse in question requests only the witnessing of the 
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punishment – there is no mention of participating in the process of scourging. 
But the jurists introduced this element in order to achieve the aim of general 
prevention. The terms of inflicting the punishments, in particular the demand 
for the direct involvement of the ruler and the witnesses in scourging and 
stoning, are clearly the outcome of the jurists’ disputes about ḥadd 
punishments, procedures and justifications. 
Even though the jurists sometimes discussed ḥadd punishments in 
terms of deterrence (thus seemingly opening a door for determining the law 
in the light of social reality), I have suggested that classical jurists generally 
stuck to the elementary assumption that ḥadd punishments are God’s rights, 
and that therefore, they are fixed and eternally immutable. Their attempts to 
justify ḥadd punishments, whether as deterrents or as serving other purposes, 
are limited because, as I discussed in detail in chapter one, they projected 
ḥadd punishments as muqaddarāt  (“things decreed by God”) and generally 
agreed that there was little that could be done to waive the ḥadd punishment. 
Arguably, classical legal discussions of ḥadd punishments in terms of 
deterrence was only of a secondary importance. 
Ḥadd punishments are presented firmly as the immutable law of God. 
The Islamic ruler (God’s representative on earth) is obliged to implement 
them without any alteration or modification. Muslim jurists discussed the 
laws of ḥadd only from within the limits of the immutable law whose 
boundaries they had themselves drawn. Indeed, the classical jurists mostly 
exercised their legal reasoning within the rules drawn from the Qurʾān, 
Prophetic and ṣaḥāba tradition. It has even been shown in this chapter that 
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there was a measure of non-rationality in the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs’ approach 
to ḥadd punishments. This is manifest in their disputes about the repetition of 
ḥadd offences, particularly in reference to the repetition of theft offence. They 
assumed that ḥadd punishments are immutable, as are their punishments, as 
dictated in the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah tradition. This led them to think only 
of the punishment and how it should be implemented rather than about the 
wisdom (ḥikma), or the purpose, behind the legislation of ḥadd punishments 
and whether or not ḥadd punishments were always an effective deterrent. 
This has been clearly shown throughout their arguments regarding the re-
implementations of ḥadd punishments in the situations where there are 
repeated offences, for example, a theft offence committed four times. 
However, despite juristic claims about the immutability of the law of 
ḥadd, the Sunnī fiqh offers some examples where ḥadd punishments are 
treated in a more mutable and flexible way, and in some cases waived. For 
instance, all Sunnī jurists replaced the punishment of banishment for ḥirāba 
with that of imprisonment. This is an obvious contradiction to the Qurᵓānic 
verse on banditry which dictates explicitly banishment as one of the four 
punishments for ḥirāba. For instance, al-Shāfiʿī provides a description of 
banishment (ṣifat al-nafy) by arguing that “banishment is either established in 
the Qurᵓān [the banishment for banditry] or in the Sunnah [the banishment 
for adultery].”305 However, the Sunnī jurists’ consensus was that the bandit 
(muḥārib) had to be imprisoned instead of being banished. They argued that 
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this was the better or more plausible (awlā) choice because banishing would 
allow the culprits to re-commit banditry and harm people. 
Now, changing the punishment for ḥirāba from banishment to 
imprisonment was a clear modification and alteration of one of God’s decreed 
punishments. Whatever the explanations behind this change, I would suggest 
that the jurists went beyond the confines of the revealed law by equating the 
punishment of ‘banishment’ and ‘imprisonment’. For in reality, these are 
significantly different. This was sometimes recognized: For example, Ibn 
Qudāma subscribes to this position, arguing that “the apparent meaning 
(ẓāhir) of the verse is that banishment (nafy) is different from imprisonment 
(ḥabs)”.306 I would suggest that the jurists undermined the general principle 
of the immutability of ḥadd punishments when they replaced the punishment 
of banishment with imprisonment. Another example is their waiving 
banishment for female adulteress and capital punishment for female 
apostates. 
Another contradiction is manifest in the theory of ḥadd as achieving 
deterrence (zajr) rather than causing destruction (mutlif) to the offender. Take 
the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs’ discussion of the four-time repetition of the theft 
offence. Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs constantly upheld the principle that ḥadd 
punishments deter and do not aim to destroy the offender. However, they 
held that the theft punishment should be re-implemented each time the crime 
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was committed, that is, up to four times. But such multiple amputations of 
the limbs undoubtedly have a detrimental or ‘destructive’ impact. 
As for the Ḥanafīs, there is a methodological error in their approach to 
ḥadd punishments. They firmly held that ḥadd punishments should not be 
adjudicated on the basis of qiyās (lā yajūzu ʿindanā ithbāt l-ḥudūd bi l-qiyās).307 
However, in some instances, they do seem to apply qiyās, for example, when 
they argue for punishing the second incident of a theft offence in analogy to 
the punishment for ḥirāba, that is, with cross-amputation. According to their 
own general principle, qiyās in this case is invalid. If the Qurᵓān has the 
ultimate authority in defining ḥadd offences and their punishments, and if the 
tradition of the Prophet does not stipulate anything else, then in this case of a 
repetition of theft crime no amputation other than the right hand should be 
inflicted.  
In sum, the different interpretations of ḥadd punishments, and 
therefore, the rules of their implementations vary between the schools of law. 
This has been shown to be the case particularly in the example of the theft 
offence. Furthermore, although the disputes of Sunnī jurists provide an 
illustration and instruction for ḥadd punishments as well as the rationale for 
them, there is a deviation from the jurists’ dispute in some instances. I have 
argued that the deterrent and punitive measures will vary depending on 
whether it is a first-time offence or whether it is a repeat or an overlapping 
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offence and whether there is a direct literal interpretation of the Qurᵓān, the 
Prophetic Sunna and the ṣaḥāba tradition.  
   The juristic doctrine of fiqh which describes the purpose of the ḥadd 
punishment as for the protection of the community could have allowed for a 
completely ‘objective, profane’ theory of punishment. Nonetheless, this was 
always secondary to the stress on deterrence and ‘warning’; this did enable 
the jurists to be flexible and allow for a measure of the religious connotation 
of punishment [the jurists may have reasoned that, if a crime is threatened 





Ch. 3: Ḥadd Punishments as Expiatory Acts (Kaffarāt)308 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Perhaps the most conventional justification for ḥadd punishment 
prevailing among Sunnī Muslim jurists was to declare them to serve as an 
expiatory act (kaffāra) that amends wrong actions, sins, or crimes. As Lange 
observes, “ḥadd and kaffārāt were often viewed in close conceptual proximity 
to each other; and some thought that to suffer the former constituted a 
variety of the latter.”309 Nonetheless, a careful examination for the 
justification of the ḥadd punishment as expiating the ḥadd offence and thus 
forestalling punishment in the hereafter will reveal that there is a certain 
tension between the views of classical jurists, especially between Ḥanafīs and 
Shāfiʿīs. This chapter investigates the juristic disagreement (ikhtilāf) about 
whether ḥadd punishment expiates committed sins or whether the culprit’s 
repentance (tawba) is the more important means to amend for committed 
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sins. This question is important because if to suffer ḥadd punishments is 
regarded as a form of expiation, it becomes religiously more acceptable to 
implement them; indeed to carry out ḥadd punishments, in such a 
perspective, becomes a way of facilitating divine mercy towards humankind. 
  Against the Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs, the Ḥanafī school of law 
held that the punishment was not enough to atone for the committed sins, 
and that tawba of the offender was much more important. What accounts for 
this difference? Arguably, the underlying reason behind this tension is the 
fact that the Ḥanafīs’ scrutiny of the purpose, or ratio legis, of the ḥadd 
punishment is restricted because the ḥudūd belong to the category of “things 
decreed by God” (muqaddarāt).310 Was God’s intention in legislating the ḥadd 
punishment to physically torture and punish the sinner? Or was it to deter 
the individual from committing similar sins? Or has God intentionally not 
revealed the ratio legis of ḥadd? To all these questions, the Ḥanafīs were 
reluctant to provide an answer. On the other hand, the Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs and 
Ḥanbalīs restricted their attempts in scrutinising the underlying purpose of 
the ḥadd punishment to the Qurᵓānic and Prophetic texts. This rests on the 
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things known in Sunnī theological tradition as “muqaddarāt” “things decreed by God 
(muqaddarāt): (1) the sustenance that God grants (rizq) (Cf. EI, 2nd, vol. viii, p. 567b); (2) the 
moment of birth and death that God imposes (Cf. EI, 2nd, vol. vi, p. 910b); (3) the actions 
predetermined by God;  (4) and a life of happiness (saʿāda) (Cf. EI, 2nd, vol. viii, p. 657b) or 
of affliction (shaqāwa) (EI, 2nd, vol. ix, p. 246b) that God bestows on man.” Lange denotes 
that “muqaddarāt convey different meanings in theology and law”. In the former, Lange 
indicates that “[…] it conveys the idea of God’s decree, or even of predestination (qadar), 
based on God’s absolute knowledge (ʿilm muṭlaq) and power (qudra) over His creation.” 
Ḥudūd offences and the punishments associated with them fall under this particular 
category.  
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Prophetic tradition that declared expiation (takfīr) to be one of the 
justifications for ḥadd punishment. 
This chapter examines the justification of ḥadd punishments as 
expiatory acts on the basis of a systematic analysis of the legal development 
of the concept of kaffāra, related specifically to ḥadd, in the Qurᵓān, the 
Prophetic tradition and in the classical fiqh tradition. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, ḥadd, particularly when implying a severe punishment, is 
justified as either to preserve a right that belonged to God (ḥaqq Allāh), or to 
deter the individual and the general public from committing forbidden 
offences. In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate that in comparison, there 
is very little written in the fiqh tradition about ḥadd as an expiatory act. The 
Ḥanafīs in particular emphasized that God specifies and legislates ḥadd 
punishments, and His “divinely decreed ordinances” are not open to juristic 
speculation of analogy (qiyās).311 However, as Lange has recently argued 
“[a]nalogical reasoning, they argued, is one of the accepted proofs among the 
“sources” of Islamic law (ḥujja aṣliyya), even if it cannot be considered a 
method used to arrive at certain knowledge (ʻilm yaqīn).”312  I argue that the 
Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs are more flexible in justifying the ḥadd 
punishment as kaffāra, despite the fact that the Qurᵓān does not categorize 
                                         
311 By analogical reasoning I understand, as Lange in “Sins, Expiation and Non-Rationality in 
Ḥanafī and Shāfiʻī Fiq” explains, “[…] the intellectual process where Sunnī jurists required 
the jurist (al-faqīh) to demonstrate by a process of independent legal reasoning (qiyās and 
ijtihād), why certain factor of ratio legis (ʻilla) occasions the original norm (ḥukm al-aṣl), and 
with what purpose, and then to investigate whether this occasioning factor also occurs in the 
case under examination, that is, the novel case.” 
312 Lange, “Sins, Expiation and Non-Rationality in Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī Fiq”. 
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ḥadd punishments as kaffārāt.313 A more nuanced differentiation between the 
various legal opinions about ḥadd punishment as kaffāra is necessary in order 
to understand the basis of the argument justifying punitive corporal and 
capital punishment as means of purification and expiation. 
 
3.2 Expiation (takfīr) in the Islamic tradition 
3.2.1 Origins and etymology 
Etymologically, kaffāra (pl. kaffarāt) is an act of expiatory nature to 
amend for a sin committed by a Muslim. Chelhod states that kaffāra is 
derived from the root k-f-r which, according to him, is “undoubtedly Arabic”, 
conveying the meaning of covering up a thing or a person so that it is hidden 
from view. He argues that kaffāra in the Qurᵓān is not primarily a blood 
sacrifice as is Hebr. kappārā in the Levitical system.314 
Abū al-Rīsh provides a fuller meaning of kaffāra. For him, kaffāra 
covers both material and spiritual (ritual) aspects. He claims that the concept 
of kaffāra has no comprehensive and inclusive definition, that it was not 
narrowly defined and that its causes were not elaborated in the fiqh tradition. 
Kaffāra in the Islamic tradition, according to Abū l-Rīsh, is a term that 
denotes an obligation upon an individual. Abū al-Rīsh defines the concept of 
kaffāra as “the name for an ordained punishment to cover the sin committed 
                                         
313 Lange suggests that the Shāfiʻīs who were followers of Ashʿarism broadened the scope of 
opportunities for the expiation of sins. He argues “It is perhaps no coincidence that works 
dedicated to the kaffārāt were written predominantly by Shāfiʻī-Ashʿarite authors.” See 
Lange, “Sins, Expiation and Non-Rationality in Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī Fiq”. 
314 J. Chelhod, “Kaffāra”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. iv, p. 406. 
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in word and deed (ism li ʿuqūba muqaddara ʿalā irtikāb al-maḥẓūr qawlan wa-
fiʿlan)”.315 Kaffāra is perceived as both a ritual act (ʿibāda) and a punishment 
incurred on account of a specific transgression (ʿuqāba), but the aspect of 
punishment is more apparent and prevalent than is the ritual aspect.316 
 
 
3.2.2 Kaffarāt in the Qurᵓān 
The Qurᵓān dictates a set of expiatory and propitiatory acts for a 
number of errors and offences. These errors and offences are as follows:317 
(1) Violations of the ritual requirements, for instance, pilgrimage 
(ḥajj), and fasting in the month of Ramadan (ṣawm). According to the Qurᵓān 
(5:95), the kaffāra for killing animals in the state of iḥrām is to offer a 
sacrificial animal at the Kaʻba. In the case where the pilgrim is unable to 
sacrifice, s/he is to feed the poor or to fast. Moreover, the Qurᵓān (2: 196) 
stipulates further expiatory acts without, however, applying the term kaffāra. 
For instance, if the pilgrim (ḥājj) because of illness is forced to shave his head 
before the day of ʿīd al-aḍḥā, he must then fast; in the case where he is unable 
to fast for an illness, he is to give alms (ṣadaqa) or sacrifice an animal. 
                                         
315 Muḥammad Abū al-Rīsh, Al-Kaffārāt fī Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-ᵓAmāna, 
1987), pp. 11-12. 
316 Abū al-Rīsh, Al-Kaffārāt, p. 12. 
317 Here I follow the exact overview provided by Lange, “Expiation”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
3rd, vol. II, p. 721b. 
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(2) Breaking oaths (yamīn, pl. aymān): According to the Qurᵓān (5:89) 
the breaking of uttered oaths requires the kaffāra of feeding and clothing ten 
of the poor, or freeing a slave, or fasting for three days. 
(3) Divorcing one’s wife by uttering the words “You are like my 
mother’s back to me” (anti ʿalayyā ka-ẓahrī ummī): This pre-Islamic practice, 
known as ẓihār in the Qurᵓān (58:2), can be atoned for by four specific 
expiatory acts. In order for the husband to resume marital relations with his 
wife, he is to free a slave, or fast for two consecutive months, or feed sixty of 
the poor. 
(4) Unintentional homicide: The Qurᵓān (4:92) specifies three types of 
unintentional homicide (qatl al-khaṭaᵓ). The term kaffāra is not explicitly 
mentioned in this context. However, the meaning is also implied. The kaffāra 
for such a sin is to free a slave and pay the blood money (diya) to the victim’s 
heirs. 
In addition, Qurʾān 5:45 declares the act of forfeiting one’s claim to 
retaliation (whether in cases of homicide or injury) to be a kaffāra, without 
mentioning the offence which this specific kaffāra might help to expiate. The 
performing of kaffāra here is a way to accumulate merit in the eyes of God; it 
is therefore propitiatory in nature rather than expiatory (seeking to appease 
God, not to atone for a specific sin),318 akin to other instances where the 
Qurᵓān declares good works to compensate for evil works. 
                                         
318 According to Lange, [t]he object of expiation is sin itself, while the object of propitiation 
is God.” See Lange, “Sins, Expiation and Non-Rationality”. 
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Expiatory and propitiatory acts share some common aspects, and both 
appear concurrently in the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah. However, the propitiatory 
acts are of a much less fixed and inflexible kind. The major difference 
between expiatory and propitiatory acts, however, is that an expiatory act is 
due as a punishment. This is unlike the propitiatory act, as the latter does not 
encompass the meaning of punishment entailed in the expiatory acts. Kaffārāt 
of the expiatory kind are determined and defined by God, therefore, they 
ought to be fulfilled as stipulated in the Qurᵓān.319 Overall, however, the 
Qurᵓān does not provide a clear or comprehensive doctrine of atonement, but 
the conceptual proximity of kaffārāt and ḥudūd is already adumbrated in it: 
(1) (expiatory) kaffārāt and ḥudūd are divinely ordained and, therefore, 
immutable and fixed; (2) both are God’s rights; and (3) both are contested 
areas in the later fiqh (al-ḥadd wa al-kaffārāt amr mukhtalaf fīh).320  
 
3.2.3 Kaffarāt in the Prophet tradition (ḥadīth) 
As stated, it does not seem possible to construct either a clear or a 
comprehensive doctrine of atonement on the basis of the Qurᵓānic references 
alone. For instance, one Qurᵓānic verse states that “as long as you [Muslims] 
abstain from major sins (kabāᵓir) we will cover up (nukaffir) your sins 
(sayyiᵓāt)” (4:31). This verse suggests that kaffāra only atones for the minor 
sins. However, the Prophetic tradition is replete in narrations where major 
sins are also said to be open to the possibility of expiation kaffāra. One 
                                         
319 Abū al-Rīsh, Al-Kaffārāt fī Al-Fiqh Al-ᵓIslāmī, pp. 20, 21.  
320 Ibid., p. 24. 
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prominent tradition even states that “every sinful act has a kaffāra (li-kulli 
ʿamal kaffāra)”.321 In fact, there is a significant number of kaffārāt listed in 
the Prophetic tradition ranging from rituals to misbehaviour of conduct.322 
However, in this section I restrict my examination to the kaffārāt of ḥadd 
offences.323 
According to Lange, the number of expiatory acts kaffārāt grew over 
the first centuries of Islam and in fact throughout the later Middle period. As 
he writes, “the Qurᵓān and Sunnah speak about fifty, perhaps more, expiatory 
kaffārāt. This is an estimate, however, and does not account for the issue of 
the authenticity of certain ḥadīths, or in fact for the ways in which the 
fuqahāᵓ elaborated on the issue of expiation.”324 Lange argues that this growth 
of kaffarāt may be said “to have been facilitated by the lack of distinction 
between propitiatory acts and expiatory acts in the Muslim doctrine of 
atonement.”325 
As for the earthly punishments for ḥadd offences of theft, armed 
robbery and illegal sexual intercourse, these are said to serve as kaffārāt. 
This, however, was initially doubted by al-Shāfiʿī, and reportedly the Prophet 
                                         
321 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 189. 
322 According to Lange, “[f]rom the Qurᵓān, the idea of propitiatory kaffārāt appears to have 
spread into the ḥadīth, where one finds listed a great number of propitiatory acts, such as 
showing remorse (nadāmah), seeking religious knowledge (ṭalab al ʿilm), martyrdom in jihād, 
fasting, frequent and extended visits to the mosque and, especially, proper ablutions and 
prayer”. See Lange, “Sins, Expiation and Non-Rationality”. 
323 For more about the different types of kaffārāt see: Lange, “Expiation”, Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, Three. 
324 Lange, “Sins, Expiation and the Non-Rationality”.  
325 Ibid. 
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himself had said that he did not know “whether or not the ḥudūd are kaffarāt 
for those who are punished with them.”326 As for the punishment of unlawful 
sexual intercourse (zinā), the Prophetic tradition tells of the stories of Māʿiz 
and al-Ghāmidiyya. Both reportedly confessed to their crime of zinā. The 
Prophet would have praised their repentance and told them that the stoning 
would expiate their sin.327 As for the punishment of theft, it is reported in the 
Prophetic tradition that the Prophet ordered a thief’s hand to be amputated 
and requested the thief to be brought back to him. The Prophet is believed to 
have asked the thief to repent, and to have said: “God, forgive him and 
accept his repentance.”328  
 
 
3.2.4 Kaffārāt in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
3.2.4.1 Ḥadd punishments as kaffārāt in fiqh textbooks  
In general, the concept of kaffāra (pl. kaffārāt) is not dealt with in a 
separate chapter devoted to this subject in fiqh textbooks. Instead, the 
kaffārāt are discussed in a number of different chapters, such as the chapters 
on prayer, pilgrimage, fasting in the month of Ramaḍān, homicide, and in the 
breaking of oaths, etc.329 According to Lange, “most works specifically 
dedicated to the kaffārāt appear to be a late, post 6th/12th century 
phenomenon and to deal exclusively with the propitiatory type of kaffārāt, 
                                         
326 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 190. 
327 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 107, 108-9. 
328 Al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 5, pp. 446-7; al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 167-8.  
329 Cf. Al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, pp. 107, 108-109; vol. 3-4, pp. 152-3; vol.  7-8, p. 132. 
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promising forgiveness for ‘former and future sins’.”330 As he notes, the 
propitiatory kaffārāt, however, are not legally relevant – they are too 
unspecific for this, promising forgiveness for sins that remain unspecified. 
Muslim jurists regard kaffāra as a specific type of punishment 
stipulated in the Qurᵓān against crimes regarded as severe transgressions. It is 
in the fiqh tradition where jurists expanded and circumscribed the basic 
provisions about ḥadd punishments as expiatory acts as laid down in the 
Sunnah.331 The Ḥanafīs are the exception, showing reluctance in accepting 
ḥadd punishments as kaffārāt. The Ḥanafīs’ position is explained by the fact 
that the kaffārāt are not explicitly mentioned in revelation and that the 
Ḥanafīs reject analogical reasoning in all norms “decreed by God”, which 
include the ḥadd punishments as well as the kaffārāt.332 This rests on the fact 
that analogy (qiyās) is a legal method that implies reasoning in which a 
residue of doubt always exists; thus, it cannot be applied to the kaffārāt 
because the kaffārāt are classified as punishments, and punishments may and 
cannot be adjudicated in the presence of doubt (Cf. ch. 1). The numerical 
aspects of ḥadd punishments (the number of lashes for example, or the time 
span stipulated for banishment) are known only through the Qurᵓān and the 
Sunnah, but cannot be apprehended through use of legal reasoning. 
According to the Ḥanafīs, the occasioning factor (the ʿilla, or ratio legis) of the 
                                         
330 Lange, “Expiation”, vol. II, p. 721b. 
331 Cf. Lange, Justice, Punishment and the Medieval Imagination, p.  
332 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 41; Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr, vol. 5, pp. 251-2. 
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kaffārāt cannot be known due to the kaffārāt’s non-rational nature.333  The 
Ḥanafīs hold that, since the Qurᵓān does not stipulate that ḥadd punishment 
constitutes kaffāra, this can be established neither by analogy nor by some 
other form of ijtihād. Applying the kaffārāt solely on the basis of independent 
legal reasoning, without an explicit ordination (naṣṣ), is rejected altogether. 
The Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs, on the contrary, agreed on the 
general permissibility of analogical legal reasoning in all domains of law, 
including the kaffārāt and ḥadd punishments. Muslim jurists of these schools 
tended to regard the kaffārāt as a type of punishment (ʿiqāb), incurred on 
account of a transgression (maʿṣiya).334  
 
 
3.2.4.2 How did the ḥadd punishments come to be regarded as 
kaffārāt? 
As I have noted above, the Ḥanafīs refuted the view that ḥadd 
punishment serves as an act of expiation for sins (kaffāra), as they only 
accepted kaffārāt as defined in the Qurᵓān and Sunnah. They could adduce 
certain ḥadīths according to which the Prophet inflicted the punishment and 
requested the culprits to repent their sin – in order to argue that punishment 
alone was not enough to exculpate the offender: “A man confessed that he 
committed theft and was brought to the Prophet for a verdict. The Prophet 
                                         
333 Lange, “Expiation”, p. 721b. 
334 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 190; Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj ilā sharḥ al-minhāj, vol. 8, 
pp. 8-9; Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 93; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, vol. 9, p. 418. 
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ordered his hand to be amputated. The thief’s hand was amputated and the 
Prophet asked him to repent.”335 
According to the Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs, ḥadd punishments 
were explained (and thereby, arguably, justified) as acts of an expiatory 
nature to amend for sins outlined in the Qurᵓān and Sunnah. While the 
Qurᵓān says nothing about the expiatory function of ḥadd punishment, heavy 
recourse was made to a number of Prophetic ḥadīths according to which the 
Prophet declared ḥadd punishments to be kaffārāt. One of the most often 
cited narrations endorsed by Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs is a tradition 
traced back to the Companion Ibn ʻUbāda al-Ṣāmit, who narrated that: 
 
We gave the oath of allegiance, that we would not join partners in 
worship besides God, would not steal, would not commit illegal sexual 
intercourse, would not kill a life which God has forbidden, would not commit 
robbery, and would not disobey God and His Messenger, and if we fulfilled 
this pledge we would have paradise, but if we committed any one of these 
[sins], then our case will be decided by God.336 
 
This narration seems theologically problematic because it is clearly 
inconsistent with the Qurᵓānic view on what is widely held to be one of the 
gravest sins in Islam, that is, setting up partnership with God, or shirk.337 
According to the Qurᵓān, God forgives any sin except shirk. In fact, shirk is the 
                                         
335 Al-Nasāᵓī, Sunan, vol. 2, p. 793.  
336 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. vi, p. 7; Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 2, p. 742; Al-Tirmidhī, Sunan, vol. 1, p. 
390. 
337 For a fuller entry on the Qurᵓānic concept of shirk, see: D. Gimaret, “Shirk”, Encyclopaedia 
of Islam, Second Edition, vol. ix, p. 484b. 
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only unforgivable sin: “Verily, God forgives not [the sin of] setting up 
partners [in worship] with Him, but forgives whom He wills, sins other than 
that, and whoever sets up partners in worship with God, has indeed strayed 
far away” (4:116). It is not clear, in this context, how Muslim jurists managed 
to reconcile the narration attributed to the Prophet with this particular 
Qurᵓānic verse. The commentaries on this particular narration concentrate on 
the expiatory aspect of the ḥadd punishment.338 The narration together with 
its standard commentary suggests that even those who commit shirk, if they 
are punished with ḥadd punishment, are excused and forgiven. 
A similar narration is attributed to the Prophet through his cousin ʿAlī. 
ʿAlī is reported to have related that the Prophet said: 
 
He who sins in this life and was punished for it, God is far more just 
than to combine two punishments on His servant. He who commits an error 
in this life and God hides his error and pardons him, then God is far more 
generous than to punish the servant for something that He has already 
pardoned.339 
 
The Imām al-Shāfiʿī, however, was not sure whether the ḥadd 
punishment would in fact expiate the culprit in the hereafter. The Shāfiʿīs did 
not claim certainty about the ḥadd punishment, that is, whether it constitutes 
expiation. Nonetheless, it appears that al-Shāfiʿī, or at least the later 
adherents of his school, gradually came to agree with the Mālikīs and 
                                         
338 Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr (Lahore: Darussalam, 2000), vol. 5, p. 165 
339 Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, p. 165. 
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Ḥanbalīs on this point.340 The Ḥanbalīs used to quote a ḥadīth from the 
Prophet according to which he ordered a woman named al-Juhayniya to be 
stoned for committing illegal sexual intercourse. It is reported that, after 
stoning al-Juhayniya, ʿUmar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb questioned the Prophet about his 
participation in her funeral. The Prophet is reported to have responded by 
saying: “Have you not seen anything better than she gave her soul to God?” 
(wa-hal wajadata afḍala min an jāddat bi-nafsihā).341 
    The Ḥanbalī Ibn Qudāma cites another narration from the Prophet: 
 
A man named ʿAmrū b. Samra b. Ḥabīb came to the Prophet 
confessing that he had stolen a camel from a tribe he named. The Prophet 
sent a messenger to the tribe asking about the stolen camel. The tribe 
confirmed that the camel had been stolen. Then the Prophet ordered the 
thief’s right hand to be amputated… ʿAmrū b. Ḥabīb, when he saw his 
amputated hand, commented: “Thanks to God that He purified me from the 
hand that committed theft and which could have led me to hellfire”.342  
 
Interestingly, the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfiʿīs endorsed almost the same 
Prophetic ḥadīths; however, their interpretations of these narrations vary 
significantly, because they applied different methods of interpretation that 
sometimes resulted in opposing outcomes. This tension among the legal 
schools in regard to justifying ḥadd punishments as expiatory acts will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
                                         
340 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, vol. 9, p. 399. 
341 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 44. 
342 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, pp. 122-3. 
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3.3 Legal debates about ḥadd and repentance (tawba) 
3.3.1 The Ḥanafī view 
The disagreement among the jurists about ḥadd as kaffāra began, 
arguably, when the Ḥanafī jurists restricted their analogical reasoning to the 
cases not listed as the “things decreed by God”.343 Since ḥadd punishments are 
among the “things decreed by God”, the Ḥanafīs refused to interfere in them 
by way of ijtihād.344 Instead, the Ḥanafīs argued that repentance (tawba) of 
ḥadd offences, for example in cases where confession is obtained, was the 
only means to amend and atone for the committed sin. This argument is 
consistent with their special treatment of ḥadd punishments as the “things 
decreed by God”. Since ḥadd punishments are not declared kaffārāt in the 
Qurᵓān, the Ḥanafī jurists clearly did not have the Qurᵓānic foundation to 
include ḥadd punishments in the list of kaffārāt; and one of the characteristics 
of their school was that they remained skeptical vis-á-vis the authority of 
Prophetic ḥadīth in jurisprudence, thus ending up with no explicit naṣṣ to 
argue for the status of ḥadd as kaffāra. 
                                         
343 Lange in “Sins, Expiation and the Non-Rationality” scrutinizes the underlying reasons that 
prevented the Ḥanafī jurists from treating the things decreed by God (i.e., kaffārāt) as 
susceptible to analogical reasoning of qiyās. In his words “This [refusing to apply analogy to 
kaffārāt] was because all Sunnī jurists agreed that qiyās and ijtihād could arrive only as a 
result of probabilistic knowledge (ʿilm ẓanī). In order for a jurist to achieve certainty (yaqīn), 
that is, knowledge beyond doubt (yaqīn muṭlaq), this always requires neither errors nor 
doubts and the only source without errors or doubts is the divine revelation (Qurᵓān) and the 
sound Sunnah.” 
344 According to Lange “[f]ew, if any, exhaustive lists of muqaddarāt appear to be in Sunnī 
legal literature.” He refers to the most complete list as being found in al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ 
Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab. See Lange, Justice, Punishment and the Medieval Muslim Imagination, 
184. 
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The Ḥanafīs however did cite a number of Prophetic narrations where 
the culprits had willingly confessed their crimes (for the Ḥanafīs, a sure sign 
of their repentance, or tawba) and were later announced by the Prophet 
himself to have been granted the forgiveness they sought. Particularly the 
ḥadīths about Mālik and al-Ghāmidiyya were frequently quoted in the Ḥanafī 
legal textbooks. They cited the Prophetic response to the stoning al-
Ghāmidiyya, namely, that “she repented, and if her repentance is to be 
distributed among the ummah it will be sufficient.”345 According to another 
narration the Prophet condemned the Companion Khālid b. al-Walīd for 
cursing her and is reported to have said: “Do not curse her as she repented 
(tābat) and she is forgiven!”346 
Let us recall that other interpretations of this ḥadīth were possible. The 
Ḥanbalī Ibn Qudāma, for example, argued that when the Prophet said to 
Mālik and al-Ghāmidiyya that they were forgiven it was because they 
requested to be purified from their sins. “This is because ḥadd is kaffāra, and 
repentance (tawba) does not negate the [expiatory power of the] 
punishment.”347 Ibn Qudāma understood the purification in this particular 
narration to be achieved through the capital punishment of stoning, and not 
by the contrition al-Ghāmidiyya had shown upon her request to be purified 
from the sin. 
                                         
345  Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 2, p. 737. 
346 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 2, 737; Abī Dāwūd, Sunan, vol. 2, p. 743. 
347 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 130. 
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   The Ḥanafīs cited another Prophetic ḥadīth which they regarded as a 
proof (dalīl) for the position that repentance is the only means to achieve 
atonement and expiation for the committed offenses. According to the ḥadīth 
in question, a thief confessed to his theft offence and had his right hand 
amputated as a result. The thief was then brought back to the Prophet and 
was asked by the Prophet to repent his sin. The man said that he repented 
and the Prophet is reported to have said: “O God forgive him, and accept his 
repentance.”348 Al-Sarakhsī remarks that the Prophet asked the thief to repent 
even after he was punished. This is proof that atonement for the sin or crime 
is not achieved or fulfilled by the amputation per se, but through repentance 
alone.349 
Ḥanafī jurists were reluctant to accept the idea that ḥadd punishments 
in themselves, in cases proven by either testimony or confession, were the 
key to atonement for sins.  The Ḥanafī jurist Ibn Nujaym noted that Sunnī 
jurists disagreed as to whether purification from sin without repentance is 
one of the consequences of ḥadd punishment (ikhtalafa al-ʿulamāᵓ fī-anna l-
ṭuhra mina al-dhanb min aḥkāmihi min ghayr tawba).350 According to Ibn 
Nujaym, the majority of the Ḥanafī jurists agreed that purification from sin 
by way of punishment was in fact not one of the aḥkām (norms) of ḥadd. 
Thus, if the punishment was inflicted without the culprit repenting from his 
offence, the sin was not atoned for; only direct Qurʾānic evidence could have 
                                         
348 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 168.  
349 Ibid.  
350 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 4. 
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convinced them of the opposite.351 This opinion rests on the fact that the 
Qurᵓān unequivocally guarantees only the bandits of the ḥirāba crime the 
chance to repent, and therefore, their punitive ḥadd punishment is dismissed 
(5:34). This is of course, according to all Sunnī jurists, when repentance is 
obtained prior to being captured by the Muslim authority (Cf. ch. 1). 
      Al-Sarakhsī elaborated further on this matter, arguing that the 
ḥadd punishment was either a disgrace (khizy) or a punishment by way of 
example (nakāl) (Cf. ch. 2). In order for the culprit to be purified from the sin 
committed, he ought to sincerely repent. Genuine repentance, according to 
the Ḥanafīs, is the one in which there is contrition and sincere determination 
not to commit the same offence again (tamām al-tawba bi-l-nadam ʿalā mā 
kāna minhu wa-l-ʿazma ʿalā an lā yaʿūda ilayhi min baʿd).352 Needless to say 
perhaps, this repentance has to occur before the punishment is inflicted, at 
least where the punishment is a capital punishment, because the culprit will 
not be given a chance to repent and show remorse for his wrongdoing. Those 
who are punished with corporal punishment retain the option to repent and 
the chance to show remorse thereafter. The Ḥanafīs talk about the 
opportunity for culprits who are to be punished by a capital punishment to 
show contrition before they are executed; this, then, demonstrates that they 
have regretted their sin. 
3.3.2 The Shāfiʿī view 
                                         
351 Ibid.: idhā uqīma ʿalayhi al-ḥadd wa-lam yatub lam yasquṭ ʿanhu ithm al-maʿṣiya. 
352 Al-Sarakhsī, Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 9, p. 168. 
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Contrary to the Ḥanafīs, the Shāfiʿīs held that ḥadd punishments are 
kaffārāt to amend for ḥadd offences.353 This opinion rests on a ḥadīth 
according to which the Prophet said that “whoever commits something of 
such sins [ḥadd] and receives the legal punishment for it, that will be 
considered as the expiation for that sin.”354 This narration led the Shāfiʿī jurist 
al-Ramlī to state: “There is a benefit from having the ḥadd punishment 
inflicted as it will result in having the hereafter’s punishment dropped.”355 Al-
Shāfiʻī commented on this narration: “I have not heard of any narration on 
ḥudūd that is more explicit than this one (wa lam asmaʿ fī-l-ḥudūd ḥadīth 
abyan min hādhā).”356 
However, al-Shāfiʿī also endorsed another Prophetic narration 
according to which the Prophet doubted that ḥadd punishment would expiate 
the culprits’ sins. The Prophet is reported to have said that “Who knows, 
maybe (laʿalla) the ḥudūd were revealed to expiate the sins [my emphasis]”.357 
Repentance, in this perspective, seems to have a more significant function in 
atoning for the ḥadd offense that was committed. Another of al-Shāfiʿī’s 
opinions appears to point in the same direction. Al-Shāfiʿī preferred that, if 
                                         
353 In contradistinction to the Ḥanafīs’ position on the inapplicability of legal reasoning to the 
things decreed by God (i.e., kaffārāt), Lange in “Sins, Expiation and the Non-Rationality” 
argues that the Shāfiʻī doctrine of applying legal analogy constitutes correct procedure in all 
legal issues including ḥudūd norms. Lange offers clear elaborations on why and how the 
Shāfiʻīs did not see any theological factors that precluded them from applying analogy, and 
thus, for them as Lange argues “there is no such obstructing factor [to apply analogy] in the 
divinely ordained punishments or expiatory acts.” 
354 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 189. 
355 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, pp. 8-9. 
356 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 190. 
357 Ibid. 
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someone commits a ḥadd offence, he should hide it and not confess it. The 
culprit is to regret and repent the offence he committed and never to commit 
the same crime again “because God accepts repentance from the wrongdoers 
(naḥnu nuḥibbu li-man aṣāba l-ḥadd an yastatira wa-an yattaqī Allāh wa-lā 
yaʿūda li-maʿṣiyat Allāh fa-inna Allāh yaqbalu al-tawba min ʿibādihi).”358 
To the best of my knowledge, al-Shāfiʿī never reconciled these two 
contradictory tendencies. It seems that he did not validate one of the two at 
the expense of the other, but lived with the tension that obtained between 
them. In the meantime the Ḥanafīs, in remaining faithful to their basic 
premise, argued that the narration in which the Prophet expresses doubt that 
ḥadd punishments expiate sins aims at those who repented and showed 
remorse while the punishment was inflicted.359 
Unlike for the Ḥanafīs, and despite al-Shāfiʿī’s hesitation in the matter, 
repentance for the Shāfiʻīs did not become the pivotal point in discussions 
about the expiating power of ḥadd punishments. The first reason was that the 
Prophet Muḥammad was reported to have himself inflicted the ḥadd 
punishment, despite the fact that the culprits repented and showed 
contrition, that is, in the cases of Māʻiz and al-Ghāmidiyya. The Shāfiʿīs 
highlighted narrations according to which the Prophet inflicted the 
punishments despite the fact that those punished had repented of their 
crimes. Al-Ramlī held that “ḥadd offences, that is, illegal sexual intercourse, 
theft, consuming alcohol, are not dismissed by repentance and this is evident 
                                         
358 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 7, p. 250. 
359 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Baḥr al-rāᵓiq, vol. 5, p. 4. 
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because the Prophet inflicted the ḥadd punishment even on those who 
repented.”360 He argued that “whoever is punished for the ḥadd in this world, 
he is not punished for it in the hereafter, unless he insisted on re-committing 
the ḥadd offence and does not repent.”361 
The second reason was related to the concept of tawba (repentance) 
and its forms.362 According to the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī doctrine, there are two 
types of repentance. The first is insincere repentance (tuqya), namely, 
showing self-mortification to escape the ḥadd punishment. This is similar to 
confessing to Islam under the sword. The second type of repentance is 
genuine repentance, which is open manifestation of contrition made evident 
by reform. A period of time is required in order to reform and show that 
rehabilitation has in fact taken place. According to the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs, 
the problem is imbedded in the uncertainty of recognizing genuine 
repentance, particularly when the crime is brought before the judge. For the 
Shāfiʿīs, in other words, punishment was ‘enough’ to ensure expiation (takfīr); 
arguably, however, this also meant that they were keener to implement 
                                         
360 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 8; Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 367. 
361 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 8. 
362 Rubin writes about the post-Qurᵓānic literature on repentance: “As for repentance in post-
Qurᵓānic literature, a good overview can be gained from Ibn Qudāma’s (d. 690/1291) Kitāb 
al-Tawwābīn. Apart from chapters revolving around the Qurᵓānic instances of repentance, 
there are also numerous chapters containing edifying folk tales praising the pious repentance 
of figures from among the Children of Israel, as well as from the pre-Islamic Arabs. Further, 
there are also traditions about Companions of the Prophet and other ascetics of the first 
Islamic eras.” Cf. Uri Rubin, “Repentance and Penance”, Encyclopaedia of the Qurᵓān, vol. 4, 
p. 426a.  
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punishment than the Ḥanafīs, who emphasized the aspect of repentance over 
the suffering of punishment. 
   According to al-Ghazālī, “repentance which is required of Muslims is 
the abandoning of any action which violates the religious law and resolving 
not to commit a similar act in the future […] the Muslim must atone for his 
sins in the special way prescribed by the religious tradition.”363 He suggests 
that repentance along with the punishment prescribed by the religious 
tradition constitutes kaffāra. This is consistent with the Shāfiʻīs’ doctrine, 
namely their refusal to waive the ḥadd punishment when repentance 
occurs.364 According to the Shāfiʿīs, repentance never preempts ḥadd 
punishment, except in ḥirāba.365 But, if repentance does not negate the ḥadd 
punishment in this world, why would it preempt the punishment in the 
hereafter? Perhaps here is the root of al-Shāfiʿī’s hesitation in the matter. 
Al-Nawawī is a good example of a Shāfiʿī jurist who stresses the fact 
that it is hard to determine the sincerity of the culprit’s repentance. “It is 
impossible to know the truth of it”, he writes, “so how is one to know 
whether he [the culprit] is reformed? (lā sabīla ilā ḥaqīqatihi fa-kayfa yuʿrafu 
iṣlāḥuhu)”.366 Al-Nawawī points out that the legal disagreement about 
repentance, its accountability and validity, occurs because repentance can 
only be established securely if the culprit is granted sufficient time to show 
                                         
363 Mohamad Ahmed Sherif, Ghazālī’s Theory of Virtue (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1975), p. 125. 
364 Cf. Chapter one: 1.4.2.3.  
365 Al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 367. 
366 Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 7, p. 368. 
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his reform and for his reformation to be assessed;367 however, if the judge 
gives the culprit the required time to repent, then the ḥadd law is virtually 
inoperative (muʿaṭṭal), and this goes against the general spirit of ḥadd 
punishments. 
Al-Shīrāzī argued that Qurᵓān 4:16 and 5:39 stipulate that repentance 
has to come with reform, since anyone can pretend repentance for the sake of 
avoiding severe punishment.368 Al-Shīrāzī suggested that repentance must be 
endorsed through good deeds and visible reform. This is because Qurʾān 4:16 
stipulates that “if they repent… and do good works, leave them alone… 
Surely God is ever all-Forgiving and most Merciful”. 
In theory, the Shāfiʿī jurists did not deny the judge the role to discern 
the sincerity of the culprit and the extent of his true reform, nor did they 
deny the role of repentance in gaining forgiveness in the hereafter. However, 
on the practical level, repentance had no legal implications, and therefore the 
sincerity of repentance was ultimately left to God to judge on the Day of 
Judgement.369 
 
3.3.3 The Ḥanbalī and Mālikī view 
Like the Shāfiʿīs, the Ḥanbalīs and the Mālikīs thought that it was 
problematic to regard repentance as kaffāra and instead focused on ensuring 
that corporal and capital punishment is implemented as an expiatory act. The 
                                         
367 Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 7, p. 368: al-tawba baʿd al-rafʿ lā takfī fī isqāṭ al-ḥadd li-
annahu lā budda min maḍy zamān ḥattā yaẓharu al-ṣidq min tawbatihi. 
368 See al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj, vol. 8, p. 8. Al-Ramlī repeats and supports this position. 
369 Ibid.; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, pp. 453-4. 
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Ḥanbalī Ibn Qudāma validated repentance only when it is incurred before the 
crime is brought before the judge: this he regarded as an indication that the 
repentance was genuine. However, if it happened afterwards, he felt it was 
most likely a case of insincere repentance (tuqya).370 Furthermore, the 
Ḥanbalīs provided no further elaboration on what made them consider 
repentance as genuine only when it occurs before the case is brought to the 
Muslim judge. In other words, what was the juristic criterion to presume that 
“genuine” repentance is only valid before the culprit is brought to the judge 
and that the obtained repentance after the culprit is brought to the judge 
makes him suspicious (i.e., by submitting un-genuine repentance) is not 
systematically discussed in the Ḥanbalī tradition.  
However, showing a more flexible approach than the Shāfiʿīs, Ibn 
Qudāma argued that to assess the sincerity of the culprit’s repentance is not 
limited by time to a certain period (ṣalāḥ al-niyya laysa muqaddar bi-mudda 
maʿlūma).371 Overall, however, the Ḥanbalīs were as reluctant as the Shāfiʿīs 
to accept that repentance in itself is enough to expiate the culprit from 
punishment, both worldly and eschatologically. They let themselves be 
guided by the fact that the ḥadd punishments are more often talked about in 
the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah than is repentance and its various forms and 
conditions. For the Ḥanbalīs, to allow repentance to preempt punishment, 
especially after the crime is brought before the judge, undermines the general 
principle of ḥadd punishment as the fixed and immutable law of God (Cf. ch. 
                                         
370 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, vol. 9, p. 130. 
371 Ibid., p. 131. 
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1). Since repentance does not negate the worldly punishment, the ḥadd 
inflicted, therefore, is viewed as kaffāra from eschatological punishment. 
Finally, as for the Mālikīs, they too rejected that repentance can 
preempt ḥadd punishment for crimes such as illegal sexual intercourse, theft 
and false accusation of illegal sexual intercourse. Al-Khurashī rejected 
repentance in the aforementioned crimes and did not give any importance to 
the time given to the culprit to show remorse and repentance.372 This opinion 
rests on the Mālikīs’ approach to ḥadd punishments as defined in the Qurᵓān 
and the practice of the Prophet. Al-Qarāfī argued that, in the light of the 
Qurᵓānic ḥadd verses and the various opinions of the Prophet about the issue, 
one should follow the opinion that the suffering of the ḥadd punishment is 
the act of expiation (kaffāra) and not the culprit’s repentance.373 Overall 
Mālikīs paid little attention to repentance, its aspects and forms. Interpreting 
the Prophetic tradition on ḥadd punishment as the only way to expiate the 
culprit is the central argument of the Mālikīs. The Qurᵓānic ḥadd verses in 
addition to the Prophetic tradition seem to endorse their argument that ḥadd 
deters and expiates the culprit. 
                                         
372 Al-Khurashī, Ḥāshiyat (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997), vol. 8, p. 332: lā yasquṭu 
ḥadd l-sariqa wa-l-zinā wa l-qadhf bi-l-tawba wa-lā bi l-ʿadāla wa-in ṭāla zamānuhumā. 
373 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīra, vol. 9, p. 414. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
In conclusion, despite the fact that there is a clear absence of 
systematic interest of Sunnī jurists with regard to the classification of the 
expiatory acts, ḥadd punishments were classified in the Sunnī tradition as 
forming as the result of a transgression incurred against offences forbidden in 
the Qurᵓān. There was a tendency among Sunnī jurists to view ḥadd 
punishments simply as that – that is, as legal punishments –, and not as 
religious rituals. The consensus of Sunnī jurists was that ḥadd punishments 
were to be subsumed under the muqaddarāt and characterised by the 
imposition of a decreed norm without specification of either the concrete 
reason or the larger purpose (ḥikma) that lies behind the divine norm. Thus, 
the ḥadd punishments were viewed as muqaddarāt, that is, “things specifically 
defined and decreed”. 
It has been shown in this chapter that the point of contention among 
Sunnī jurists was to determine the nature of the things decreed by God and, 
specifically, whether the human has the capacity to apprehend them. The 
Ḥanafī school of law rejected regarding the ḥadd punishment as expiating the 
culprit from punishment in the hereafter and instead, discussed the role of 
repentance as the only means to expiate worldly sins. While the Ḥanafīs 
argued that the divinely ordained punishments served the greater good of 
humankind (cf. chapter one), they rejected that they served an atoning 
function for the individual. The Ḥanafīs also claimed that the divinely 
ordained punishments were meant as a retribution for sins, but that only God 
knew the precise gravity of sin. 
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The Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs, and Ḥanbalīs, on the contrary, consistently held 
that the ḥudūd are kaffārāt; they thus justified the severe punishments 
inflicted in the law of ḥadd as kaffārāt, along with the other justifications of 
ḥadd that they proffered, that is, ḥadd as the right of God and as deterrence. 
The Ḥanafīs restricted their justifications of the severity of ḥadd punishment 
to either preserve a right of God, or to generally and individually prevent 
people from committing ḥadd offences. To suggest that ḥadd punishments 
double up as kaffārāt was not one of the Ḥanafīs’ argument to justify them. 
The Ḥanafīs argued that desisting from the ḥadd offence was demanded in all 
ḥadd verses that promise to reward those who desist, and a ḥadd punishment 
for those who insist on committing forbidden offences. 
The Ḥanafī jurists consistently held that the occasioning factor (ʿilla) of 
kaffārāt norms could not be known due to the kaffārāt’s non-rational nature. 
As one type of the muqaddārāt (others include, notably, the ḥudūd), the 
kaffārāt “escape the human faculty of reasoning”. This argument is critically 
discussed in Lange’s account on Justice and Punishment, and the Medieval 
Imagination (2008) “[…] it could be argued that all legal regulations of ḥudūd 
norms that came to be subsumed under the loose category of muqaddarāt 
have one important feature in common: they all illustrate God’s 
incomprehensible purpose in connecting what man calls “cause” with what 
man calls “result”.374 The Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs, on the other hand, 
insisted on the general permissibility of analogical reasoning in all domains 
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of the law, including the kaffārāt. In Lange’s words “[…] the Shāfiʿīs did not 
hesitate to embrace analogy in the muqaddarāt.”375 According to all Sunnī 
schools of law, except the Ḥanafīs, kaffāra was conceived as one of the 
mechanisms, next to repentance and God’s free exercise of mercy, that assure 
forgiveness, and therefore salvation, despite a sinful act. 
Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī jurists were inclined to regard ḥadd punishments 
as a means of expiation and atonement. In their legal treatises, they devoted 
sections about ḥadd punishments serving as kaffārāt (bāb anna l-ḥudūd 
kaffārāt); this was based on a Prophetic report according to which the 
Prophet said that 
 
whoever among you commits something of such sins [ḥadd offences] 
and receives the legal punishment for it, that will be considered as the 
expiation for that sin; and whoever commits something of such sins and God 
screens him, it is up to God whether to excuse or punish him.376 
 
As noted above, al-Shāfiʿī’s response to this narration was: “I have not 
heard in reference to God’s ḥudūd any more decisive report than this report 
(wa-lam asmaʿ fī l-ḥudūd ḥadīthan abyana min hadhā).”377 Al-Nawawī, 
commenting on al-Shāfiʻī’s statement, opined that “this is a decisive response 
to those who said that the ḥadd punishments are deterrents (zājirāt) and not 
                                         
375 Ibid, p. 191. 
376 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 3, p.509. 
377 Al-Shāfiʻī, Al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 190. 
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acts that expiate sins (mukaffirāt).”378 In conclusion, it has to be said that the 
majority of classical Sunnī jurists agreed with al-Nawawī. 
                                         




Chapter 4: Modern views of traditional justifications of ḥadd 
punishments 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In Part I of this thesis, I examined a number of strategies for the 
justification of the ḥadd punishments in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Part II 
looks at modern and contemporary debates about ḥadd and consists of two 
chapters. In Ch. 4, I attempt to critically evaluate the basic outlines of 
modern Muslim debate about the justifiability of ḥadd punishments, 
highlighting to what extent modern positions echo, attack or simply sidestep 
classical fiqh positions. 
For the purpose of analysis, I divide debates in reference to ḥadd 
punishments into four main camps of Muslim scholars. Each camp is defined 
and classified on the basis of the approaches and attitudes it brings to the 
transmitted knowledge of the Islamic legal tradition (Qurᵓān, sunnah, fiqh). 
The chapter attempts to introduce a basic typology of modern and 
contemporary strategies for the justification of ḥadd punishments. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 1 aims to 
describe, as objectively as possible, the various methods and approaches in 
the modern and contemporary Muslim debate about ḥadd laws and the 
justification for their punishments. The second section aims to evaluate the 
relevance of classical jurisprudence (fiqh) for contemporary Muslim discourse 
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about the justifications of ḥadd punishments. Finally, section 3 aims to 
outline and delineate the differences and the commonalities between the four 
camps of contemporary Muslim scholars. 
 
4.2 The four contemporary camps: definitions and approaches 
Johnston suggests that “to read and interpret one’s sacred texts in the 
light of changing sociopolitical realities – as in writing about ‘Islam’ and 
human rights, for instance – is a case of simply ‘doing theology’.379 Muslim 
jurists who articulate their views of Islamic law based on their understating 
of the Qurᵓān and the transmitted tradition of the Prophet are obviously 
engaging in Islamic theology. Islamic law for contemporary Muslim scholars 
is “a project always undertaken in a particular context and necessarily 
assuming a particular hermeneutic (theory of textual interpretation) and 
epistemology (theory about what we can know and how we come to know 
it)”.380  
   This section deals with the basic methods and approaches applied by 
modern Muslim scholars. I focus here on how contemporary scholars relate 
their work to the Islamic tradition (Qurᵓān, Sunnah, ijmāʿ and fiqh), which 
elements of it they embrace and which elements they reject, and which 
trends exist within the four major groups. These four camps are as follows: 
the Salafis, conservatives, traditionalists, and modernists. 
 
                                         
379  David L. Johnston, “Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿah”, Die Welt des Islams 47, 2 (2007), p. 150. 
380 Ibid., p. 150. 
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4.2.1 The Salafis/fundamentalists’ approach (al-uṣūliyyn) 
Scholars of the Salafi approach tend to value a strict and literal 
interpretation of the Qurᵓān, the Prophetic teachings, as well as the practice 
of the early pious Muslims (ṣaḥāba). According to a Prophetic ḥadīth, “the 
best of mankind is my generation, then those who come after them, and then 
those who come after them”.381 According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
Salafism is “a neo-Orthodox brand of Islamic reformism, originating in the 
late 19th century and centered in Egypt, aiming to regenerate Islam by a 
return to the tradition represented by the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) 
of the primitive faith”. The entry continues: 
 
It is worth mentioning that in modern times the word has come to 
have two dissimilar definitions. The first, used by academics and historians, 
denotes a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas, and sought 
to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilisation. The second quite 
different use of the word favored by self-described contemporary Salafis, 
defines a Salafi as a Muslim who follows literal, traditional [...] injunctions of 
the sacred texts rather than the somewhat freewheeling interpretation of 
earlier Salafis. These Salafis look to Ibn Taymiyyah, not 19th-century figures 
of Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din, Rashid Rida.382 
 
It is this second understanding of the term “Salafi” which is used as 
our point of departure here. The literal meanings of the Qurᵓānic passages 
and the Prophetic narrations hold a great authoritative value for Salafis, and 
                                         
381 Al Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, vol. 8:76: 437. 
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the ṣaḥāba, who are to be emulated, are role models for living as purely and 
piously as possible. By contrast, the tradition of jurisprudence (literally, 
everything produced or established by early, classical and medieval Muslim 
jurists) is devalued by Salafis; legal doctrines as developed by the fuqahāʾ are 
entirely rejected. The Salafis claim that the tradition of jurisprudence is not 
binding and has no authority. As the prominent Salafi advocate Mawdudi 
states: “everything contained in a book of fiqh does not constitute Islamic 
law.”383 Accordingly, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is swept aside as a 
fundamental reference, and instead the traditions of ṣaḥāba practice and 
opinion is effectively employed in its stead. 
 Salafi scholars make sweeping claims about the accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of the Qurᵓānic teachings and the injunctions of the 
Sunnah tradition. According to them, no room is left for human legislation in 
an Islamic state. If anything, the Salafis argue that “human legislation, 
according to Islam, is and should be subject to the supremacy of divine law 
and within the limits prescribed by it.”384  The Salafis deny man discretion in 
matters ordained in the Qurᵓān or practiced by the Prophet. According to 
their ideology, this follows from Qurʾān 33:36: “It is not for any believing 
man or woman to decide by themselves a matter that has been decided by 
God and His messenger, and whoever commits an affront to God and His 
messenger is certainly on the wrong path.” 
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      Outstanding representatives of Salafi ideology are the Pakistani 
Mawdudi and the Saudi al-Hageel. For instance, Mawdudi states: 
 
Islam admits no sovereignty except that God made, and consequently, 
does not recognise any law giver other than Him... the aspect of the legal 
sovereignty of God is as clearly emphasized by the Qurᵓān as the one 
pertaining to His being the only deity to be worshipped... the Sunnah 
constitutes the only source of divine guidance and law, as no further revealed 
guidance is to come to which it may become necessary for mankind to turn... 
it is this dispensation by Muḥammad that constitutes the supreme law which 
represents the will of God, the real sovereign.385 
 
 
Mawdudi held that the Prophetic teachings constitute the only source 
of Divine guidance and law. As for the Prophet, according to him, he was not 
merely the bearer of a message but also the divinely appointed leader, the 
ruler and the teacher. The duty laid on him, Mawdudi argued, was to explain 
and illustrate the law of God by his words and deeds. “This entire life-work of 
the Holy Prophet, which is the Sunnah which in conjunction with the Qurᵓān 
formulates and completes the Supreme Law of the real Sovereign … 
constitutes what is called ‘Sharīʿah’ in Islamic terminology.”386   
Suleiman al-Hageel’s Human Rights in Islam and their Application in the 
Kingdom of Saudi (2001) arguably represents the Saudi government’s 
understanding of the Qurᵓānic teachings. Al-Hageel advocates that the Qurᵓān 
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has been and is the only constitution of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while 
the Prophetic Sunnah constitutes the approach to its application.387 
Furthermore, the Qurᵓānic teachings and the Prophetic practices are viewed 
as having laid down clear and categorical injunctions and prescribed specific 
rules of conduct. In this way, the Salafis reject any interference of any jurist 
or judge to alter the specific injunctions of the Sharīʻah or the rules of 
behaviour expounded by it.388 In further illustration of this theme, the Salafis’ 
premises are as follows: 
       First, God perfected His religion, and secondly, the Qurᵓān is the 
cornerstone and foundation of Islamic law. In addition, the Prophetic 
statements and the practice of his Companions (ṣaḥāba) concerning matters 
of worship and worldly matters are all infallible. Accordingly, Salafis suggest 
that the Companions’ consensus is the only conceivable and credible 
consensus. According to the Salafis, it is possible to revive Islam and renew 
its genuine religious identity by following the Qurᵓān, the sound Sunnah of 
the Prophet, and the guidance of the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ). 
Hallaq observes that Salafis (literalists) rejected jurisprudence because by 
“resorting to legal speculation and an over-use of reasoning” the fuqahāʾ 
“negate the essence of Islam, which is the reasonableness of religious 
obligation.”389  
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  Scholars of the Salafi approach are widely criticised for being too 
literalist in their reading of the Qurᵓānic text and the Prophetic ḥadīth. 
Moreover, Salafis are accused of having reduced the areas of free and 
independent reasoning (ijtihād) established by early classical and medieval 
Muslim scholars. Ramadan criticises the Salafi approach, stating: “It is 
essential to question the methodological assumptions and some reductions 
made by contemporary literalist trends that often represent themselves as the 
only true ‘Salafi’. Those trends tend to reduce and level all areas of study and 
methodological categories established by scholars through the ages.”390 
According to Ramadan, the Salafīs are reductionists, and their restricted 
interpretation of the Qurᵓān has made it impossible to give adequate answers 
to contemporary challenges.391 
  
4.2.2 The conservative approach (muḥāfiẓūn/muqallidūn) 
The second group of scholars that is examined here is termed the camp 
of the conservatives (muqallidūn). These conservative scholars rely on the 
Qurᵓān, the Prophetic tradition Sunnah, and the consensus (ijmāʿ) of the 
Companions, but contrary to the Salafis they also value the tradition of the 
earlier authorities of Muslim classical and late-medieval jurists. The 
conservatives’ have recourse to the Islamic jurisprudence tradition because 
the early jurists explored different areas of laws and were able to creatively 
engage with novel issues that occurred in their time. The works of the fuqahāʾ 
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provide conservative Muslim thinkers with a variety of answers for novel 
cases, found neither in the Qurᵓān nor in the Sunnah. Arguably, the 
conservatives’ reliance is limited to following, by a process of imitation 
(taqlīd), the classical ijtihād of early Muslims jurists. Thus, they could be seen 
to lack the skills and, therefore, the ability to apply their own reasoning 
(ijtihād). Conservative thinkers usually adhere to one of schools of law and 
remain loyal to it.  
   Obviously, the majority of contemporary Muslim scholars are to 
some degree loyal to the fiqh tradition of the early generation of Muslim 
jurists. This tradition of the early generation is viewed as the safest path to 
comprehend the meanings of the Qurᵓānic teachings and the Prophetic 
practices. For instance, the contemporary conservative Muhammad Oqla 
represents the conservative approach. In reference to ḥadd punishments, Oqla 
relies largely on the classical manuals of the early jurists to determine ḥadd 
offences, the various ḥadd punishments and the conditions of validity of ḥadd 
as well as the ways to inflict the ḥadd punishments. It appears that Oqla 
draws his arguments about ḥadd and the justifications for ḥadd punishments 
more or less directly from the Sunnī schools of law, without engaging in what 
could be termed ijtihād. Although Oqla makes extensive references to the 
Sunnī tradition, he fails to contribute critically to the contemporary disputes 
about ḥadd law and its justifications. All he does is to quote Muslim classical 
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jurists’ opinions on the implementations of ḥadd punishment and the way it 
should be inflicted.392 
    Another conservative scholar, Muhammad Qadri, assumes that ḥadd 
punishments must be inflicted as a matter of fact. According to him, ḥadd 
punishments are very well established in the Islamic tradition (Qurᵓān, 
Sunnah, ijmāʿ and fiqh). For Qadri, it is 
 
       [a] unanimous fact that the ḥadd is not established only through 
the Qurᵓān but … equally through Prophetic Sunnah and the definite ijmāʻ of 
his Companions.... [A]ny discrimination between Qurᵓān and Sunnah for the 
establishment of the ḥadd is absolutely prohibited as an act of dastardly 
perversion contrary to the unanimous consensus of the Muslim ummah in all 
times and periods.393 
 
For Qadri, jurisprudence is essential for a number of reasons. He is 
aware that the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah contain very little about the actual 
implementations of ḥadd punishments. Qadri’s and all other conservatives’ 
reliance on the fiqh works is driven by necessity, especially when, as often in 
the law of ḥadd, the Qurᵓān and Sunnah provide only broad and general 
principles. Further, the tradition of the Prophet cannot be trusted easily: it 
requires a careful examination of the transmitters of the ḥadīth as well as of 
the content of the ḥadīth.394 
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There is no reason to believe that contemporary conservatives have 
attempted to critically evaluate the jurists’ manuals. The fiqh tradition is 
relied on with no effort to critically read or systematize the arguments 
presented by classical jurists. This is clearly stated by Jamila Hussain, who 
holds that “the Qurᵓān and Sunnah are the primary sources and the 
interpretations and opinions of the learned jurists the secondary sources.”395 
Indeed, the conservatives’ approach is to view fiqh opinions as “sources”, not 
as an ongoing discussion which they join in the spirit of critical dialogue. 
 
4.2.3 The traditionalists’ approach  
The camp of contemporary Muslim thinkers that is referred to here as 
traditionalists shares many characteristics with the conservatives. The big 
difference is in the value the traditionalists attribute to ijtihād. Traditionalists 
claim that the pure form of Islamic law is embodied in the Qurᵓān, the 
Sunnah of the Prophet and the consensus (ijmāʿ) of the early generation of 
Muslims. In difference to the conservatives, however, the traditionalists take 
the legal doctrines elaborated by Muslim classical jurists into considerable 
consideration. Traditionalists unanimously agree that there is a harmony 
between divine revelation (Qurᵓān) and sound reason, and that these should 
not stand in conflict. Furthermore, if there appears to be a contradiction or 
conflict between the two, it is because one or the other has been 
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misunderstood.396 The traditionalists emphasize that human reason is a fourth 
source of law which, according to them, is vital and necessary for evolving 
conditions. 
     Hallaq argues that the authority and prestige of the founding 
fathers and the later jurists (fuqahāᵓ) is maintained and even defended by 
many traditionalist scholars.397 Further illustration of this claim is that there 
is good reason to believe that Muslim jurists of the traditionalist approach 
have realised that the Qurᵓān and the Prophetic tradition of ḥadīth have often 
fallen short of supplying all the answers to contemporary problems, 
particularly in the area of civil transactions (they are believed to have 
provided a comprehensive system of worship and belief). 
Accordingly, in the eyes of the traditionalists, there is a continuing 
need for ijtihād and qiyās, particularly when these sources do not contradict 
Islamic religious tenets. In addition, the public interest or welfare (maṣlaḥa) 
is one of the cornerstones of the traditionalists’ approach. It is worth 
mentioning that the concept of maṣlaḥa has been amplified to such an extent 
that it can stand on its own as one of the main legal theories and 
philosophies in a modernised Islamic criminal law. A number of traditionalist 
scholars have contributed to the domain of Islamic law, and to the legal 
doctrines of ḥadd. Here I choose some of the most distinguished among them 
and present their methods and approaches in reference to Islamic criminal 
law. 
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         Muḥammad Abū Zahra (b. 1898) is an example of a cautiously 
pro-ijtihād traditionalist scholar. He has written extensively about crimes 
(jarāᵓim) and punishments (ʿuqūbāt) in classical jurisprudence (fiqh).398 Abū 
Zahra treats the Qurᵓān as the primary source of legislation, hence, as the 
yardstick for all other Islamic sources of legal authority (Sunnah, ijmāʿ, and 
qiyās/ijtihād). He views the Sunnah of the Prophet as the secondary 
legislative source of law and holds it to fulfil an explanatory function. In 
reference to ḥadd offences, Abū Zahra regards ḥadd punishments as the 
precisely defined and ordained criminal law of the Qurᵓān.399 He argues that 
the revealed passages (naṣṣ) dealing with ḥadd crimes indicate that ḥadd 
punishments have an upper limit – the unambiguous punishment dictated in 
the Qurᵓān.400 Abū Zahrah argues that the “ḥudūd Allāh are defined in the 
Qurᵓān and for this reason when ḥadd crimes are brought before the judge 
the punishments are not subject to alteration or modification under any 
circumstances.”401  
       When Abū Zahra has recourse to the tradition of jurisprudence it 
is because of the ambiguity of verses about the ways in which ḥadd 
punishments should be inflicted, ways that are found neither in the Qurᵓān 
nor in the Prophetic narrations. According to Abū Zahra, “all the Islamic 
provisions came achieve the common good for peoples (al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya 
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kulluhā qad jāᵓat li-maṣāliḥ al-ʿibād)”402. Ḥadd offences, according to him, are 
crimes committed against the well-established interests of society; this, he 
holds, is clearly stipulated in the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah. Abū Zahra 
highlights that the penalty for the crime protects maṣlaḥa and that 
implementing Islamic criminal law fulfils genuine justice in this world.403 
   Another prominent contemporary jurist is ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿŪda (d. 
1954), author of al-Tashrīʿ al-jināᵓī al-Islāmī muqāranan bi-l-qānūn al-waḍʿī 
(“The Islamic criminal legislation in comparison with secular law”). 
Throughout his book, ʿŪda presents the opinions of the four Sunnī legal 
schools of fiqh and summarizes most of their disputes.404 For ʿŪda, the 
primary sources of Islamic law are the Qurᵓān, Sunnah and consensus of the 
Companions. The secondary sources of law are the derivative sources of 
ijtihād and qiyās, which should agree with what is said in the Qurᵓān and the 
Sunnah.405 As in the case of Abū Zahra, one sees here an acceptance of the 
fiqh tradition, combined with a cautious espousal of ijtihād. 
The contemporary jurist and mufti al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926) represents 
the orthodox Muslim jurists who give the authority of classical jurists’ 
heritage a vital position in contemporary legal debate. His influential work 
The Lawful and The Prohibited in Islam (2003) is an attempt to explain the 
prohibitions of things, the purpose of the prohibition and its punishments. Al-
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Qaraḍāwī covers, for example, the punishments for fornication, theft and 
drinking alcohol. Al-Qaraḍāwī discusses the purposes of prohibitions from an 
Islamically philosophical point of view. He insists that the effect of 
threatening potential offenders with punishment has much greater impact 
than the punishment.406 Al-Qaraḍāwī focuses on the reasons and purposes 
behind the divine prohibitions and presents these as the crucial basis on 
which any theory of justification for the law of ḥadd must rest. Al-Qaraḍāwī 
pays little attention to the punishments of exceeding ḥadd Allāh and, instead, 
highlights the sinfulness of these prohibited acts in Islam.407 
      A more recent example of a contemporary jurist who qualifies as a 
“traditionalist” is Khaled Abou El Fadl, even though this appellation is open 
to debate, since Abou El Fadl is in many respects a lot more radical than the 
likes of Abū Zahra, ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿŪda and al-Qaraḍāwī. In Rebellion and 
Violence in Islamic Law, Abou El Fadl argues that “[c]onceptually, one should 
distinguish between juristic discourses, Islamic law, and Muslim law.”408 The 
first signifies how jurists have traditionally conceived of the law, the second 
is the ‘ideal’, inaccessible Law as it only exists in the mind of God, and the 
third refers to the reality of applied Sharīʿah in the history of Islam. El-Fadl’s 
main thrust in his approach is to demarcate the line between the divine 
‘spirit’ of the Law on the one hand, and the way in which the jurists 
attempted to understand the purposes and functions of the divine law. He 
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writes that “the function of law and the role of jurists tend to emphasize the 
need for order and stability.”409 
As to the Prophetic tradition, Abou El Fadl argues that the Muslim 
dogma does not assert that the ḥadīth literature is divinely protected from the 
possibility of corruption: “There is a considerable degree of creative 
subjectivity in the process of authenticating, documenting, organizing, and 
transmitting the reports attributed to the Prophet and the Companions.”410 He 
views the Sunnah as “a symbolic construct that obtains its meaning and 
normative power from the juristic culture.”411 
   Despite the fact that Abou El Fadl values the tradition of jurists, he is 
very critical in pointing out some of their faults and shortcomings when 
dealing with the fiqh tradition. For example, he points out that sometime, 
“the jurisprudential inquiry did not focus on the original intent in order to 
service the text, but in order to service the socio-political reality through the 
use of the text.”412 He argues that respect for the integrity and independence 
of the Qurᵓān and the absolute autonomy of its divine message does not mean 
that no interpretive community or individual may re-engage or re-examine 
the texts in which the divine will expresses itself.413 
 
4.2.4 The Modernist Approach 
                                         
409 Ibid., p. 61. 
410 Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 105. 
411 Ibid., p. 97. 
412 Ibid., p. 118. 
413 Ibid., p. 132. 
 181 
The main feature of the modernists’ approach is that the modernists 
devalue the tradition of jurisprudence (fiqh),414 a feature the modernists have 
in common with the Salafi thinkers. Their main emphasis is concentrated on 
contemporary Qurᵓān interpretations. To the Prophetic tradition of Sunnah, 
they have less recourse. Further, the consensus of the early Muslims (ṣaḥāba) 
is not binding for them as an authoritative source of law. Nonetheless, the 
modernists see in the early consensus “a worthy contribution to Sharīʻah 
inasmuch as it has made possible changes to suit the needs of changing times 
and usages.”415 
           The majority of the modernist scholars altogether discarded the 
classical principles of legal theories, and the methodologies developed by 
classical jurists.  Hallaq describes the modernists’ approach thus: 
 
[it] consists of understanding revelation as both text and context. The 
connection between the revealed text and modern society [turns] upon an 
interpretation of the spirit and broad intention behind the specific language of 
the texts.416 
 
The modernists consistently hold that the Qurᵓān must be interpreted 
as a unified text and considered in light of the context of early Islam. They 
argue that all legal rules stipulated in the Qurᵓān are in constant change. It is 
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as if the modernists encourage and urge all Muslims to maintain the door for 
ijtihād widely open, but not to think about ijtihād within the narrow 
framework of the fiqh tradition. In failing to do this, modernists warn, 
application of the Qurᵓānic rules will prove disastrous.417 
        The modernists’ approach entails three main steps. The first is to 
treat the Qurᵓān as a unified scripture that has an underlying ‘spirit’ or 
general direction, as opposed to the atomizing approach of classical fiqh. 
Secondly, interpreters must consider the revelatory context of the Qurʾān. 
Thirdly, they must be aware of the fact that the Islamic legal norms are 
mutable and always evolving. One of the most prominent advocates of this 
approach is the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988). In Islam and 
Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (1982), Rahman 
highlights that Muslim scholars traditionally failed to understand the 
underlying unity of the Qurᵓān, coupled with their practical insistence upon 
fixating their attention on the words of various verses in isolation. He 
describes this approach as “atomistic”, permitting laws to be derived from 
verses that were not at all legal in intent.418 Furthermore, he enunciates that 
this piecemeal approach to the Qurᵓān has not ceased in modern times; 
indeed, in some respects it has worsened.419 
       Another prominent modernist thinker is the Lebanese jurist and 
philosopher Ṣubḥī al-Maḥmaṣānī. In The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam, 
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al-Maḥmaṣānī acknowledges that the principle of the evolution of Islamic law 
rests on the fact that conditions, customs and sects of the world and nations 
do not develop according to stable patterns or programs. There is an absolute 
need for constant change and from transiting one condition to another. 
“Inasmuch as this applies to persons, times, and provinces, it applies likewise 
to countries, ages and states. Such is God’s order amongst his creatures.”420  
   Al-Maḥmaṣānī’s main thrust revolves around the argument that the 
interests of the people (their maṣāliḥ) are the basis of the divine legislation of 
law. Thus, he argues, it is both necessary and reasonable that Sharīʿah rules 
should undergo changes to suit the changing times; and that these rules be 
affected by the social organisation and the environment. His model in this 
discussion is Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, who argued that the legal 
interpretation should change with the change in times, places, conditions, 
intentions and customs. Al-Maḥmaṣanī quotes Ibn al-Qayyim by stating that 
“ignorance of this fact [the necessity of change] has resulted in grievous 
injustices to the Sharīʿah, and has caused many difficulties, hardships, and 
sheer impossibilities, although it is known that the noble Sharīʿah, which 
serves the highest interests of mankind, would not sanction such results.”421   
    Furthermore, textual ordinances and rulings, according to al-
Maḥmaṣānī, may be set aside for three reasons. First, when the ration legis 
changes, that is when the ruling no longer produces the intended maṣlaḥa. 
Secondly, when the actual ruling is based on a custom that people no longer 
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practice. Thirdly, when necessity demands it.422 This suggests that, in this 
way, contemporary jurists may address and challenge those laws of the 
Qurᵓān and the Sunnah that are perceived to be incompatible with modern 
needs and attitudes, while the religious and ethical message of Islam as 
embodied in the sacred texts is left intact. Al-Maḥmaṣānī argues that 
disregarding textually based rulings does not mean that the text itself is 
altered, and therefore invalid, but only that its exegesis undergoes some 
change.423 
 
4.3 Ḥadd Justifications in Muslims’ Contemporary Debate 
In order to shed more light on how contemporary Muslim thinkers 
have related their views of ḥadd to the classical fiqh tradition, this section 
explores how much recourse to classical justifications of ḥadd punishments 
can be detected in their writings. Generally speaking, contemporary authors 
tend toward the view that very little has been written in the classical fiqh 
tradition about the purposes behind ḥadd punishments. El-Awa argues that 
the jurists paid little attention to the justification of ḥadd. This is, as he puts 
it, due to the fact that 
 
        Muslim jurists were not interested in discussing the matter as 
these punishments are the province of God alone. Since they have been 
prescribed in specific terms and are to be imposed without question, it was 
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considered unnecessary to say much about the purpose they served or the 
reasons for which they were prescribed.424 
 
          However, as the discussion in the previous chapters has 
demonstrated, classical jurists did reckon with a number of justificatory 
elements in ḥadd jurisprudence. In fact, classical jurists sometimes went to 
some length to justify the severity of ḥadd punishments, even if their 
accounts often lack a systematic categorization. In the following, I examine 
the extent to which each of the four contemporary camps has made recourse, 
whether explicitly or obliquely, to the classical discourse of Muslim jurists 
about the justifications of ḥadd punishments. This is all the more worthwhile 
the effort since ḥadd has come to be understood, both by Muslims and by 
Western observers, purely under the aspect of its being a divine decree 
(muqaddar) from God, when in reality the discourse about ḥadd as a 
preventative measure (zajr, radʿ) and expiatory act (kaffāra) continues to be 
quite rich, though not to equal measure in all of the four camps outlined 
above. 
 
4.3.1 The Salafis/fundamentalists 
4.3.1.2 Ḥadd as God’s right (ḥaqq Allāh) 
Salafis generally tend to embrace the idea that the ḥadd punishments 
are an immutable right of God, a similar view held by the majority of Sunnī 
jurists. They enunciate that ḥadd punishments as stipulated in the Qurᵓān and 
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the Sunnah belong only to God; God’s law must not be questioned or 
‘rationalized’, because God lays no responsibility upon His creatures unless it 
is due to some divine wisdom of which He knows best.425 Thus, for them, 
once the crime is litigated to the judge the punishment must be inflicted 
regardless of any caveats discussed in the Sunnī tradition. Salafis have 
viewed ḥadd punishments as “the fulfillment of a right which belongs to 
Allāh; and since their enforcement is a duty towards Allāh, they may not be 
modified nor changed in any way, nor may they be abolished by either 
individuals or groups.”426 Therefore, Salafis have described God’s limits as 
prescribed in the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah as “His sacred norms” (maḥārimuh) 
which He guards “jealously”.427 Since there the tradition of Sunnī jurists is 
entirely discarded, there is no distinction made between the rights of God 
and those of the individuals.  
Associating ḥadd laws directly with God, and stressing the notion that 
they are “God’s rights” has led the Salafis in their literal reading of the 
Qurᵓān to conclude that the limits prescribed in the Qurᵓān are sacred and 
once and for all times fixed. To enhance their claim they ask why, if the ḥadd 
punishments were not God’s rights, would the Prophet have been so very 
keen to include them in the Qurᵓān, which states clearly that these 
punishments are inflicted because they are His rights (ḥuqūquhu). The fact 
that the Prophet and his Companions are reported to have implemented ḥadd 
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punishments has also affected the Salafis understanding of ḥadd punishments 
as the rights of God which must be guarded.428 
The Salafis’ understanding of ḥadd punishments as representing and 
preserving God’s rights is consistent with their literal approach to the Qurᵓān 
and the Prophetic Sunnah. Salafis do not usually wish to enter debates about 
the wisdom or the rationale behind ḥadd punishments. According to them, 
there is no need to justify God’s injunctions, as He knows what is best for His 
creatures. To justify the ḥadd punishment requires investigating the 
underlying meaning of the Qurᵓān, its ‘spirit’, and such an endeavour is 
clearly rejected by the Salafis, as the only authoritative source for them is the 
plain meaning of Qurᵓān. The Qurᵓān defines the crime and its punishment, 
and examples of the implementation of the ḥadd punishment are found in the 
Prophetic tradition. This suffices for the Salafis, and they urge the Muslim 
ruler or government to apply God’s law. Since the Salafis totally discard the 
jurisprudence tradition, the term ḥaqq Allāh is perceived differently than in 
the fiqh tradition, where it is tied to the notion of the “common good” 
(maṣlaḥa), especially by the Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs (see ch. 1). The only 
point in common with the fiqh tradition is that ḥadd law is a divine 
ordinance, but for the Salafis it is a non-negotiable law. 
 
4.3.1.3 Ḥadd as prevention (zajr, radʿ) 
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Although, as stated, Salafi scholars are generally averse to exploring 
the purpose or underlying ‘meaning’ of the ḥadd punishments, one notices 
that they often comment rather extensively on the “infinite” wisdom behind 
the implementations of ḥadd punishments. Their general assumption is that 
“human beings are naturally predisposed to avoid pain and discomfort, 
hence, if they know that committing a crime will result in the enforcement of 
such penalties, this will serve to deter them from engaging in such acts of 
disobedience.”429 Therefore, ḥadd punishments are viewed and presented as 
“a protective wall, as it were; it is tantamount to the public statement that 
Muslim society rejects crime and will not allow it under any 
circumstances.”430 Importantly, Salafis have regarded the severe punishments 
in Islamic law as a Muslim duty to guard and preserve the five most essential 
elements of Islam (al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khamsa), clearly these were the elements 
elaborated by the early jurists of the Mālikī school of law. For instance, Al-
Hageel justifies ḥadd punishments by suggesting that they 
 
prevent bloodshed; they prevent life from being wasted; they protect 
people’s honour from being violated and their lines of descent from becoming 
confused; they keep money from being lost, wasted or consumed in an unjust 
way; they preserve people’s minds from imbalance and even death; and they 
prevent religion from becoming an object of ridicule.431  
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431 Ibid., p. 153. 
 189 
Salafis describe the punishments for offences like adultery and false 
accusation as punishments for social crimes and acts of public indecency. 
Thus, for the Salafis, it is necessary for such crimes to be retaliated by severe 
punishments which can serve as an effective restraint and deterrent. The 
punishment for false accusation is declared to “prevent people’s morals and 
honour from being attached by lying tongues and false report, and to prevent 
people from raising accusations against one another unless they have 
evidence in support of their claims [...] the punishment for such accusations 
in Islamic law has been established to prevent the fulfillment of this very 
aim.”432 
    Similar arguments occur in reference to theft. The Salafis propose 
that the purpose of severe punishments is the benefit of society. Therefore, 
amputation of the hand is to sacrifice a part for the sake of the whole 
community, which is regarded as one of the main principles of the ḥadd law. 
Amputation of the thief’s hand serves as a lesson and warning to those who 
entertain thoughts of taking other people’s money so that, instead of doing 
what they may have had in mind, they will refrain, thereby preserving and 
protecting other people’s property.433 Finally, the punishment for ḥirāba is 
declared to be a 
 
deterrent whereby those criminals may think twice before they 
consider committing such crimes. The psychological dimension of this 
                                         
432 Ibid., p. 163. 
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penalty is based in the idea of balance, that is, while a person is 
contemplating a crime, he will be reminded of the penalty which will, in 
return, make him consider the dreadful consequences of committing. This 
Islamically prescribed penalty works as a deterrent due to its psychological-
oriented basis.434 
 
The Salafis pay far less attention to ḥadd punishment as an individual 
deterrent. Their sole concern is about enforcing the ḥadd punishments as set 
forth in the Qurᵓān and the Sunnah as the only sufficient remedy to do away 
with sinful crimes or, at the very least, to minimize them.435 Overall, the 
Salafis display a curious tendency to engage in judgments about the deterring 
effect of ḥadd punishments, even if such reasoning is a commonplace of the 
fiqh tradition, which in theory the Salafis refuse to acknowledge. Further 
research may bring to light, however, variations within the Salafi camp. Here 
I am outlining only some of their basic arguments. 
 
4.3.1.4 Ḥadd as expiation (kaffāra) 
The Salafis concur with the Prophetic tradition that “God is too 
gracious to punish one of his servants twice for the same offence.”436 There 
has been reliance on and recourse to the classical justification about 
considering ḥadd punishments as instruments of correction for those who 
exceed the limits of God. In fact, the punishments are presented to Muslims 
as “instruments of corrections” (jawābir) in the sense that, if someone 
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commits a crime for which one of these penalties has been prescribed, and if 
the penalty is then carried out against the culprit, this serves to atone for his 
crime.”437 
Salafis rely on the Prophetic ḥadīth according to which he said that 
ḥadd punishments are acts that expiate one from the hereafter’s 
punishment.438 They completely neglect the disputes of classical jurists about 
whether to suffer ḥadd is an expiatory act. There is a complete absence of 
legal argumentation about expiation, repentance and their implications for 
the hereafter. This is due to the fact that the Salafis restrict themselves to the 
Qurᵓān, Sunnah and the tradition of the Prophet’s Companions (salaf). Their 
rejection of the fiqh tradition has affected their ability to critically discuss 
and therefore to justify ḥadd punishments as expiatory acts. 
 
4.3.2 Conservatives’ justifications  
4.3.2.1 Ḥadd as God’s Rights (ḥaqq Allāh) 
Conservatives tend to argue that ḥadd offences are divinely defined, 
hence, ḥadd punishments ought to be considered likewise “ordained” (ʻuqūbāt 
muqaddara). For this reason, ḥadd punishments are considered rights of God. 
Oqla argues that ḥadd punishments are fixed and cannot be waived once the 
crime is brought before the judicial authority. In fact, no one has the right to 
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waive ḥadd under any condition.439 Thus, in ḥadd punishment any 
intercession (shafāʿa) is unacceptable either by the judge or by the ruler.440 
Further illustration of this claim is that only God knows the wisdom (ḥikma) 
behind the ḥadd punishments; this wisdom can be understood as to protect 
and maintain the welfare of Muslims. Although conservatives value the fiqh 
tradition they completely reject ijtihād and qiyās because they view ḥadd 
punishments as simply “ordained” (muqaddar).441 
 
4.3.2.2 Ḥadd as prevention 
Conservatives argue that the aim of ḥadd punishments is to generally 
and individually prevent crimes. This rests on the Qurᵓānic verses that 
describe ḥadd punishments as a disgrace. This has led the conservatives to 
justify ḥadd punishments for the reason that they deter those who have even 
the slightest inclination towards committing ḥadd crimes; such people would 
restrain themselves in view of the punishment. As Qadri argues, “in order to 
achieve this objective, Sharīʿah has clearly commanded that the fixed 
punishments of Islam should not be reduced or mitigated even under pressure 
of the sentiment of mercy.”442 He claims that the ultimate purpose of the 
severe punishments of ḥadd is to put fear of prosecution into the hearts of the 
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public, for example, by hanging up the chopped-off hands and feet of the 
criminal, and by the punishment of stoning in broad daylight.443  
 Moreover, ḥadd punishments are retributive in nature. As 
conservatives have advocated, “the first objective of Islamic punishment is to 
award punishment to the culprit equal to the magnitude of his guilt because 
this is inflicted in exchange for the crime he has committed.”444 It is believed 
that the idea of retribution is rooted in the Islamic philosophy of punishment 
on the assumption that the suffering originating from a sinful or criminal act 
cannot be adjusted without punishment.445 The punitive character of Islamic 
penal law is represented through the infliction of some of the punitive 
practices. As Qadri argues concerning death penalties, amputation of hands 
or feet, imprisonments, transportation, confinement: “The criminals are 
prevented from repeating the crime either due to a permanent or temporary 
disability.”446 
 
4.3.2.3 Ḥadd as expiation (kaffāra) 
Conservatives share with the Salafis the view that ḥadd punishments 
are acts of an expiatory nature, and a means of moral and spiritual 
purification of the crime committed. Qadri comments in regard to the 
philosophy of Islamic penal law that 
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if Islam had not prescribed these kinds of punishments, its penal 
system would have remained incomplete and primitive. It is a remarkable 
feature of the Islamic penal system that it has created a balance between the 
mundane and spiritual aspects of human life by prescribing physical 
punishments to eliminate ethereal accountability.447 
 
        Conservatives have argued that the justification of ḥadd as an 
expiation is clearly evident in a number of prophetic narrations, for example, 
in the stories of Māʿiz and al-Ghāmidiyya which present the Prophet as 
voicing the opinion that Māʻiz and al-Ghāmidiyya were forgiven because they 
willingly requested the Prophet to carry out the punishments for the sins they 
committed. Oqla argues that if Māʿiz and al-Ghāmidiyya were not sure they 
would be forgiven, they would not have insisted on the punishments being 
carried out. They desperately wanted to be expiated from the punishments in 
the hereafter.448  Conservatives rely the Prophetic ḥadīths to indicate that 
ḥadd punishments expiate the culprits for sins committed in this world. 
Conservatives expand their arguments about ḥadd punishments to include 
repentance and its effect on the process of carrying out the punishments. 
They acknowledge the disputes of Muslim jurists on repentance. 
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4.3.3 The traditionalists’ justifications  
4.3.3.1  Ḥadd as God’s Right (ḥaqq Allāh) 
Traditionalists tend to view ḥadd punishments as the “pure” right of 
God (ḥaqq khāliṣ). This is because ḥadd are defined in the Qurᵓān and, 
therefore, are strictly fixed. Al-Qaraḍāwī states that “Islam has restricted the 
authority to legislate the ḥarām and the ḥalāl, taking it out of the hands of 
human beings, regardless of their religious or worldly position, and reserving 
it for the Lord of human beings alone.”449 This is a similar approach to the 
classical view on the nature of ḥadd law: “punishment prescribed by God is 
the exercise of His exclusive Right. Ḥadd is the fixed punishment for the 
reason that this can neither be increased nor be decreased by anybody.”450 
Therefore, ḥadd punishments are perceived as the “sacred norms set by Him” 
(maḥārimuh); they must be guarded and not exceeded.451 Traditionalists have 
agreed with the classical jurists that exceeding these limits constitutes an 
aggression against God, even if the aggression is made against a private 
right.452 
According to Abū Zahra, ḥadd punishments are God’s rights because it 
is not left to the Muslim judges and rulers to decide which punishment 
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combats which crime. God’s right is presumed to be “embodied in the general 
ḥaqq of the Muslim society. For this reason God has ordained ḥadd 
punishments to protect Islamic society… ḥadd punishments are set to protect 
Muslims.”453 In a further illustration of this claim, ḥadd norms establish what 
is a good deed (faḍīla) and an obscene deed (radhīla), and they establish a 
firm separation between them.454 Things forbidden in the Qurᵓān are warned 
against and, if the forbidden acts are committed, this is seen as an aggression 
against God and society.455 
   The traditionalists point out that Sharīʿah has aims and purposes 
embodied in God’s law. God’s law aims to preserve and protect the general 
welfare of humanity. Thus, ḥadd punishment is perceived as God’s right 
because it guarantees the benefit of the whole community.456Abū Zahra states 
that “the precise explanation of what constitutes a right of God is that God’s 
right is embodied in the public interest (ḥaqq Allāh mā yamassu l-
mujtamaʿ)”.457 By equating “God’s right” with the well-being of society, the 
traditionalists show themselves to be more willing than the conservatives to 
engage with the more speculative side of fiqh. 
 
4.3.3.2 Ḥadd as preventions 
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Traditionalists justify the severity of the ḥadd punishment as a 
deterrent tool to effectively combat crimes at all levels, generally and 
individually. The examples given by them are based on the Saudi government 
statistics. These statistics, according to Jamila Hussein, reveal that “the 
existence of Islamic criminal law … has resulted in it [Saudi-Arabia] being 
remarkably free of crime. The deterrent effect of harsh penalties such as 
cutting of the hand for theft has reduced the incidence of theft to a very low 
level.”458 
        Thus, the ḥadd punishment in their debates is said “to fit the 
crime, taking into account the circumstances of the accused”; the 
traditionalists thus hope “that whatever punishment is given will deter 
further immorality and corruption.”459 
      It appears that the majority of the traditionalists tend to justify the 
ḥadd punishment as a measure aiming at general deterrence. For instance, 
Abū Zahra justifies ḥadd punishments as preventing people from committing 
the same offence, and this is in fact the ḥadd punishments’ primary aim (al-
maqṣad al-aʻẓam). Ḥadd punishment serves as a lesson for the public to resist 
future temptation to commit forbidden crimes.460 Punishments like stoning, 
amputation, and crucifixion are meant to deter Muslims from committing 
such offences. Also Ḥadād al-Ṭāhir views ḥadd punishments as punishments 
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ordained to deter further immorality and corruption.461 The primary aim of 
punishments like scourging is to deter the culprit; for instance, in the offence 
of false accusation the punishment is believed to “deter the culprit (taᵓdīb al-
jānī).462 Muhammad Waqar views the punishment of ḥadd to act as a 
deterrent, as well as a reformatory measure for the offender.463 
 
4.3.3.3 Ḥadd as expiation (kaffāra) 
Contemporary traditionalists seem to pay relatively little attention to 
the justification of ḥadd punishment as expiation. Since the Qurᵓān is 
completely silent on ḥadd punishment as a form of expiatory act, 
traditionalists have tended to avoid the question whether ḥadd punishment 
atone for the culprit’s offence in the hereafter. Traditionalists are more 
inclined to discuss repentance and its role in attaining forgiveness in the 
hereafter. They make extensive recourse to the Ḥanafī classical tradition of 
fiqh to stress that repentance atones for the sin whether the punishments is 
inflicted or not.   
For instance, Abū Zahra seems to advocate the opinions of the Ḥanafīs 
when he argues that “whosever repents will be forgiven”,464 and that 
“repentance waives and expiates ḥadd punishment in this world and the 
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next.”465 Abū Zahra quotes the Prophetic ḥadīth according to which the 
Prophet associated forgiveness only with repentance. Arguably, Abū Zahra 
contradicts himself; in his introduction to ḥadd laws, he defines ḥadd 
punishments as an immutable fixed law of divine measures.  In the section on 
repentance, Abū Zahra shares the view of the Ḥanafīs that repentance waives 
and expiates the ḥadd punishment. He argues that “repentance purifies the 
soul and ḥadd punishments are ordained to purify it, and if repentance does 
purify it, then there is no need for the punishment.”466 
 
4.3.4 The modernists’ justifications  
4.3.4.1 Ḥadd as the right’s of God (ḥaqq Allāh) 
Modernists agree that ḥadd as mentioned in the Qurᵓān constitute a 
“divinely ordained law”. However, they interpret the nature of ḥadd 
punishments as God’s rights differently, and provide a different interpretation 
to the classical one. Ḥadd norms are viewed as divine instructions stipulated 
in the Qurᵓān to give general guidance to humans on moral and religious 
duties.467 The modernists deny that the Qurᵓān encompasses Sharīʿah in the 
form of a codified law that is eternally unchangeable. Instead, as Shahrour 
holds, God merely sets certain limits for the law, limits within which there is 
scope for human legislation. Human societies are emphatically encouraged to 
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explore this scope freely.468 Contrary to the classical understanding of ḥadd 
norms as “fixed”, the modernists have argue that the relationship between 
the eternal validity of the legal message and the historical temporality is 
dynamic. They view the spirit of the Islamic legislation as seeking to avoid 
implementation of the ḥadd punishments, especially when they are 
indiscriminately enforced. Instead, modernists consider mitigation as 
absolutely vital.  
       The fact that ḥadd are stipulated in the Qurᵓān does not indicate 
that ḥadd punishments are fixed and immutable. As Kamali suggests, “ḥadd 
punishments are meant to prevent crime and signify the limits of what is 
tolerable and what is not… The concept of “separating or preventing limits” 
of the Qurᵓān is thereby replaced by the idea of fixed punishment.”469 Kamali 
thus accuses the fiqh tradition of reducing the Qurᵓān’s broad and 
comprehensive concepts of ḥadd to fixed mandatory punishments. 
 
4.3.4.2 Ḥadd as prevention 
Modernists argue that ḥadd punishments must be understood, in the 
words of El-Awa, on the basis of “a justification for punishment which looks 
to the future, i.e., to the prevention of crime”, so that “what is taken to be of 
supreme importance is that punishment prevents offences.”470 They advocate 
that the recognition of the deterrence aspect embodied in the application of 
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the Islamic penal system is “deeper and stronger than in other systems… 
deterrence is recognised as the predominant justification for punishments, 
particularly for ḥadd punishments.”471 Modernists have held that the current 
implementations of ḥadd punishments show little care for offenders.472  
   The modernists agree that the general aim of ḥadd punishments is to 
stop a crime from being repeated in the future. The more severe the 
punishment is, the graver the crime. This rests on the Qurᵓānic ḥirāba verse in 
which the noun nakāl can be variously translates as ‘exemplary punishment’ 
or ‘punishment as a deterrent’. In Shahrour’s view, “Allāh has set a condition 
by which the thief’s hand shall be cut off: its aim should be a warning so that 
the crime will not be repeated. This means that the punishment has a 
sociopedagogic function; it is not a merciless revenge of a crime.”473 
 
4.3.4.3 Ḥadd as expiation (kaffāra) 
It is obvious that Muslim modernist scholars do not pay attention to 
the juristic dispute about ḥadd punishments as acts of an expiatory nature. 
This is due to the fact that modernist scholars have faced difficulties in 
meeting the challenges facing the Islamic Sharīʻah as a whole, and its Islamic 
criminal law in particular. Modernists have been interested in finding 
solutions to solve these challenges, in fact the modernist camp has been the 
only one to recognise and effectively deal with the contemporary difficulties 
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faced by the Islamic Sharīʿah, particularly the application of ḥadd laws. 
Arguably, the demands for reforming the Islamic Sharīʿah and making it 
suitable for contemporary needs has led most modernists to take steps to re-
examine the classical heritage of the Islamic sources, and in most cases, to 
reject it. There is no single argument in the modernists’ debate about 
considering ḥadd punishment as a punishment that expiates the culprit from 
the hereafter’s punishment. 
   What characterizes the modernists’ debate about the justifications of 
ḥadd is their outright rejection of regarding the ḥadd as immutable law and of 
the idea that only God knows its purpose. The modernists clearly believe that 
some of ḥadd justificatory aspects are not acceptable in debates about the 
applicability of ḥadd to our modern time. This includes the aspects of 
considering ḥadd as the right of God and as expiation. Modernist scholars 
often consider the implementation of ḥadd punishments as unjust acts 
perpetrated in the name of Islam and on the basis of sheer ignorance by 




4.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that contemporary 
Muslim scholars approach the Islamic tradition differently. Throughout their 
debate on ḥadd punishments and how they can or cannot be justified, it is 
evident that the debate has always been contentious, and will remain so. I 
have illustrated that the basis for this scholarly contention is the different 
approach to the sources of Islamic law, particularly the Islamic criminal law 
of ḥadd as it was developed in the fiqh tradition. Consequently, the debate is 
concerned with either defending the Islamic tradition or calling for a more or 
less radical reform. 
When speaking about ḥadd punishments in contemporary Muslim 
discourse, one cannot escape dealing with the different approaches applied to 
the most authoritative sources of Islam. I have examined to what extent the 
contemporary justifications of ḥadd punishments correspond to the classical 
justifications of ḥadd punishments. Strikingly, in discussing the general views 
on the theory of ḥadd punishments, one notices that the contemporary 
discourse on ḥadd has completely shifted from the general discourse on ḥadd 
as in fiqh criminal law to a discourse on whether the Islamic authoritative 
sources, that is, Sunnah, ijmāʿ and ijtihād/qiyās (the Qurʾān never being 
questioned for obvious reasons), are in themselves valid or not. A derivative 
question is: if these sources are (still) valid, to what extent are these sources 
relevant in a modern-day context?  
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  I noticed throughout conducting this chapter that little attention has 
been given to the classical details about ḥadd offences and the punishments 
associated with them. This may in fact be another repercussion of the kind of 
fundamental questioning that underlies all contemporary Muslim discourse 
on Sharīʿah: This questioning creates insecurity, and insecurity polarizes, so 
that either scholars take the fiqh tradition for granted, without really 
engaging with it, or they reject it outright. 
In part I of this dissertation, I attempted to survey the classical 
justifications of ḥadd punishments critically and systematically. This has 
enabled me to argue that justificatory theories of ḥadd punishments are far 
less discussed in contemporary Muslim discourse than they were in the 
classical tradition. I have suggested that Salafis and conservatives justify ḥadd 
punishment from a confessional stance, and that there is no real legal 
argumentation going on concerning, in particular, the severity of ḥadd 
punishments. The Salafis and the conservatives tend to stress, instead, that 
ḥadd offences and their prescribed punishments are fixed and immutable. 
Thus, the punishments are not subject to any modifications. 
With regard to the methods and approaches applied to the Islamic 
tradition, traditionalists and conservatives have applied similar methods to 
validate the Qurᵓānic stipulations of ḥadd punishments, the Prophetic 
practices and the legal debate of Muslim jurisprudents. Modernists and 
Salafis, on the other hand, reject the tradition of jurisprudence. Periodically, 
they enunciate the need for recourse only to the Qurᵓānic teachings. 
However, their approach to the Qurᵓān differs significantly. Salafis are 
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literalists, because they assume the Qurᵓān to be the true word of God 
revealed to His Prophet, accurate and fully applicable in his time and in ours. 
Thus, the Salafis assume the originality and purity of the Qurᵓānic teachings. 
In addition, they acknowledge the practice of the Prophet and His pious 
Companions and regard them as the authoritative secondary source of law of 
explanatory nature. Modernists, on the other hand, pay more attention to 
what they perceive as the underlying spirit of the Qurʾān. They deny a one-
to-one translation of Qurʾānic particulars to contemporary life; they also by 
and large reject the Prophet Sunnah. 
         As for the traditionalists, the debate about the justification of the 
severity of ḥadd punishments does not exceed what one finds in the classical 
treaties of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Traditionalists advocate that ḥadd 
punishments are immutable; however, the traditionalists make full recourse 
the many ways offered by the fiqh tradition to circumvent the 
implementation of the punishments (in particular, by way of shubha). 
I have argued that the only camp to have shown hardly any interest in 
justifying the ḥadd punishments is the modernists’ camp; this may be because 
they completely devalue the fiqh tradition, and most of the ḥadd justifications 
stem from fiqh. As I demonstrated in this chapter, the modernists are 
concerned with reconstructing the Islamic tradition in a fundamentally new 
direction. The process of reformation is still taking place in the circles of 
Islamic modernists intellectuals. The modernists insist on the fact that it is 
necessary to emphasise the core principles of Islam; for them, Sharīʿah law 
constantly changes and evolves. The modernists hold consistently that 
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Sharīʿah is compatible with civilisation in every time and place. Al al-
Maḥmaṣānī writes, “the spirit of the Sharīʿah, therefore, was and still is 
founded upon public interest, public good and the facilitation of life in 
general.”474 The modernists make ample recourse to the concept of maqāṣid, 
holding that there is a crucial need for re-applying this concept to the Qurᵓān, 
to shift one’s hermeneutical emphasis from the letter of the text to its 
purposes and to the ethical direction behind it. As Johnston observes: 
 
    The maqāṣid perspective is … a choice to shift one’s hermeneutical 
emphasis from the letter of the text to its purpose and thus, to the ethical 
direction behind it. It implies a primary ontological and epistemological shift 
– a step away from the classical Sunnī-Ashʿarī tendency toward ethical 
voluntarism, and a step toward granting human reason more latitude in 
interpreting and applying the “general edicts” of the texts.475 
 
Finally, all four camps justify ḥadd punishments as a way of leading to 
general and individual deterrence. Salafis and conservatives claimed that 
ḥadd punishments maintain peace and justice in the countries in which 
Islamic criminal law is implemented. The modernists argue that ḥadd law can 
in theory achieve general and individual prevention; however, the current 
implementation of ḥadd punishments has caused severe injustices against 
women and poor people, for instance, in countries like Sudan and Nigeria. 
 Salafis and modernists share the same goal, namely, the reformulation 
of legal theory in a manner that will bring into successful synthesis the basic 
                                         
474 Maḥmaṣānī, The Philosophy of the Islamic Legislation, p.119 
475 Johnston, “Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʻah”, p. 186 
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religious values of Islam, on the one hand, and a substantive law that is 
suitable to the needs of a modern and changing society, on the other. The 
methods they use to arrive at this end, however, differ significantly.476 Salafis 
and modernists have criticised traditionalist scholars for having all too freely 
practiced qiyās, which led them to derive rulings contrary to the intention of 
the Lawgiver.477  Scholars like Kamali, El-Awa and Quraishi argue that the 
primary source of law which is the Qurᵓān contains very little about the 
theory or the philosophy behind the punishments of ḥadd crimes. They argue 
that the Qurᵓān contains basic rules and commands, usually expressed in a 
very broad manner and frequently capable of varying interpretations.478 
                                         
476 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theory, p. 214. 
477 Ibid, p. 217. 




Chapter 5: The contemporary application of ḥadd punishments and the 
disputes surrounding it 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In chapter 4, I examined a number of intellectual trends within 
contemporary Muslim legal thought and attempted to show how 
representatives of each of these trends position themselves vis-à-vis 
traditional legal doctrines regarding ḥadd punishments. While the question as 
to how contemporary thinkers relate to traditional Islamic jurisprudence is of 
great importance, in this chapter I will discuss how new emphases and foci in 
the debate, largely but not always independent from the questions asked by 
fiqh, have emerged in the contemporary debate about ḥadd law and its 
current application.  
 This chapter tackles issues concerning contemporary applications of 
ḥadd punishments. It encompasses a review of contemporary Muslims’ calls 
for the re-introduction of ḥadd laws and the capital and corporal punishments 
associated with them, as well as the so-called “Islamisation of the criminal 
code” proposed in a number of Islamic countries. Instances of the 
implementation of Islamic criminal law in countries of the Muslim world 
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have encountered a tremendous reaction from the West, human rights 
organisations and victims of ḥadd laws.479 
The chapter, first, provides historical background on a number of 
Islamic countries where ḥadd laws are implemented and have been constantly 
reported to human rights organisations. I discuss the application of Islamic 
criminal law in Islamic countries that have either been implementing the law 
or have recently re-introduced it in place of Western criminal law. Secondly, 
this chapter attempts to critically evaluate four key arguments, both in favour 
and against the (re-)introduction of ḥadd laws in Muslim societies, that have 
emerged in the contemporary debate of Muslims scholars concerning ḥadd 
theory as well as the punitive practices involved in it. In this endeavor, the 
distinction between four basic camps that I have proposed in ch. 4 is crucial 
in order to understand on what theological and hermeneutical grounds 
Muslims scholars argue when they debate the potentiality of activating the 
                                         
479 As Heiner Bielefeldt notes, “[i]t seems beyond question that many tensions between 
traditional Islamic norms and international human rights standards exist. No one can predict 
whether and how they will be settled in the future. However, because all cultures and 
religions are open to various interpretations and evolution, the frequently perceived 
antagonism between universal human rights and cultural identity appears at least 
questionable.” See Bielefeldt, “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate”, Human Rights 
Quarterly 17,4 (1995), pp. 595, cf. 601. Johnston reflects on the Muslims’ reaction to the 
perception of the concept of human rights in the following words: “the human rights concept 
has had a strong and pervasive impact on Muslim writers from the 1970s on. From official 
Muslim declarations to a number of individual articles and books, the literature is 
impressive. In the name of Islam this concept is wholeheartedly endorsed for the most part, 
but for a minority of other writers, it is condemned as a Western, secular intrusion.” 
Johnston however criticises these writings as to neither draw coherently from traditional 
Muslim sources nor squarely face the obvious discrepancies between the two systems. See 
Johnston, “Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿah”, p. 152.  
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Islamic Sharīʻah, in particular its criminal portion. Thirdly, I attempt to 
provide a platform to understand why and how contemporary Muslim 
scholars tend to disagree over the theory of Islamic criminal law and its 
current implementation. This, it is hoped, will allow us to comprehend the 
reasons behind the emerging calls that either advocate ḥadd laws or wish 
nullify them. Overall, I hope to shed light on one of the most controversial 
issues in contemporary Islamic law, namely ḥadd, an area in which one sees 
very clearly a great diversity of Muslim positions. 
 
5.2 Islamic ḥadd laws today 
During the pre-modern period, Islamic ḥadd laws were considered part 
of the legal system of Muslim society across the Muslim world. As Peters has 
shown, basing himself on the abundant archives and other sources, 
particularly of the Ottoman period, there are many examples of the 
application of Islamic criminal codes.480 When new legal codes were 
introduced in many Muslim countries during the colonial period, the law of 
ḥadd was usually the first part of the traditional legal system that was 
abolished. As Peters writes, 
 
the emergence of Western hegemony in the nineteenth century greatly 
affected the legal systems in the Islamic world. In most Islamic countries that 
came under European colonial rule, Sharīʻa criminal law was immediately 
                                         
480 Peters, in Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, gives a detailed account of the classical 
doctrine and traces the enforcement of criminal law from the Ottoman period to the present 
day.  
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substituted by Western penal codes. In some other countries, however, this 
was a gradual process: there the final abolition of Islamic criminal law took 
place after a period of reform, during which Islamic criminal law continued 
to be implemented.481 
 
The periodic calls for the re-activation of Islamic criminal law, in 
particular ḥadd laws, in a number of Islamic countries reflect the fact that 
“from the 19th century onwards Islamic criminal justice had gradually 
retreated from the sphere of public law in the face of borrowing, and partial 
imposition of European laws until it was completely replaced by the latter in 
the majority of Muslim societies.”482 Consequently, during the last quarter of 
the twentieth century a number of Muslim countries have experienced 
various degrees of secularisation of their legal system and so have taken 
gradual steps to ‘re-Islamise’ their criminal law systems by introducing 
Islamic criminal offences and sanctions (ḥadd) in their codified laws. Some 
Islamic regimes, such as the Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and the 
                                         
481 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, pp. 3-4. 
482 Sidahmed, “Problems in Contemporary Applications of Islamic Criminal Law Sanctions: 
The Penalty for Adultery in Relation to Women”, p. 187. Cf. Peters: “From the late 
eighteenth century, Western powers extended their influence into the Islamic world. This 
resulted in the colonial conquest of Indonesia, India, North Africa and Central Asia, 
accompanied by a sharp increase in Western political and economic influence in countries 
that did not lose their independence. A few regions, such as the Arabian Peninsula, escaped 
Western expansion, because Western powers regarded them as devoid of economic or 
strategic interests. The nineteenth century was a period of drastic law reform in the Muslim 
world, due to two global factors. One was the Westernization of state and society, which 
entailed the adoption of Western laws. The other was indigenous: the emergence of 
modernizing states with centralized bureaucracies, both in the colonies and in the countries 
that had kept their independence. Such states needed a new legal system, and especially new 
systems of criminal law.” Cf. Peters, Crime and Punishment, p. 103.  
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Northern States of Nigeria, have re-introduced Islamic criminal law in place 
of Western criminal codes. 
   The proponents of the applicability of ḥadd punishments in 
contemporary Muslim society have constantly argued that there is no sound 
justification for suspending Islamic regulations that are specifically stipulated 
in the Qurᵓān and Sunnah.483 The Islamist regimes aimed at establishing an 
Islamic state, and the main characteristic of an Islamic state, according to the 
Islamists, was to enforce Sharīʿah in all domains, including ḥadd laws. Peters 
describes the re-introduction of the Sharīʻah as having become the rallying 
cry of the religiously inspired political movement. As Peters argues, this idea 
of going back to the cultural roots and of imposing Islamic norms on society 
was appealing to large segments of the population that were opposed to the 
increasing Western political and overwhelming cultural influence.484 
 
5.2.1 Saudi Arabia 
The only Islamic country to have an uninterrupted application of 
Islamic Sharīʿah is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.485 The Saudi government has 
                                         
483 Ibid., p. 188. 
484 Ibid., p. 144.  
485 After the General Assembly of the United Nations had decided on the Universal 
Declaration on Human rights, in 1948, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia strongly objected to the 
principle of religious liberty, particularly to the right to change one’s religion, a right 
explicitly mentioned in Article 18 of the Declaration. Saudi Arabia eventually joined South 
Africa and six communist states and abstained from the vote. Heiner views the Saudis’ 
attitude as “a reflection of the reluctance of a conservative Islamic government to endorse 
the emancipatory concept of human rights, a concept that is perceived to be alien and 
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officially announced and defined itself as an Islamic state in which all rules 
and regulations are according to the Islamic faith, whose primary sources are 
the Qurᵓān and the Prophetic Sunnah. Accordingly, the government 
advocates that whatever decisions the government takes must be based on 
the rules and regulations of the Islamic Sharīʿah, and that it should never 
violate a single rule of that Sharīʿah.486 
The Saudi government holds that the state must not interfere with the 
substantive laws of Sharīʿah, particularly ḥadd laws. As al-Hageel writes, 
“Islam does not permit a nation to cancel or disregard any of the Sharīʿah 
rules and regulations on the grounds that the people are the source of 
authority.”487 Al-Hageel warns that, once the ruling authority of the state 
exempts itself from adherence to the laws of Sharīʿah, it will have committed 
a grave offence in Islamic Sharīʿah. He further writes that the principle of the 
sovereignty of Islamic Sharīʿah means 
 
[that] the State is committed to the strict and full application of 
Islamic Sharīʻah and to the preservation of its noble implications expressed 
through the protection of the religion, the self, the honor, the mind and the 
money of the Muslim and of the Islamic community. It further means that no 
one under no circumstances whatsoever, be he a ruler or a citizen, shall 
tamper with the State’s efforts to apply the Sharīʿah law, to modify or adapt 
it. On the basis of this conviction, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as an Islamic 
                                                                                                                     
detrimental to the Islamic tradition.” See Heiner, “Muslim voices in the Human Rights 
Debate”, p. 603. 
486 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam and Their Applications in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 
9. 
487 Ibid., p. 35. 
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State, has committed itself to the strict and full application of the Islamic 
Sharīʿah, whose provisions and stipulations are being implemented in 
absolute sincerity and with adequate accuracy, thus complying with Allāh’s 
orders in seeking fulfillment of its people interests.488 
 
In Saudi Arabia the Islamic criminal law stipulates that no punishment 
can be inflicted except for the crimes prohibited in the Qurᵓān and specified 
in the Prophetic and juristic tradition. Ḥadd laws are to be seen as a 
constitutional issue “because the enforcement of these penalties in the 
Kingdom is based on explicit texts from the Holy Qurᵓān and the Prophetic 
Sunnah”.489 
   According to Amnesty International, the nature of offences that are 
punished under Saudi criminal law is so wide-ranging that is hard to draw 
the line between morality and criminality: “these offences are regulated by a 
mixture of Sharīʿah… rules and government legislated laws, most of which 
are extremely vague and therefore open to abuse.”490 Furthermore, it has 
been reported that the death penalty under ḥadd law is invoked in at least 
three instances: for adulterers where the sentence is carried out by stoning; 
for apostasy; and for highway robbery when the offence results in loss of life, 
according to the majority of Islamic jurists. However, in Saudi Arabia people 
                                         
488 Ibid., pp. 35-6. 
489 Ibid., pp. 149-50. 
490 A paper compiled and presented by Amnesty International for the 1st World Congress 
Against the Death Penalty (Strasbourg, 21-23 June 2001). See http://www.middle-east-
info.org/league/saudi/saudi.pdf. Accessed on the 12/11/2010 at 11am.  
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have been executed for this latter offence even when it did not result in lethal 
consequences.491 
        According to Amnesty, punishment by amputation (qaṭʿ) has been 
enforced in Saudi Arabia for offences mainly limited to cases of theft and 
highway robbery, where it is part of cross-amputation.492 Amnesty have 
warned that the Saudi criminal law interpretation of “causing corruption on 
earth” of ḥirāba crimes, particularly in the absence of any clear definition, 
leaves the door open for the death penalty to be invoked even when offences 
do not result in lethal consequences.493 Likewise, the punishment of flogging 
has been mandatory in Saudi Arabia for a number of offences and can also be 
used at the discretion of judges as an alternative or in addition to other 
punishments.494  
          Amnesty International reports have recorded 90 judicial 
amputations between 1981 and December 1999 in Saudi Arabia, including at 
least five cases of cross-amputation, but the true number is probably much 
higher. It has been reported that on December 1999 two men were convicted 
                                         
491 Ibid., p. 2. 
492 “Saudi Arabia: Further Information in Fear of Amputation, Torture and other ill-
Treatment”. Cf. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE23/025/2008/en. Accessed 
on the 12/11/2010 at 11am. 
493 “Saudi Arabia: A Secret State of Suffering”, A paper compiled and presented by Amnesty 
International for the 1st World Congress Against the Death Penalty, p. 3. Cf. 
http://www.middle-east-info.org/league/saudi/saudi.pdf. Accessed on the 12/11/2010 at 
11am. 
494 “Flogging of Elderly Woman May Be Imminent”. Cf. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE23/037/2009/en. Accessed on the 
12/11/2010 at 11am. 
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of highway robbery, each had a hand and a foot amputated in the city of 
Tabuk.495 
The Islamisation of criminal law, in particular ḥadd laws in various 
countries and under different Islamist regimes, has not met with much 
opposition in other parts of the Muslim world. In most Islamic countries the 
Islamisation of the criminal law in places like Nigeria or Afghanistan was 
approved and supported by large segments of the Muslim society.496 As Peters 
points out, this has been due to “the powerful ideological discourse 
surrounding it, which holds promises for the ordinary people.”497 
       In fact, the Islamisation of criminal law in several Islamic 
countries, over the last forty years or so, has proven to be the favourite task 
of self-styled Islamic regimes, whether new in power or long established. The 
message conveyed in such re-Islamisation reforms is that an immediate start 
is made to construct a ‘real’ Islamic state where the law ‘fits’ the Islamic 
society. To enhance political power, religious legitimacy has become a crucial 
ingredient of government in many parts of the Muslim world; hence, the 
Islamisation of Islamic law is, for many governments, an effective tool. In 
reference to the reintroduction of Islamic criminal law, since 1972 seven 
countries have enacted legislations to reintroduce Islamic criminal law. 
                                         
495 “Saudi Arabia: A Secret State of Suffering”, A paper compiled and presented by Amnesty 
International for the 1st World Congress Against the Death Penalty, p. 12. Cf. 
http://www.middle-east-info.org/league/saudi/saudi.pdf. Accessed on the 12/11/2010 at 
11am. 
496 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 146. 
497 Ibid., p. 146. 
 217 
Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, and North Nigeria have fully re-introduced 
Islamic criminal law. Also the United Arab Emirates (1978) have passed 
Islamic criminal laws and the Malaysian state Kelantan (1993). However, 
these laws were either never effective, not having been approved by the 




Islamic criminal law came into force as soon as Colonel Ghadafi seized 
power in Libya in 1969. He promulgated that Islam and Islamic law would be 
the only source of inspiration for him and his militant supporters.499 Ḥadd 
codes were legislated between the period of 1972 and 1974, during which 
period the Libyan legislative committee announced four ḥadd offences: theft 
and robbery (Law 148 of 11 October 1972), illegal sexual intercourse (Law 
70 of 20 October 1973), unfounded false accusation of fornication (Law 52 of 
16 September 1974), and the drinking of alcoholic beverages (Law 89 of 20 
November 1974). Ḥadd laws essentially follow the Mālikī doctrine, the 
prevailing school in Libya and North Africa, but are to some degree 
‘modernized’. Peters monitors the deviation of Libyan legislation of ḥadd laws 
from classical doctrine. As he notes, 
                                         
498 Kamali, “Punishment in Islamic Law”, pp. 203-234. 
499 “Inclusion of the judicial punishments of amputation and flogging in the penal code”. Cf. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE19/002/1994/en. Accessed on the 
12/11/2010 at 11:30 am. 
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criminal responsibility begins at the age of eighteen and not at puberty 
as in the classical doctrine. Second, a bandit who has not taken property or 
another person’s life is sentenced to imprisonment instead of banishment and 
a bandit who has both killed and plundered is punished with the death 
penalty only and his body is not publicly exposed (crucified) (art. 5, Law 
184/1972). Third, if a person who has already been punished with 
amputation commits a second theft or banditry, he will not be sentenced to 
further amputations but to imprisonment until he repents, with a minimum 
of three years (art. 13, Law 148/1972). Further, unlawful sexual intercourse 
is only punished with flogging, and not with stoning to death.500 
 
5.2.3 Pakistan 
In 1977 General Zia ul-Ḥaqq, supported by the Islamist organisation 
al-Jamāʻa al-Islāmiyya, seized power over Pakistan. In 1979 he promulgated a 
program of Islamisation of Pakistan’s criminal law. The Pakistani Constitution 
was amended by adding article 203-D, which established a Federal Sharīʿah 
Court that must examine “whether or not any law or provisions of a law is 
repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Qurᵓān and the 
Sunnah and can rescind laws found to be in conflict with Islam.”501  
    After the first announcement of the re-Islamisation of the Pakistani 
criminal law in 1979, it is reported that special courts for speedy trials began 
operating on 31 August 1991. A constitutional amendment adopted by the 
Pakistani parliament in July 1991 empowers the federal government of 
Pakistan to set up such courts to ensure quick prosecution of offences. On the 
                                         
500 Peters, Crime and Punishment, p. 154.  
501  Ibid., p. 155. 
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10th of February 1979, President Zia-ul-Haqq promulgated four ordinances, 
collectively referred to as the “Hudood Ordinances” which were crafted to 
make significant revisions in Pakistan’s criminal law system. The intent of the 
ordinances, as stated by president Zia, was to bring Pakistan’s legal system 
into conformity with the precepts of Islam.502 
The Pakistani criminal laws follow the classical, mainly Ḥanafī, 
doctrine. Fixed ḥadd punishment can only be carried out if the Federal 
Sharīʿah Court tries the case. In cases of banditry, the punishment for merely 
frightening persons, without killing or taking property, is not exile, but a 
maximum of thirty lashes and imprisonment of at least a maximum of three 
years. As against classical doctrine, exposure of the dead body (crucifixion) is 
not mentioned as an additional punishment in cases of banditry with 
homicide and plunder. The Islamic rules concerning unlawful sexual 
intercourse are identical with the classical doctrine. Rape (zinā bi-l-jabr), 
defined as intercourse with a man or woman without or against her/his 
consent if this has been obtained under duress or by fraud, is mentioned as a 
separate offence, with the same punishment as that for unlawful sex, if 
proven according to Sharīʿah.503 
                                         
502 Charles H. Kennedy, “Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood 
Ordinances”, Asian Survey 28,3 (1988), p. 307; Quraishi, “Her Honour: An Islamic Critique of 
the Rape Laws of Pakistan From A Woman’s Perspective”, p. 288. 
503 Cf. Waqar al-Huaq, Islamic Criminal Laws: Hudood Rules and up to Date Commentary.  
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The Pakistani way of enforcing Islamic criminal law has been careful 
and controlled, except with regard to blasphemy laws.504 Amputation and 
death by stoning have not been inflicted; only flogging is frequently 
practiced. Peters views the implementation of ḥadd in the Pakistani case to 




Soon after the Islamic revolution in Iran at the beginning of 1979, 
Islamic special courts were set up. The Iranian revolutionary courts did not 
define specific crimes of a political nature. As early as 1981, the 
revolutionary courts began to try sexual offences and other ḥadd crimes, and 
the first sentences of amputation and stoning were carried out. In 1982 and 
1983 four laws were enacted to codify Islamic criminal law. The law 
concerning ḥadd and other relevant provisions is based on Shiʿīs doctrine.506 
According to the Iranian civil code, criminal liability begins at puberty which 
is set at nine years for girls and fifteen years for boys.507  
                                         
504 Cf. Tahir Wasti, The Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Sharīʻah in Practice. 
Leiden: Brill, 2009. 
505 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 169. 
506 Peters notes that “[a]postasy is not mentioned as a ḥadd crime. This however, does not 
mean that an apostate is left without a punishment. Since article 289 of the code of criminal 
procedure lays down that sentences in criminal matters must mention that article on which 
the conviction is founded but that the courts must apply the Sharīʿāh in cases in which the 
code does not give a ruling. Death sentences for apostasy have been pronounced on the 
strength of this rule.” See Peters, Crime and Punishment, p. 160. 
507 Ibid., p. 160 
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The definition of the offence of armed disturbance of the peace has 
been clearly expanded by the Iranian legal authorities to include a number of 
offences, particularly of a highly political character, such as membership of 
groups espousing armed rebellion, planning and financially supporting the 
overthrow of the Islamic government and willingness to occupy important 
posts in a government after the overthrow of the Islamic regimes. These acts 
can, therefore, be punished with death, crucifixion and cross-amputation. The 
penalty for drinking alcoholic beverages is eighty lashes.508 Reports by human 
rights organisations indicate that all punishments mentioned in the law are 
actually applied, with the possible exception of crucifixion, although the 
criminal code mentions this punishment, which consists of tying the convict 
to a cross, leaving him there three days and taking him down after that 
period, even if he has not died in the mean time.509  
           Human rights organisations have reported numerous instances 
of stoning, judicial amputations and floggings, sometimes carried out before 
the execution of a death sentence.510 Compared to Saudi Arabia, many 
sentences of amputation and stoning have been given, especially during the 
first decade after the Iranian revolution. 
In view of the many restraints established in traditional fiqh on the 
application of ḥadd punishments it is doubtful whether all these judgments 
were obtained in conformity with Sharīʿah, which stipulates, for example, 
                                         




that testimonies and confessions made under duress are not valid. Since the 
testimonies of eyewitnesses are generally difficult to find, it seems evident 
that most sentences were pronounced on the strength of confessions and that 
one may have justified doubts as to whether these were obtained without 
undue pressure, as heavy reliance on confession as a means of proving crime 
can be an incentive for the police to apply torture to the suspect during the 
preliminary investigation. Generally speaking, punitive practices in Iran 
became highly politicised after the revolution. Thus, ḥadd punishments were 
used by the revolutionary courts to suppress any form of oppression.511 
    A recent example of the application of ḥadd laws in Iran is the by 
now famous case of Sakinah Ashtiani, a 43 year-old mother of two. She is 
currently being held on death row. She was convicted in May 2006 of having 
illicit relationships with two men and received 99 lashes as her prescribed 
sentence. Despite the scourging, she was then also convicted of adultery 
while married, a charge she is reported to have denied, and is now sentenced 
to death by lapidation. The following report about her trial has been made 
available through Amnesty International: 
 
              During her trial, Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani retracted a 
‘confession’ that she had made during her pre-trial interrogation. Sakineh 
alleged that she had been forced to make the ‘confession’ under duress, and 
denied the charge of adultery. Two of the five judges found her not guilty, 
noting that she had already been flogged and adding that they did not find 
the necessary proof of adultery in the case against her. However, the three 
other judges - including the presiding judge - found her guilty on the basis of 
                                         
511 Ibid, pp. 163-4. 
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‘the knowledge of the judge’, a provision in Iranian law that allows judges to 
make their own subjective, and possibly arbitrary, determination whether an 
accused person is guilty even in the absence of clear or conclusive evidence. 
Having been convicted by a majority of the five judges, Sakineh Mohammadi 
Ashtiani was sentenced to death by stoning.512 
 
Following an international outcry against her sentence, the Iranian 
Embassy in London publicly stated that Sakineh Ashtiani would not be 
executed by stoning; however, there has been no mention of any other 
possible means of execution.513 
Years before Sakineh Ashtiani’s case, under the presidency of 
Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), the Iranian government seemed to be 
moving toward the abolition, or at least the permanent adjournment, of some 
of the more extreme aspects of the law of ḥadd. In 2002, the Iranian Head of 
the Judiciary instructed judges to impose a moratorium on stoning penalty. 
Despite this, at least five men and one woman have been stoned to death 
since 2002. In January 2009, the Spokesperson for the Judiciary, Ali Reza 
Jamshidi, confirmed that two executions by stoning had been carried out in 
December 2008 and said that the directive on the moratorium had no legal 
weight and that judges could therefore ignore it.514 
 
5.2.5 Sudan 
                                         
512 “Iran: Execution by Stoning”. Cf. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE13/095/2010/en.  
513 Ibid.  
514 Ibid. 
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The Sudanese committee for law revision was set up 1977 to prepare 
for the Islamisation of the Sudanese criminal law. However, the proposals 
drafted by the committee were shelved. Soon afterwards, in September 1983, 
the introduction of Islamic legislation came into active play.515 The main 
characteristic of the 1983 legislation of criminal code is the outright 
deviations from the classical fiqh, for instance, applying Islamic criminal law 
to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Moreover, as Peters notes, those who 
drafted the 1983 Penal Code evidently wanted to extend the scope of fixed 
punishments. This was done by broadening the definitions, by applying fixed 
punishments to offences other than the traditional ḥadd crimes, and by 
relaxing the rules of evidence. For instance, the definition of theft was wider 
than the classical one. This implies that the scope of behaviour punishable by 
amputation was greatly extended.516 Moreover, circumstantial evidence is 
now admitted in many cases. For instance, the pregnancy of an unmarried 
woman functions as evidence of the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse, 
and possession of stolen goods is accepted as evidence of theft. 
   In light of the severe criticism of the 1983 criminal code, the 
Sudanese had to re-introduce a new criminal code; this was legislated in 
January 1991. This criminal code stipulates that, for the time being, the 
provisions regarding drinking and trading in alcohol, apostasy, theft, false 
accusation of illegal sexual relation and the punishments for unlawful sexual 
                                         
515 Cf. Shamil Jeppie, “Sharia and State in the Sudan: From Late Colonialism to Late 
Islamism”, Religion as a Social and Spiritual Force. Edited by: Meerten B. Ter Borg and Jan 
Willem Van Henten (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010). 
516 Peters, Crime and Punishment, pp. 165-6. 
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intercourse and retaliation will not be applied in the South. According to 
Peters, criminal liability begins with puberty, but not before the age of fifteen 
and no later than the age of eighteen.517  
   Peters argues that the new Sudanese criminal code is more in 
agreement with the classical doctrine than the initial code, especially with 
regard to the definitions of the ḥadd offences. However, since the 1983 
Evidence Act with its relaxed standards of proof for ḥadd offences remains in 
force, ḥadd offences can be easily established in court. Indeed, such 
punishments are still being enforced. For example, on 25-27 January 2001, 
five men suffered cross-amputation after being sentenced for banditry. There 
are no indications that the government or the judiciary want to put an end to 
the enforcement of the severe ḥadd punishments.518 
 
5.2.6  Nigeria 
According to Amnesty International, new Sharīʿah criminal codes have 
come into force in 12 states in Northern Nigeria since 1999.519 The 
                                         
517 Ibid., p. 168. 
518 Cf. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/033/2004/en. Accessed on the 
12/11/2010 at 11:30 am. 
519 Nigeria is an African Federal Republic of 36 states and one federal capital territory 
(Abuja). The states are further subdivided into 589 local government areas. The federal 
government defines and monitors national policy, while state and local governments are 
charged with implementing such policies. However, each state has its own government, law 
and judiciary. Nigeria has three major penal legislations coexisting. They consist of the Penal 
Code and the accompanying Criminal Procedure Code Cap 81 Laws of the Federation 1990 
(ACP), the Criminal Code and the accompanying the Criminal Procedure Act Cap 80 laws of 
the Federation 1990 (CPA) and the Sharīʻah Penal Legislation (26) in 12 northern states 
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organisation is aware of at least 11 death sentences handed down since 1999 
by Sharīʿah courts in the States of Bauchi, Jigawa, Katsina, Niger, and 
Sokoto; in four of these the convicted have been women.520 Amnesty 
International reported the most recent woman convicted of adultery as Fatima 
Usman who received her death sentence in May 2002 from the Sharīʿah court 
of Gawu-Babangida. 
However, at present, nobody sentenced to death for adultery under the 
new Sharīʿah criminal legislation has yet had their sentence carried out.521 
According to Amnesty International’s investigation, poor, illiterate, rural 
women who do not conform to social norms and have had a pregnancy 
outside marriage appear to be at particular risk of being charged with capital 
offences in all the criminal systems of Nigeria.522  The death penalty has been 
introduced under ḥadd codes for criminal offences such as adultery (53), rape 
(54) and sodomy (59). The punishment for the aforementioned offences is 
execution by stoning.523 Cases attracting capital punishments, for instance 
adultery, are tried by the lower Sharīʿah courts. Furthermore, the right of 
                                                                                                                     
including both laws defining criminal offences and their punishments. The foregoing also 
applies to those states that have adopted the accompanying criminal procedure codes. 
520 “Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Punishments”, Amnesty International Annual Report 
Entries on Nigeria 1968-2010, (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2010), pp. 71-5. 
 Cf. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/018/2010/en. Accessed on the 
12/11/2010 at 11:30 am.  




appeal to an upper Sharīʻah court is guaranteed in all the Sharīʿah criminal 
procedure codes. 
         The Nigerian state of Zamfara, a state in the predominantly 
Muslim north, has enacted its own legislation in the domain of criminal 
law.524 Islamic criminal law was introduced on 27 January 2000 when the 
first Sharīʿah criminal code in North Nigeria was enacted, after the 
establishment of Sharīʿah courts to implement it. Calls for the Islamisation of 
criminal law has been viewed as a reaction against the centre of gravity of 
Nigerian politics which had moved to the mainly non-Muslim south.  This is 
viewed as a challenge to federal politics and an attempt to reassert Muslim 
political power. Furthermore, there was a widespread belief that imposing 
Islamic norms on public life, by banning the drinking of alcohol and by 
putting an end to prostitution, would secure God’s help in making the 
Nigerian Muslims stronger. The codes include the Mālikī doctrine of ḥadd and 
other relevant offences.525 
                                         
524 Peters points that “the reintroduction of Islamic criminal law in Northern Nigeria is 
constitutionally more complicated than its implementation elsewhere. Nigeria is a multi-
religious state, and the Federal Constitution explicitly forbids the federation of state to accept 
an official state religion. Among Nigerian constitutional lawyers there is disagreement about 
whether or not the implementation of Sharīʿah criminal law can be seen as the adoption of a 
state religion.” See Peters, Crime and Punishment, p.170. 
525 According to a report by Amnesty International, “the dominant Mālikī interpretation of 
Sharīʿah in Nigeria considers pregnancy as a sufficient evidence to convict a woman for 
adultery. The oath of the man denying having had sexual intercourse with the woman is 
considered sufficient proof of his innocence unless four independent and reputable eye-
witnesses declare his voluntary involvement in the act of sexual intercourse.” Cf. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/018/2010/en. Accessed on the 
12/11/2010 at 11:30 am. 
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5.3 Debates about ḥadd punishments today: four key arguments 
On this backdrop of the re-Islamisation of criminal law in a number of 
Islamic countries, let us turn to contemporary debates that reflect this new 
situation. Four main issues have emerged as the key concerns of 
contemporary Muslim scholars when they express themselves about the 
applicability as well as the current implementations of ḥadd punishments. 
Each of these four camps has its own definition of correct ethical behaviour. 
Hence, each speaks of the gravity of the ḥadd offence in different terms. For 
example, there are those who insist on the special seriousness of ḥadd offence 
and therefore, stress that ḥadd punishments are justified because they 
correspond to a uniquely Islamic system of specific moral values. Such voices 
emerge mostly from the Salafi, conservative and traditionalist camps. In the 
following, I offer an overview of key discussions of ḥadd and their 
punishments in the modern period. 
My aim here is to examine the main driving forces behind the current 
demands for the expansion of the Islamic Sharīʿah law into criminal law, 
demands which contrast sharply with the modernists’ view of ḥadd, which 
calls for acknowledging historical change and the contextual nature of ḥadd 
laws, and therefore, the limits in interpreting the scriptural evidence for 
ḥadd. In the debates of contemporary Muslim scholars there are thus two 
main contradictory stances. On the one hand, we find the proponents of 
Sharīʿah calling for the re-implementations of ḥadd punishments. These 
punishments, as they argue, are explicitly dictated in the Qurᵓānic text and 
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the Prophetic tradition. On the other hand, we find the modernists’ calls for a 
moratorium on ḥadd laws while simultaneously attempting to find solutions 
for the contemporary challenges that are facing the current implementation 
of ḥadd punishments. As I suggest, each camp views God’s aims behind the 
legislation of ḥadd punishment differently. For this reason, their discussion is 
quite rich and thus invites detailed examination. 
 
5.3.1 Pro-ḥadd arguments 
Contemporary defenders of ḥadd punishments usually make recourse 
to issues of cultural authenticity, that is, the need to preserve Islam’s heritage 
(which includes fiqh). They also emphasize that ḥadd norms are deeply 
anchored in Islamic ethics, to the point that the whole edifice of Islamic 
ethics will collapse if one abandons that position that ḥadd punishments 
continue to be relevant and applicable in today’s society. In the context of 
each of these two foci of the pro-ḥadd line of argumentation, I shall highlight 
a number of positions taken by some of the outstanding authors writing 
about the topic. 
 
5.3.1.1 Ḥadd punishments as an expression of cultural and religious 
authenticity 
‘Cultural and religious authenticity’ is one of the key words that are 
most often associated with the justification of ḥadd punishments in the 
postcolonial period. As was mentioned before, Salafis and conservatives have 
claimed that the ḥadd penalty associated with each crime is divinely 
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ordained, and therefore, it is presumed that it is impermissible to alter, 
reduce or increase it, since it is a penalty stipulated by a divinely revealed 
text.526 Reinforcing this claim is the belief that the philosophy of Islamic 
punishments is essentially different from and highly superior to the penal 
philosophy advanced by Western criminologists.527 Heiner highlights that 
Western thinkers often reject Western human rights-driven proposals for the 
modification of Islamic criminal law on the grounds that these proposals are 
imposed by force rather than being in natural harmony with the ‘native’ 
interests of Muslim peoples. As he notes, “Muslim conservatives frequently 
have perceived any commitment to the implementation of human rights as a 
new Western ‘crusade’. That is, they fear that human rights are part and 
parcel of an all encompassing ideology or way of life that is intended to 
eventually replace Islamic faith and practice.”528 
Consequently, Salafis and conservatives have viewed ḥadd 
punishments as the re-assertion of cultural authenticity. The espousal of ḥadd 
is stylized as “the pious choice of Muslims – both rulers and ruled – to submit 
themselves to the divinely ordained laws of the Sharīʿah instead of man made 
regulations.”529 This alleged authenticity is drawn from the Qurᵓānic 
teachings and the Prophetic practice, both of which are of course assumed to 
be authentic, and to preserve a kind of meta-historical, eternal truth 
                                         
526 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam and Their Applications, p. 12. 
527 Qadri, Islamic Penal Law and Philosophy, p. 489. 
528 Bielefeldt, “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate”, p. 616. 
529 Sidahmed, “Problems in Contemporary Applications of Islamic Criminal Sanctions”, p. 
187. 
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particular to Islam and Muslims. Conservatives and Salafis regularly call for 
the re-implementations of ḥadd laws, as these calls are based on the 
assumption that Islamic criminal law is part of the essence of Islam. For 
instance, the call for implementing the stoning penalty for unlawful sexual 
relations, according to them, is based on the idea that this punishment 
belongs to Islam as a historical fact.530 In Pakistan, the intent of the 
Islamisation of the Pakistani legal law, as stated by president Zia, is to bring 
Pakistan’s legal system closer to the precepts of Islam.531 In the Nigerian case, 
the Sharīʿah courts are hailed for the opportunity they provide “to submit 
totally to their Islamic cultural heritage, which always remain in force as an 
ideal and final court of appeal”.532 
An important advocated of the application of ḥadd law in Nigeria is 
Anyanwu Ogechi, whose basic premise is that “[b]y its comprehensiveness 
Sharīʻah forms the main unifying force in Islamic culture, and affirms the 
‘collective representations’ that hold members of the society together.”533 
Ogechi attempts to justify the implementation of ḥadd punishments within 
modern Islamic societies. As he argues, “in modern societies, the criminal 
justice system not only produces social solidarity by reaffirming the society’s 
bond and its adherence to certain norms, but also serves to legitimize the 
                                         
530  See Qadri, Islamic Penal Law and Philosophy, p. 489. 
531 Charles H. Kennedy, “Islamization in Pakistan: Implementations of the Hudood 
Ordinances”, Asian Survey 28,3 (1988), p. 307. 
532 Anyanwu Ogechi, “Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria: The Justifications and 
Challenges of Islamic Law of Sharīʻa”, Journal of Law and Religion 21,2 (2005/2006), p. 315. 
533 Anyanwu Ogechi, “Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria”, p. 336. 
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political authority of the state.”534 Ogechi describes the calls of the Salafis and 
conservatives for applying Sharīʿah as “essentially a product of an historic 
desire by Muslims to rescue their society from sliding into moral decay and 
losing its identity.”535 In reference to the Nigerian case, Ogechi states that the 
implementation of Islamic criminal law is a  “reassertion of Islamic identity, 
which the British undermined during the colonial period [...] the Sharīʿah 
embraces a system of meaning that linked Muslims to their rural and pre-
capitalist origin (pre-colonial).”536 
Ogechi observes that the justice system of any society has to reflect its 
traditions, customs and religious beliefs, and that the full meaning, 
importance and implication of Sharīʿah must be grasped before we can pass 
judgment about the ‘relevance’ of Sharīʿah law in countries such as Nigeria.537 
He continues by stating that “the way that a particular society punishes 
reflects its culture and structures the way that people think about criminals, 
which provides the intellectual framework through which they judge 
individual behavior and recognize offenders.”538 Therefore, the 
implementation of Islamic Sharīʿah, particularly ḥadd punishments, is 
described as necessary for the reason that Sharīʻah is “not optional”, given 
that it is “a question of religion and not politics.”539 Concluding his line of 
                                         
534 Ibid., p. 315. 
535 Ibid., p. 317. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid., p. 320. 
538 Ibid., p. 321. 
539 Ibid., p. 329. 
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thought, Ogechi views Sharīʿah as a way of life for Muslims, and its criminal 
law provisions are no exception to this rule.540 Ogechi proposes that “any 
time members of Muslim society participate in punishment, they reaffirm 
their faith in the system.”541 
 This explicit linkage of ḥadd punishments with the culture and 
identity of Muslims has been widely rejected by contemporary modernists, 
and Western human rights organizations.542 On the other hands, the Salafis 
and conservatives completely reject such criticism. They regard any such 
Western criticism as an interference and absolute violation of the internal 
affairs of Muslims. Their attitude towards human rights is to reject it as an 
alien concept that is basically hostile to their own traditional culture.543 For 
instance, al-Hageel views Western criticism of the current implementation of 
ḥadd punishments in Saudi Arabia as “unacceptable, unjustified interference 
in its [Saudi Arabia’s] internal affairs, in fact, it is forbidden according to the 
statues of international law.”544 Accordingly, he views the current calls for 
                                         
540 Ibid., p. 341. 
541 Ibid., p. 335. 
542 Bielefeldt writes: “What seems problematic is the widespread presumption – be it explicit 
or implicit – that human rights belong exclusively to the Christian tradition. On this 
problematic view, the universality of human rights becomes tantamount to the universal 
religious mission of Christianity. At the same time, the emancipatory claim of equal rights of 
freedom might be distorted by premature harmonization with more traditional and 
authoritarian Christian concepts.” See Bielefeldt, “Muslims in the Human Rights Debate”, pp. 
587-617.  
543 Ibid., p. 601. 
544 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam and Their Applications, p. 150. 
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nullifying the Islamic penal law as “a blatant call for the violation of human 
rights.”545 
Salafis and conservatives constantly accuse the West of interfering in 
the internal affairs of the Muslims, but, as they claim, “before hurling abuses 
and insults against Islamic punishments, they [the West] should first probe 
into their own blood stained hatred-hewn and jealousy-prone hearts.”546 
There is a strong tendency among scholars of both camps to perceive Western 
criticism as “directed against the teachings of Islam per se rather than any 
political system.547 In practice, Ogechi views the British implemented law in 
Nigeria as “[...] intended to suffocate Islamic law.”548 
It is clear that Salafis and conservatives judge ḥadd punishments to be 
not in the least as cruel and terrible as they have been portrayed by Western 
human rights organisations. As al-Hageel claims, “these penalties are not as 
terrible as they are portrayed by the enemies of Islam who work to defame 
the reputation of Islam and its followers.”549 Conservatives and Salafis also 
like to point out that “it is easy to forget the even in Western countries, until 
comparatively recently, the law condoned punishments at least as severe and 
sometimes even more horrible than the ḥadd punishments.”550 Clearly, Salafis 
and conservatives have perceived the current criticism against Islamic penal 
                                         
545 Ibid., p. 149. 
546 Qadri, Islamic Penal Law and Philosophy, p. 508. 
547 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam and Their Applications, p. 9. 
548 Ogechi, “Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria”, p. 320. 
549 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam, p. 149. 
550 Hussain, Islamic Law and Society: An Introduction, p. 139. 
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law as “absolutely baseless, false, and biased”, and “rooted either in sheer 
ignorance or scholastic dishonesty.”551 
There is a strong tendency to believe that the proponents of ḥadd 
punishments rely only on the Qurᵓānic injunctions and the Prophetic practice 
in order to defend their calls for re-implementing ḥadd punishments in the 
Muslim world. Assuming the specific offences and sanctions prescribed in the 
primary sources of law in the Qurᵓān and the sunnah, proponents of Sharīʻah 
insist on arguing that there is no acceptable justification for suspending 
regulations that are specifically outlined in these divine sources.552 Such a 
firm belief that ḥadd punishments are clearly and unequivocally prescribed in 
revelation, and not subject to further interpretation or negotiation, of course 
is highly problematic in any discussion about the feasibility to reform Islamic 
law, including its ḥadd provisions. As Heiner suggests, in order to overcome 
the defensive attitude towards human rights, Muslims must scrutinise the 
sources of the Islamic tradition and of modernity critically. Such critical 
probing of the scriptures of Islam leads Abou El Fadl, for example, to identify 
parts of the tradition that, while adequate and applicable in past periods of 
Islamic history, have become incoherent or fundamentally inconsistent with 
the very basic assumptions of revelation. Abou El Fadl accepts the divine 
nature of the Qurᵓān and sees no inconsistency or rupture in accepting the 
                                         
551 Qadri, Islamic Penal Law and Philosophy, p. 516. 
552 Sidahmed, “Problems in Contemporary Applications of Islamic Criminal Sanctions”, p. 
188. 
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idea of a text protected by God from human alterations or redactions.553 
Qurᵓānic revelation came to express God’s purposes for humanity in a specific 
sociocultural context, but is not applicable one-to-one to the contemporary 
context in which Muslims live. In the words of Johnston, Abou El Fadl “has 
gone beyond the modern quest for certainty (typified by Descartes) and 
adopted the post modern episteme and hermeneutic that define truth as an 
interactive dynamic between revelation, human reflection upon nature and 
creation, and human perception of socio-historical experience.”554 Abou El 
Fadl’s main argument about the Qurᵓān being an authoritative source of law 
but still in need of creative interpretation is embodied in this statement: 
 
               The Divine Will is the ultimate source of all authority and the 
authoritative is whatever the reader (or agent) is willing to defer to and is 
willing to treat as an exclusionary factor in all relevant determinations. 
Accordingly, for a believer in the juristic paradigms, the instructions 
containing the indicators of God’s Will are authoritative (i.e. the Qurᵓān and 
Sunnah). Furthermore, any interpretive community or individual that bases 
itself on the deciphering and understanding of the Divine instructions is 
authoritative as long as the believer is willing to trust that such a community 
or individual has discharged its obligations of honesty, self-restraint, 
diligence, comprehensiveness, and reasonableness […] authoritativeness is a 
function of deferment of judgement based on the conditions of trust. This, in 
my view, is the normative process of authoritativeness in Islam.555 
 
As Abou El Fadl suggests, studying the sources of Islamic tradition 
cannot consist in simply applying traditional principles unquestioningly, but 
                                         
553 Abou El-Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 105. 
554 Johnston, “Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿah”, pp. 185-186. 
555 Abou El-Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, pp. 132-3. 
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might still provide critical insights into modernity. As he recommends, one 
should refrain from all claims of exclusivity with regard to human rights, and 
he suggests that in fact the Islamic tradition may have its own resources to 
build a discourse of human rights. The creation of “an overlapping normative 
consensus in order to coexist peacefully on this small globe” is only possible 
if human rights are truly and fully understood as “the privilege of the whole 
of humanity, or a normative demand directed to the different peoples, 
cultures, and religions”.556 
 
5.3.1.2 Ḥadd as part of an Islamic ethics 
A fundamental principle (aṣl)557 of Islamic jurisprudence is that actions 
are permissible if not qualified otherwise. Al-Qaraḍāwī states that to make 
lawful and to prohibit things is a prerogative that belongs to God alone. 
Nothing is prohibited except what is prohibited by a sound and explicit text 
(naṣṣ) from the Lawgiver. The traditionalists argue that the prohibition of 
things is primarily due to their impurity and harmfulness.558 According to the 
majority of contemporary Muslim jurists, the offences prohibited in the 
Qurᵓān are all considered as unethical behaviour, and therefore, their 
punishments are established as the means of promoting the moral values and 
                                         
556 Heiner, “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate”, p. 602. 
557 Aṣl (pl. uṣūl) denotes the origin, source, foundation, basis, or fundamental principle. See 
EI, M.G, Carter, “ Uṣūl (a)”, Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. x, p. 928b. 
558  Al-Qaraḍāwī, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam, p. 3. 
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general welfare of human society.559 Abolishing the punishments dictated for 
exceeding the limits prescribed in the Qurᵓān is regarded as one of the most 
serious forms of disobedience, which is claimed to lead to harm both in this 
world and the next.560 Furthermore, the Prophetic tradition is viewed as a 
kind of “handbook of Islamic ethics, inasmuch as in the general Muslim view 
the correct performance of religious duties and the right understanding of 
religious doctrine are inseparable elements of the moral life.”561 As 
Serajzadeh writes, 
 
[i]f Islamic penal law – as part of Sharīʿah – has had a real prohibitive 
effect on crime, it is not simply because it is applied as formal penal law. It is 
mainly because the complex of religious ideas to which it belongs has had a 
great influence on the mentality of Muslims [...] Islamic penal law has had its 
prohibitive effect on crime as a normative system respected by Muslims, and 
not just as penal law that threatens offenders.562 
 
 
Traditionalists, Salafis, and conservatives unanimously agree that ḥadd 
provisions carry a fundamental importance for the constitution of an Islamic 
ethics based in revelation. Modernist voices, on the other hand, are 
conspicuously absent in this argument. 
                                         
559 Qadri, Islamic Penal Law and Philosophy, p. 489. 
560 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam, p. 154. 
561 R. Walzer, “Akhlāḳ”, Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. I, p. 325b. 
562 Serajzadeh, “Islam and Crime the Moral Community of Muslims”, p. 125. 
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   To commit any of the offences explicitly forbidden in revelation is a 
crass instance of sinful behaviour. Thus, the Islamic criminal system (al-niẓām 
al-jināᵓī) aims at protecting as well as maintaining the ethical interests of 
Muslims as stipulated in the Qurᵓān.563 Abū Zahra argues that the purpose of 
Islamic punishments is to protect the ethics and the public interest (maṣlaḥa) 
of the Muslim community.564 The traditionalists hold that the public welfare 
is the primary aim (maqṣad) of the Islamic Sharīʿah; hence, it is mandatory 
that it is guarded and protected at all times.565 Ḥadd punishments are thus 
projected as the solution to the misfortunes, upheavals and injustices that 
have plagued the modern Islamic world.566 
It seems that ḥadd offences are considered especially grave because of 
their potential to undermine the “five objectives of the Law” (maqāṣid al-
Sharīʿah al-khamsa). According to Gleave, “the term is used in works of legal 
theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and refers to the idea that God’s law, the Sharīʿah, is a 
system which encompasses aims or purposes. If the system is correctly 
implemented, these aims will be achieved.”567 As Gleave states, “most Sunnī 
legal theorists subscribe to the view that Sharīʿah has aims and principal 
amongst these is the promotion of the benefit for the believers.”568 
                                         
563 Oqla, Niẓām al-Islam: al-ʿIbāda wa al-ʿUqūba, p. 104.  
564 Abū Zahra, Al-Jarīma wa al-ʻUqūba fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī: al-ʿUqūba, p. 37. 
565 Ibid., p. 43. 
566 Ogechi, “Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria”, p. 320. 
567 Gleave, “Maḳāṣid al-Sharīʿh (a)”, p. 569b. 
568 Ibid., p. 569. 
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In reference to fornication and adultery, al-Qaraḍāwī explains the 
strictness of Islamic law in prohibiting zinā by pointing out that it “leads to 
confusion of lineage, child abuse, the breaking up of families, bitterness in 
relationships, the spread of venereal diseases, and a general laxity in morals; 
moreover it opens the door to floods of lust and self-gratification.”569 
Similarly, the same strictness and seriousness applies to theft and armed 
robbery (ḥirāba) offences. According to al-Hageel, these offences potentially 
“endanger people’s positions, their honor, and their lives” and as a 
consequence of these offences, people’s “lives will become bitter and hardly 
worth living, since the thief is like a wild animal that may savage anyone it 
encounters.”570 Ḥadd punishments, on the other hand, provide a means by 
which to reaffirm the moral boundaries of society. This leads Ogechi to 
conclude that ḥadd punishments must be implemented when “the operating 
legal norm in a society is violated”. In his view, the law of ḥadd 
 
tests the resolve of the society to promote social solidarity through the 
affirmation of its values. Punishment provides a society with a definition of 
what crime is; how it will be punished; how much punishment is appropriate; 
and what emotions can be expressed through punishment; who is permitted 
to punish; and where the authority to punish lies.571 
 
 
5.3.2 Contra-ḥadd arguments 
                                         
569 Al-Qaraḍāwī, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam, pp. 133-134. 
570 Al-Hageel, Human Rights in Islam and Their Applications, p. 166. 
571 Ogechi, “Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria”, p.320. 
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Arguments against the applicability of ḥadd punishments in today’s 
society are usually voiced by traditionalists and especially, by modernist 
Muslim thinkers, even if it is not always easy to make a neat distinction 
between these two groups and the Salafis and conservatives. Traditionalists 
such as Abou El Fadl, for example, may offer ideas and arguments which 
conservatives can use to underscore the value of the fiqh tradition and 
therefore, the relevance of the fiqh doctrines about ḥadd. On the other hand, 
a modernist like Muhammad Shahrour, while suggesting extreme reforms to 
the law of ḥadd, is in other instances not entirely opposed to implementing, 
for example, the punishment of flogging for zinā, as I will show in due course. 
In the following section, I focus on two arguments of the anti-ḥadd faction: 
that to implement ḥadd punishments today would be an anachronism, and 
that ḥadd provisions in the Qurʾān and Sunnah can and indeed must be 
interpreted in such a way that makes ḥadd punishments virtually irrelevant 
for the here and now. 
 
5.3.2.1 Ḥadd and the question of historical change: debates about the 
(in-)applicability of ḥadd in the modern age 
When discussing ḥadd, modernist scholars tend to focus on the 
question of historical change and the inapplicability of ḥadd punishments in 
the changed world of today. They agree upon the fact that the fundamental 
principles of Islam – such as justice, mercy, and equality before the law – are 
immutable, absolute, and eternal. However, their implementations in time or 
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in history are relative, changing, and in constant mutation.572 Therefore, the 
modernists have suggested that nowadays Muslims must try to remain 
faithful to those principles and strive to implement them as best they can, but 
that they must do so according to the requirements of their own time. 
Modernists have completely rejected the mere imitation, reproduction, or 
duplication of the historical models that were developed in a particular 
historical context but can hardly claim to be relevant today.573 
   The Islamic tradition, including the reports about the actions and 
opinions of the Prophet’s Companions (ṣaḥāba), entails narrations about the 
implementation of ḥadd punishments which can be shown to be relevant and 
in accordance with a specific time and context – namely, that of early Islam. 
For instance, stories about the second caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who is 
often remembered for his stern sense of justice, are thus interpreted to 
demonstrate that the law of ḥadd is subject to change according to the 
circumstances of the crime within its particular social and historical context. 
It is not always easy to distinguish between the eternal and the non-eternal 
sides of revelation, and according to the modernists, this difficulty has led to 
many of Islam’s contemporary dilemmas. As Tariq Ramadan puts it, “by 
failing to distinguish sufficiently between the immutable and the changing – 
and never doing so systematically – contemporary literalists bestir a series of 
other confusions involving especially grave consequences.”574 
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Consequently, Muslim modernists agree with the other camps that 
Qurᵓānic injunctions, prohibitions, and recommendations carry absolute and 
immutable aspects; but importantly, they disagree with the other camps in 
the sense that they believe that the concrete implementation of fundamental 
Islamic norms necessarily takes different and changing forms according to the 
changing and evolving environment575 With regard to ḥadd punishments, 
modernists have usually rejected them as inapplicable for modern Muslim 
societies. According to the modernists, this inapplicability of the law of ḥadd 
is due to two main reasons: its “ideal” character and the anachronism of fiqh 
doctrines in the world of today. 
Modernists see Islamic criminal law as an ideal law which never 
translates in any straightforward and ‘literal’ way into social practice. This 
ideal law, they suggest, could only be implemented to the letter in an ideal 
society – but this ideal society does not exist currently. Hence all application 
of the law today must realize its own contingency and contextual nature, and 
therefore allow for diversity of interpretation and for reform. (The “ideal 
law”, meanwhile, needs neither reformation nor clarification.) As El-Awa 
writes, 
 
It must be remembered that Islamic law is an ideal legal system i.e., it 
is not a law of custom which grew up within the society in which it was 
applied; rather it is a legal system which was formulated in order to realize 
an ideal society, the Islamic society. This idealism is clear enough from the 
                                         
575  Ibid., p. 18. 
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Qurᵓānic injunctions and prohibitions concerned with the social life of 
Muslims.576 
 
El-Awa indicates that if the ideal society does not exist, then Islamic 
law in its ‘pure’ form cannot be applied.577 Hence, any implementations of 
Islamic criminal law in the present day will not make any sense or be of any 
use.578 Consequently, voices have emerged that advocate that at the present 
time the application of ḥadd penalties is not required.579 
The modernists are inclined to concentrate more on exploring the gap 
between the ideal law defended by the other camps and the reality of the 
current practices of that ideal law. This gap, as Kamali suggests, has grown so 
wide as to make attention to the particularities of legal practice relatively 
insignificant at a time when Sharīʿah as a whole is being challenged as being 
irrelevant to the concerns of modern society.580 Thus, the current 
enforcements of ḥadd punishments in contemporary society have been 
viewed as totally wrong, and so, such enforcement is expected not to achieve 
the aims required by the Lawgiver. 
Secondly, the fiqh doctrines of ḥadd as they were developed in the 
medieval jurists’ manuals are seen not to fit in the present time, and their 
imposition in today’s Muslim society is condemned as an anachronism. 
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Modernists by and large think that current attempts for justifying ḥadd 
punishments signify an outright lack of understanding God’s aims and 
purposes in revealing His law.581 
         The Swiss-Egyptian modernist Tariq Ramadan plays an 
important role in this debate. In March 2005 Ramadan launched a call for a 
moratorium on corporal punishment and stoning in the Muslim world. 
Ramadan urges Muslim scholars to debate the applicability of Islamic 
criminal law as carried out in modern times. As he writes, 
 
while this debate must be started and carried out, it is necessary to 
take measures guaranteeing justice and respect for the dignity of humankind, 
particularly to the poor and of women in Muslim majority societies, for they 
are the first victims of the literal and often hasty implementation of the 
texts.582 
 
While the moratorium is in place, Ramadan wants contemporary 
Muslim jurists and scholars to re-consider a number of fundamental issues 
and asks particularly the following questions: What do the texts really say? 
What are the conditions required for the implementation of ḥadd 
punishments? And in what social context?583 
Unlike Muhammad Shahrour, another important figure in the 
contemporary debate about ḥadd,584 Ramadan is not totally opposed to the 
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idea that contemporary Muslims can learn from their legal tradition. As he 
writes, 
 
        one must immerse oneself in the Islamic Universe of reference 
and assess its sources, instruments, and (interpretative, legal, or ethical) 
methodologies, and on the other, take into the account the history of their 
concrete implementation, going so far as to measure their relevance and 
efficacy in terms of the challenges of our time.585 
 
Ramadan argues that to reject the whole tradition of Muslim 
jurisprudence will not help present-day Muslims to reconcile themselves to 
their rich past, which as he describes it is the best way of devising new paths 
toward the future.586 Ramadan rejects Shahrour’s neglect of fiqh, which he 
considers a fundamental source of law. Not only would this be disrespectful 
but also, as Ramadan enunciates, “a sort of guilty madness, cutting off 
Muslims from their heritage under the pretext of having them ‘move forward’ 
toward the ‘modern’... in the name of an illusory progress removed from its 
roots.”587 
Ramadan’s call for a moratorium on ḥadd punishments has been 
criticised by both the proponents of ḥadd laws and their opponents. For many 
in the West, the moratorium was insufficient. Westerners requested that ḥadd 
be denounced outright. Muslim scholars in the East viewed this call as an 
excessive compromise in that it was in contradiction to Islam’s core 
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principles. Further, the call was regarded as an attack against Sharīʿah 
produced by an “over-Westernised” mind “trying to please the West”.588 
Ramadan defended his call for a moratorium stating that: 
 
       In the name of the higher objectives of the message that call for 
respect for the life and dignity of women and men, equality and justice, it 
was urgent to put an end to an instrumentalization of religion through 
literalist, formalist implementations that continued to affect poor people, 
women, political opponents who have never had the means to defend 
themselves and who are punished for example’s sake and without justice.589 
 
5.3.2.2 Ḥadd punishments and the limits of interpretation in 
contemporary Islamic legal thought 
In the contemporary debate about ḥadd, Muhammad Shahrour is 
perhaps the most unconventional and creative voice to have emerged in 
recent years. Shahrour proposes a general “theory of limits” (ḥudūd) to 
resolve the many problems that arise when Sharīʿah meet modernity. This 
theory, according to Shahrour, proposes that there is always an upper and 
lower limit in each Qurᵓānic legislation about ḥadd punishments. Shahrour’s 
main thrust revolves around this argument, which implies that the entire 
body of Sharīʿah must always be subject to fresh examination in light of the 
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Qurᵓānic evidence. This can only be successfully achieved by a systematic 
and bold interpretation of the Qurᵓān.590 
Already Tariq Ramadan suggests that the “transhistorical” element in 
the Qurʾānic and Sunnah legislation can only be apprehended if the changing 
contextual modalities and conditions of application of these transhistorical 
prescriptions are taken into account.591 But in Shahrour’s account, the 
demarcation between the divine and the non-divine aspects of the Qurʾān is 
even more explicit. Shahrour seems particularly indebted to the thought of 
Fazlur Rahman in this respect, and it may therefore be worthwhile reminding 
ourselves of the legacy left by this giant of modernist thought in Islam. 
F. Rahman developed his highly complex and important Islamic 
methodology for reform between the 1960s and 1980s. Rahman severely 
criticised the traditional methodologies applied to the Islamic tradition by the 
classical jurists. For example, he entirely rejected the inherited approach of 
interpreting the Qurᵓān verse by verse. He proposed that the Qurᵓān be 
interpreted as a whole, held together by an underlying spirit that defines the 
Qurʾān’s “nature”. This spirit and nature can only be grasped if one considers 
the Qurʾān in its own setting, that is, with reference to its historical context 
on the one hand and the personality of the Prophet on the other. Rahman 
urged Muslim scholars not to fail to understand the nature of the Qurᵓān and 
the Prophet’s role in interpreting the Qurᵓān. He argued that 
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            [f]or the failure to understand the Qurᵓān as a deeper unity yielding 
a definite weltanschauung, the greatest penalty was paid in the realm of 
theological thought. Whereas in the field of law, in the relative absence of 
such an internally discovered unity, the incorporation of foreign materials 
introduced a sufficient degree of practicality, the same process of adopting 
foreign ideas in the field of theology – again in the absence of such a unitary 
vision of the Qurᵓānic weltanschauung – proved disastrous, at least in the 
case of Ashʻarism, the dominant Sunnī theology throughout medieval 
Islam.592  
 
Contrary to what this quote may suggest, Rahman saw Islamic law likewise 
stricken by an inability to differentiate between the universal spirit of Islamic 
revelation and its historical particulars. One of the main thrusts of Fazlur 
Rahman is that there is constant historical change on various levels of society 
and that, in order to meet the evolving changes successfully, the law must be 
mutable: 
 
                               When new forces of massive magnitude – socio-economic, 
cultural-moral or political – occur in or to a society, the fate of that society 
naturally depends on how far it is able to meet the new challenges creatively. 
If it can avoid the two extremes of panicking and recoiling upon itself and 
seeking delusive shelters in the past on the one hand, and sacrificing or 
compromising its very ideals on the other, and can react to the new forces 
with self-confidence by necessary assimilation, absorption, rejection and 
other forms of positive creativity, it will develop a new dimension for its 
inner aspirations, a new meaning and scope for its ideals.593 
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Rahman argued that the early Islamic historical tradition proves that the 
Qurᵓān and the Prophetic tradition Sunnah were creatively elaborated and 
interpreted to meet the new factors and impacts upon Muslim society and 
thus to turn the guidelines of revelation into a “living Sunnah” of the Islamic 
community.594 A similar move has to occur in each age anew. For Rahman, 
the fatal mistake is “to insist on a literal implementation of the rules of the 
Qurᵓān, shutting one’s eyes to the social change that has occurred and that is 
so palpably occurring before our eyes”, which is “tantamount to deliberately 
defeating its moral-social purposes and objectives.”595 Fazlur Rahman held 
that Muslims, and particularly modernist Muslims, have often contended that 
the Qurᵓān gives us “the principles”, while the Sunnah or our reasoning of the 
Qurᵓānic rulings turns these fundamentals into concrete solutions. However, 
Rahman sees this dialectic of “broad principles” vs “concrete actualization” in 
a much more nuanced way: 
 
          This is considerably less than a half-truth and is dangerously 
misleading. If we look at the Qurᵓān, it does not in fact give many general 
principles: for the most part it gives solutions to and rulings upon specific 
and concrete historical issues: but, the rational behind these solutions and 
                                                                                                                     
Islamically. This calls for a relentless process of hard, clear, systematic and synthetic 
thinking, which is not yet visible in the Muslim world. By and large, and in effect, we are 
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experiencing the two extreme attitudes born of this indolence.” Cf. Rahman, Islamic 
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rulings, from which one can deduce general principles. In fact, this is the 
only sure way to obtain the real truth about the Qurᵓānic teaching.596 
  
This brings us back to the kind of scriptural hermeneutics advocated 
by Muhammad Shahrour. For Shahrour, we are faced, on the one hand, with 
revealed norms concerning matters of worship – these are immutable and 
absolute (thābit). On the other hand, there are transhistorical ideas and norms 
in revelation which are subject to change (mutaghayyir) and defined by the 
temporal evolution and environmental changes. 
While ḥadd offences are defined in relation to the divine and so are not 
permitted under any conditions, the punishments that are associated with 
them are not as clearly defined. They are the product of the tradition and are 
therefore subject to alteration, modification and reformation under changing 
conditions and contexts – in a word, they are the objects of ijtihād. Shahrour 
calls loudly for the doors of ijtihād to be re-opened; in fact he sees this as a 
necessity in order to meet the challenges and the changes of modern culture 
and society. Islamic legislation has to be based on the principles of ijtihād, 
which, according to Shahrour, will enable a controlled renewal, and flexible 
adaptation of legal rules to changing historical circumstances.”597 
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In reference to ḥadd verses, the modernists have viewed these verses 
less as concrete instructions than as a framework within which the judicial 
authorities may adapt norms as required by social change.598 Accordingly, the 
scope of legislation, as Shahrour argues, is to allow humans to move between 
the upper and lower limits set by God in the Qurᵓān.599 According to 
Shahrour, the Prophet gave a highly advanced example of legislation that 
stood in sharp contrast to the existing abysmal economic situation and 
primitive tribalism of Arabian society.600 This observation leads Shahrour to 
conclude that today’s scholars are in a much better position to understand the 
legislative verses of the divine message because of the advances that human 
and natural sciences have achieved.601 He argues that “it is up to the 
mujtahids to decide, in the concrete historical context, which penalty is the 
most appropriate for each crime.”602 
  With regard to the limits of interpreting ḥadd verses, both Rahman 
and Shahrour present different interpretations, for instance, concerning the 
verse that stipulates the punishment for theft: “As to the thief, male or 
female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from God, 
for their crime-God is exalted in power. But if the thief repents after his 
crime, and amends his conduct, God turns to him in forgiveness; for God is 
oft-forgiving, most merciful” (Qurʾān 5:38-9). Rahman’s assumption is that 
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the concept of theft has two main elements. The first one is the unlawful 
taking of a valuable entity and the violation made against the right of a 
private possession. This is in contrast to the Arabian tribe system of tribal 
customs where the right of possession is strongly associated with an 
accentuated sense of personal honour and theft is primarily regarded, not as 
an economic crime, but as a crime against values of personal honour and its 
inviolable sanctity. However, Rahman notes that in advanced urbanised 
societies there is a visible shift in values. Theft is considered as wrongful 
primarily in economic terms, as the thief deprives the owner the right to use a 
certain economic asset or facility. Importantly, this shift in contemporary 
values of the society requires a radical change in the forms of the ḥadd 
punishment.603 Rahman contextualises the theft verse in its Arabian context, 
and this leads him to consider the crime from a different perspective when it 
comes to the contemporary context. 
While Shahrour shares Rahman’s concern to find a new relevance for 
the theft verse in the Qurʾān, his method is at the same time more daring and 
more concrete. Shahrour examines the meaning of the text by applying a 
different approach and method of interpretation of the verse. He argues that 
the verb used for ‘to cut off’ is the Arabic term q-ṭ-ʿ which, as the dictionary 
of Ibn al-Fāris shows, has more meanings than the physical amputation of 
hands alone. The dictionary provides additional examples of the usage of the 
verb ‘to cut off’, including ‘to cut a corner’, ‘to cut a long story short’, ‘to cut 
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off a relationship’, or ‘to cut down expenses’. The verb ‘to cut’ is used both 
literally and metaphorically; it does not always require a knife or a sword to 
cut something off.604 
    Moreover, Shahrour indicates that, where the Qurᵓān stipulates the 
phrase ‘to cut off’, this is always used in the context of the active participle 
sāriq, which refers to a person who is actively engaged in criminal activities 
in contrast to a person who has repented of his crime. The punishment, in 
other words, only applies to active thieves who show no repentance. Such an 
interpretation is not found in the classical fiqh tradition and goes miles to 
show Shahrour’s ‘modernist’ methodology, according to which he is quite 
happy to bypass the fiqh tradition and look at the Qurʾān with a fresh eye. 
Shahrour argues that it is questionable to attribute any conclusive meaning to 
the ‘theft verse’ and that we should seriously reconsider our current 
understanding of theft and adopt a more flexible stance toward it. For 
Shahrour, a “well-organised prison”, for example, can provide the required 
punishment of ‘cutting off’ efficiently – in this case, the ‘cutting off’ of the 
criminal from society.605  Nonetheless, Shahrour does recognise the theft 
punishment is dictated in the Qurᵓān. But he argues that the last recourse is 
the amputation of the hand, for this is the upper limit of the ḥadd for theft 
crimes. He states that 
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[t]he amputation of the thief’s hand must only be regarded as the last 
resort if other forms of punishment have proved ineffective or if the type of 
theft was very serious. If, for instance, only a slice of bread has been stolen 
and if this was not done out of sheer menace but because of desperate 
hunger, to cut off a person’s hand – as if he had stolen somebody’s 
possessions out of greed and pure self-indulgence – is a violation of the 
flexible and moderate character of Islamic law.606 
 
Moreover, Shahrour points out that the evidence to impose a level of 
the flexibility of ḥadd verses is found in the Islamic tradition. Although he 
accepts that the Prophet Muḥammad had indeed ordered the amputation of 
the hands of thieves in Median, he also argues that we should not forget that 
the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb had ruled against the Prophet’s 
example and pardoned a number of thieves.607 
There are some limits to the “theory of limits”, however. In reference 
to the offence of adultery (zinā), the Qurᵓān states that “the woman and the 
man guilty of adultery or fornication: flog each of them with a hundred 
stripes; let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by 
God” (24:2). According to Shahrour, the punitive measures in the zinā verse 
are unambiguous. They exhibit absolute norms of how to punish the crime. 
Therefore, the ḥadd for zinā should neither be less nor more than one 
hundred stripes. As Shahrour underscores, the verse makes it also clear that 
no compassion shall ‘move you in their case’.608 Thus, the punishment for 
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adultery and fornication is stated explicitly in the verse; when the offence is 
proven before the judge the punishment must result in one hundred lashes 
being inflicted on the person in a public setting. The public setting is 
intended to deter others from committing such indecent crimes. However, for 
zinā to be adjudicated, Shahrour argues that the offence has to take place in a 
public area where four witnesses could witness the offence without breaking 
any privacy. Notably, Shahrour does not recognise pregnancy as evidence of 
a zinā offence. 
It is worth mentioning that M. Shahrour does not belong to the 
profession of Islamic legal and exegetical experts, has been nowhere near 
scholarly Islamic institutions, and has not achieved any formal training or 
certificates in the Islamic sciences.609 Shahrour’s main thrust has been 
basically based on the distinction between the divine and the non-divine 
within the Qurᵓānic revelation and the Prophetic tradition.  This type of 
distinction allows him to treat the legal stipulations of the Qurᵓān as ever 
changing and always evolving, but relevant and indeed applicable as long as 
they move between the limits dictated only in the Qurᵓān and not beyond 
them.610 Christmann describes Shahrour’s method in these words: 
 
        The theoretical basis for this is what Shahrour sees as the crucial 
distinction which must be made between two different forms of any religious 
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discourse: at one level there is the divine reality, immutable, eternal, and 
absolute; while at the other level there is the human understanding of that 
divine reality, about which there is nothing divine, and which is changeable, 
partial, and relative.611 
 
Shahrour’s thought revolves around the idea that ḥadd punishments 
belong only to God, and that we can only know what ḥadd is if it is explicitly 
dictated in the Qurᵓān – which in most cases, with certain exceptions, it is 
not. As to the Prophetic tradition, Shahrour treats it as “a model of good legal 
practice in the theory of limits, not as the ultimate specification and bindings 
exemplification of Islamic law.” He suggests that Muslims regard the Sunnah 
as an exemplary method of how to cope with the challenge and legal conflicts 
that Muḥammad faced in his time, and of how to emulate his methods and 
apply them with our methodology to a system of law by which we are able to 
face the challenges of our modern times.612 As to classical fiqh, Shahrour 
completely rejects it. Particularly, he refutes qiyās and views it as oppressive. 
As he asks, “how could an analogy be drawn between the seventh and the 
twentieth centuries?”613 Shahrour claims that “we no longer need the help of 
our honourable scholars who would only continue their search for the 
umpteenth justification for amputation.”614 Instead, he calls for opening the 
door to ijtihād, even on explicit verses, arguing that “the theory of limits puts 
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the priorities right and allows ijtihād for all legal verses, whether explicit text 
[naṣṣ] or not.”615 
                                         




In conclusion, in this chapter I have attempted to provide an overview 
of the debate about the applicability of the Islamic criminal law of ḥadd in 
contemporary Muslim society. Through the course of this examination, four 
key arguments have emerged, from which I would like to draw three main 
conclusions. 
First, contemporary proponents of the re-implementation of Sharīʿah 
law focus their attention on criminal justice and particularly, the law of ḥadd. 
This area is a key bone of contention; for the pro-ḥadd faction, it is in fact the 
main area of law in which Sharīʿah should be re-activated and imposed by 
governments in Muslim societies.616 Therefore, ḥadd punishments assume a 
central place in the controversy surrounding the calls for the application of 
Sharīʿah under the conditions of modernity.617 Salafis and conservatives hold 
the view that Muslims have a choice and indeed a duty to implement ḥadd 
punishments; it is the best penal law that will work for them. Thus, 
attempting to use any type of Western notions of human rights to evaluate 
the law of ḥadd is seen as unavoidably problematic.618 For the Salafis and 
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conservatives, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the law of 
God can be overruled and challenged by man.619  
     Secondly, in the contemporary debate of Muslim scholars about the 
justifications of ḥadd punishments, there is serious disagreement about 
whether ḥadd punishments should be implemented or not. This is because 
modern scholars differ in the methods and approaches applied to the Islamic 
tradition (Qurᵓān, sunnah, ijmāʿ and qiyās/ijtihād). The modernists’ claim is 
that the Salafis and conservatives fail to distinguish between revelation which 
is immutable and absolute, and the transhistorical dimension of revelation 
which is subject to change, according to the evolution of Muslim society over 
time. The modernists see that main failure of the Salafis and conservatives in 
that they do not distinguish between the divine and the non-divine aspects of 
revelation. 
Accordingly, the modernists’ debate revolves around the fact that there 
is a set of Islamic principles that are absolute and therefore required to be 
implemented regardless of time or place.620 However, these ‘absolute’ 
principles are few: the five pillars of Islam in addition to basic Islamic 
obligations and prohibitions, especially in the area of Islamic ritual law 
(ʿibādāt). However, in the context of social affairs (muʿāmalāt) laws are 
generally viewed as flexible and changeable, unless there is an explicit 
scriptural text. Thus, the muʿāmalāt are more open to rational reasoning, 
creativity and undertaking of further research. In sum, the modernists are 
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more inclined to apply their own reasoning to Islamic penal law (ḥadd), and 
so are not all prepared to accept a penal system which is completely based on 
the perspective of classical fiqh.621 
Contemporary Muslim modernists are aware of the challenges facing 
their approach. They are the only camp to have put their finger on the 
problem of the contemporary application of Sharīʻah law. As Fazlur Rahman 
suggested, a modernist reading of the Islamic sources raises many questions 
about, for example, the eternity of the Word of God or indeed the absolute 
character of the Divine Law.622 Modernists such as Rahman, Ramadan and 
Shahrour all propose a method of interpretation of the Qurᵓān and the Sunna 
that aims to provide an honest, true and practical view of Islamic revelation. 
However, there seems to be no reason to believe that Muslim Salafis and 
conservatives are ready to accept this approach.623 Secondly, the modernists’ 
approach is accused of being “too total and abrupt” and of “sacrificing too 
much of the traditional, that is ‘historic’, Islam at a single stroke”; it is also 
suspected to carry within itself a ‘Western’ agenda of undermining Islam.624 
All these accusations naturally make the modernist project all the more 
difficult. 
The third conclusion is in reference to ḥadd punishments and the 
definitions and limits of these punishments as they are outlined in the 
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Qurᵓān. Modernists agree with the classical view that Muslim judicial 
authorities must avoid indiscriminate enforcement of ḥadd punishments and 
instead consider mitigation as absolutely vital. They go farther, however, 
when arguing that the limits set in the Qurᵓān must be guarded and not 
exceeded in any way. Shahrour’s reference to the theory of limits enables the 
legislator to evaluate the extent to which the culprit has exceeded the limits 
dictated in the Qurᵓān, and therefore, the judge will be able to identify the 
form of punishment which is to be inflicted. For instance, the verse 
describing the theft punishment indicates the upper limit of the punishments 
as the cutting off of the hand. In particular Shahrour’s “theory of limits” 
appears to offer the modernist position a new and promising way of 
reconciling Sharīʿah with the demands of our modern age. 
Finally, it is evident that Salafis, conservatives and traditionalists treat 
the historical models as their primary reference because its authors, 
presumably the Prophet and his Companions, were able to achieve coherence 
between ideals and practice.625 Contrary to this, the modernists have 
emphasised a most vital point, that is, the importance of rejecting imitation 
of these historical precedents, and instead of reproducing the ethical 
demands and human efforts through which the past ideal was achieved. Not 
to repeat early Islam’s form but to grasp its substance, spirit, and objectives: 
that is the call of the modernists.626 
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It is reasonable and convincing to argue that the laws as ordained in 
the Islamic tradition are meant to preserve the limits set by God. If God’s 
limits were set to protect the general welfare of the Muslims then, the focus 
has to be on the general welfare rather than on the literal interpretations of 
ḥadd verses. In other words, God’s intentions and aims behind the ḥadd 
punishments can only be achieved and fulfilled by maintaining the public 
welfare of the Muslims. Hence, the laws of ḥadd, as Gleave argues, hold “no 
intrinsic value, and if, on occasions, the strict application of the law 
compromises the aims of Sharīʻah then for some supporters of the doctrine of 
maqāṣid, the law can be set aside or modified so that God’s intentions might 
be fulfilled.”627 
Accordingly, the Salafi’ and conservatives’ calls for the re-
implementation of ḥadd laws for the sake of preserving the integrity of their 
cultural and religious practices cannot be considered justified. The severity of 
ḥadd punishments as they are understood in the dominant classical tradition, 
in the contemporary situation, is open to a moratorium, as proposed by 
Ramadan, and potentially, to a fundamental reconsideration. Salafis and 
conservatives take a defensive but all to easy position when stressing the 
superiority of Islamic law over man-made law. Modernist proposals such as 
Shahrour’s “theory of limits” are, on the whole, more convincing and 
appealing when one considers current debates about the applicability of ḥadd 
punishments. 
                                         





 In the course of my analysis, the term ḥadd has proven to be rich in 
significations and semantic nuances. On the one hand, the term ḥadd 
indicates that certain punishments are defined (i.e. by God) in a clear and 
unambiguous way. The second form of the Arabic root ḥ-d-d bears witness to 
this, since its maṣdar, or verbal noun taḥdīd means “definition, 
determination”. Related to this aspect is the idea that the ḥadd punishments 
are “divinely decreed” and therefore immutable and non-negotiable. On the 
other hand, one can argue that the ḥadd punishments carry their name 
because they are meant to deter people from engaging in certain immoral 
behaviours specified in revelation. Their aim is to obstruct someone’s path, 
literally to erect a ‘boundary’ (ḥadd) in front of a person, in the way of a 
border that cannot be exceeded or transgressed; however, within this 
boundary a certain space for interpretation and reasoning remains. In the 
contemporary context, Muḥammad Shahrour has pushed this line of 
reasoning to an extreme, by arguing that ḥadd punishments in the traditional 
understanding only demarcate the absolute extreme of what is allowable as 
punishment in Islamic criminal law, but that the actual social and cultural 
context of contemporary Muslim society demands far less severe 
punishments. 
      In the foregoing chapters I have attempted to critically evaluate a 
number of strategies for the justifications of ḥadd punishments as they are 
 265 
found throughout the Islamic tradition of jurisprudence (fiqh) and in modern 
and contemporary Muslim legal discourse. In chapters one to three, I have 
introduced into the fiqh discourse on ḥadd an element of systematization that 
is not necessarily found in the fiqh tradition itself, which discusses the 
various perceived purposes and justifications of ḥadd punishment 
interchangeably and in varying contexts. 
Throughout this research, four justifications have been extracted from 
within the Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and then presented and analysed in a 
systematic order.  By analysing the juristic provisions of the Islamic criminal 
law of ḥadd, we have gained insights into Islamic values, or at least into 
values held dear by the classical jurists who formulated and justified ḥadd 
laws. In chapter one, I have paid particular attention to the legal argument 
that the ḥadd punishments are to be considered “divinely ordained”, fixed 
and immutable “rights of God” (ḥuqūq Allāh). I have argued, first of all, that 
there is no Qurᵓānic or Prophetic explicit indication that ḥadd is a right 
belonging exclusively to God; instead I have suggested that the justification 
of ḥadd punishments as the right of God is a concept developed by the jurists, 
as is the concept of ḥaqq al-ʿabd, or “right of man”. I argued that ḥadd 
punishments were considered as ḥuqūq Allah as opposed to other crimes, that 
is retaliation qiṣāṣ, because jurists tended to follow a strict interpretation of 
the Qurᵓānic verses of ḥudūd where the punishments are ordained explicitly. 
This is led the jurists to regard the norms of ḥudūd as muqaddarāt in which 
the reason for its legislation is known only to God.  
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Secondly, I have shown that, despite the fact that the ḥadd laws were 
regarded as norms decreed by God (muqaddarāt), that is fixed and 
immutable, classical Muslim jurists were not unwilling to speculate about the 
ratio legis of ḥadd punishments. Particularly the Ḥanafīs circumvented the 
rigidity that seems implied in the concept of muqaddar norms by equating the 
concept of the “interest of God” with the idea of the common good or public 
well-being (al-maṣlaḥā al-ʿāmma). In fact a majority of Sunnī argued that 
these rights aim to rid the world of evil and that this, in essence, is the 
purpose of the divine legislation on ḥadd. Jurists justified ḥadd as the right of 
God for a number of factors related to the ways in which early Muslim jurists 
set the rules for the implementation of ḥadd punishments. By discussing the 
line demarcating the right of God from the individual’s right Sunnī jurists 
created a legal discourse that allowed them to make sure that the rule of 
Shari’ah law was upheld and safeguarded, and that both society’s needs 
(symbolized by the notion of “the common good”) and private interests such 
as honour and the right for retaliation were in proper balance.  
It is true, the Sunnī jurists insisted on the absolute necessity of 
implementing ḥadd punishment whenever the crime is notified to the Muslim 
judge. But they also outlined many exceptions and caveats in order to avoid 
the implementation of ḥadd punishments in specific conditions defined in 
their legal textbooks. One of the main characteristics of the definition of ḥadd 
as the right of God is that the jurists’ debate about God’s right versus the 
individual’s right is based on, and reflects, background values concerning 
basic qualities of the Muslim individual and the good Islamic society that 
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Muslims must uphold. The Ḥanafīs, for example, held that ḥadd punishments 
are the rights of God to safeguard the common good, and that when they are 
in conflict with an individual’s right, they tend to outweigh the latter. The 
Shāfiʻīs and the Ḥanbalīs tended to give individual rights greater weight in 
cases of conflict with a right belonging to God. The Mālikīs, finally, held a 
middle position, seeking to preserve both the individual right and the right of 
God. For example, the Mālikīs held that all rights must be preserved 
generally speaking, but multiple punishments are not acceptable, for 
example, one must avoid inflicting the ḥadd punishment once qiṣāṣ has been 
implemented. 
In Chapter two I have examined how jurists justified the severity of 
ḥadd punishments by arguing that they deter the general public and the 
individual from committing forbidden offences. In the course of this chapter, 
I have proposed that Sunnī jurists generally and unquestioningly assumed 
that punishments like scourging and amputation deter culprits from (re-) 
committing ḥadd offences, and that therefore, the function, purpose and 
justification of ḥadd punishment is deterrence. 
At the same time, as I have suggested in line with modern theories of 
punishment, the jurists’ presumption that ḥadd punishments deter the culprit 
is not always accurate. I have proposed that, remarkably, the jurists 
themselves had an awareness of this. How else can one explain the fact that 
the jurists were involved in an endless dispute about issues such as the 
repetition of ḥadd offences and the overlap of various ḥadd offences? It is 
obvious, especially in the Shāfiʿī and Mālikī doctrine, that the jurists had an 
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inkling of the inability of ḥadd punishments to achieve deterrence. It must be 
granted, however, that this inkling is never systematically pursued in 
classical fiqh or turned into a fully developed argument. It is indeed striking 
that Sunnī jurists never question whether ḥadd punishments are ‘just’ or 
‘unjust’. In their view, ḥadd punishments can only be ‘unjust’ with regard to 
the formalities of their implementations, that is, when there is a failure in 
ḥadd procedure. Presumably, jurists viewed ḥadd law as a just law because 
God is just; therefore His law of punishment must be just.  
As for Sunnī legal reasoning in criminal law, I have suggested that 
there was a certain inconsistency in the Shāfiʿīs’ and Mālikīs’ approach to 
ḥadd punishments and in the way they thought about possible justifications 
for ḥadd punishments. This is clearly manifest in their disputes about the 
repetition of ḥadd offences, particularly in reference to the repetition of the 
theft offence. Sunnī jurists’ assumption that ḥadd punishments are immutable 
and fixed led them to think of the particulars of the punishment and the way 
in which it should be implemented rather than about the concrete “wisdom” 
(ḥikma), or the purpose, behind the legislation of ḥadd punishments and 
whether or not the punishments in every single case were always effective as 
a deterrent. Despite the assumption of the jurists that the ḥudūd Allāh are 
ordinances decreed by God, that is fixed and immutable, Sunnī jurists’ 
writings are replete with examples where ḥadd law is dealt with in a rather 
mutable and flexible way, even to the point of making ḥadd norms 
completely inoperative. For example, the jurists replaced the punishment of 
banishment with that of imprisonment, and some jurists, like the Ḥanafīs, 
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replaced the punishment for apostasy for female apostates with 
imprisonment. 
In chapter three I have examined the justification of the ḥadd 
punishment as serving to expiate the culprit from punishment in the hereafter 
(kaffāra). I have argued throughout this chapter that the point of contention 
among Sunnī jurists was how to determine the nature of the “things decreed 
by God” – the kaffarāt, like the ḥudūd, are usually counted among the 
muqaddarāt – and whether humans have the capacity to apprehend them, 
that is, to reason about their logical structure. The justification of ḥadd as an 
act of kaffāra was sharply debated among the Sunnī jurists. The Ḥanafī school 
of law rejected the idea that the ḥadd punishment expiates the culprit from 
eschatological punishment; instead, the Ḥanafīs held that repentance was the 
only means to expiate sins. They consistently argued (cf. chapter one) that 
the divinely ordained punishments serve the greater good of humankind. 
They also claimed that the divinely ordained punishments are meant as a 
retribution for sins, but that only God knows the precise gravity of ḥadd sins, 
and that therefore it is impossible to predict whether ḥadd punishments 
would be ‘enough’ to atone for sins. 
The Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs, and Ḥanbalīs, on the contrary, consistently held 
ḥadd to be kaffāra. In this sense, they justified severe ḥadd punishments as 
kaffārāt. This happened alongside other justifications of ḥadd they proffered, 
namely, that ḥadd fulfils its purpose by being a right of God, and that it 
prevents (further) ḥadd offences. The Ḥanafīs were more restrictive in their 
justifications of ḥadd, limiting their discourse to the concepts of “God’s right” 
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and to general and individual prevention, but excluding expiation. Ḥadd as 
kaffāra was not one of the Ḥanafīs’ justifications for the severity of the ḥadd 
punishment. What this difference of opinion between the Ḥanafīs and the 
other schools shows is that the balance between repentance and ḥadd 
punishment was always a difficult thing to achieve, and that it remained a 
contentious issue. 
I set out in chapter four by classifying contemporary Muslim scholars 
into four different camps, each camp being characterized by their methods 
and approaches applied to the Islamic tradition, that is, the primary sources 
of Islamic law (Qurᵓān and Sunnah), and the secondary sources developed in 
fiqh (ijmāʿ/taqlīd and qiyās/ijtihād). In the course of the chapter, I argued that 
contemporary views on ḥadd punishments vary significantly. While the 
Salafis, conservatives and traditionalists hold that ḥadd punishments are the 
defined and immutable law of God that, though to different extents, must be 
implemented, the modernists object to this idea. They criticize the current 
implementation of ḥadd laws as wrong and as causing severe injustices. The 
traditionalists and the conservatives are the camps who follow the classical 
justifications of ḥadd punishment most closely. As for the Salafis, they share 
with them the justification of ḥadd as a right of God; they also accept, though 
with some reservation, that ḥadd punishments can expiate sins. But they are 
not willing to follow fiqh reasoning about the preventive function of ḥadd. 
This they reject as an illegitimate speculation about the ‘clear’ meaning of the 
revealed sources of Islamic law. 
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The modernists are the camp that most drastically objects to the 
classical doctrine of ḥadd and its relevance for contemporary times.  The 
modernists’ effort is focused on reforming the Islamic tradition, and on the 
ways in which Muslim scholars should espouse a more critical approach to 
their tradition. Their methodological emphasis has been on developing a new 
hermeneutics for the re-interpretation of the Qurᵓān, in order to uncover its 
underlying, ‘eternal’ spirit that is realized in different ways, however, 
according to changing times and circumstances. This is clear in the 
modernists’ various statements about the way in which contemporary Muslim 
scholars should refer to the tradition. The modernists argue that the only way 
to produce a genuine Islamic way of life, including in its legal aspects, is to 
enlighten the public conscience, including that of the educated classes, with 
Islamic values. This, in fact, underlines the necessity of working out an 
Islamic ethics systematically from the Qurᵓān and making such works 
accessible to the general reader. There is no shortcut to this process for the 
production of Islamic law; rather, the modernists aim to rethink the entire 
tradition from the bottom up. 
In Chapter five I argued that the debate about the implementation of 
Islamic criminal law today is about more than a mere reform of the law along 
the lines of technical jurisprudential argumentation. The motivations behind 
the current implementation of Islamic criminal law have been as much 
political as they have been cultural. The politicians and legislators who have 
(re-)introduced ḥadd law proclaim their commitment to one specific 
interpretation of Islamic criminal law and to the establishment of an Islamic 
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state based on that interpretation, which does not tolerate other 
interpretations. This has clearly resulted in the inability in harmonizing ḥadd 
laws with human rights, and thus, this poses the biggest challenge in any 
overhaul of the classical criminal law. Conservative regimes wish to convey 
the message that Sharīʿah, being God’s law, is superior to man-made law. Any 
objection to the practical enforcement of their specific interpretation of 
Sharīʿah will be countered with the argument that human rights conventions 
are man-made regulations, whereas the Sharīʿah is based directly on 
revelation. On the other hand, the modernists have viewed the Islamisation 
of criminal law in the traditional understanding as a fatal mistake that does 
not reflect the good that the Creator has aimed at in legislating criminal 
justice. In the contemporary pro-ḥadd camp, the need to preserve Islam’s 
cultural authenticity is a paramount argument; ḥadd, according to the pro-
ḥadd party, is deeply enshrined, and indeed constitutive of, a ‘true’ Islamic 
ethics. Those thinkers who aim to rethink ḥadd critically in the light of 
contemporary global politics, by contrast, stress the need to account for the 
historical embeddedness of the human understanding of revelation and 
therefore, the importance of applying a sophisticated and up-to-date 
hermeneutics to the sources of the law in Islam. 
In this research, the review of classical fiqh strategies for the 
justification of ḥadd punishments has made it possible to capture important 
differences between the classical positions; it has demonstrated that classical 
fiqh discussions about ḥadd were a contested and nuanced area of thought. In 
this analysis, it has been necessary to go beyond the categories that have 
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historically characterised the Islamic legal theory of criminal law, and to 
impose our own grid of systematization and interpretation. The differences 
between justifications of ḥadd are not captured simply by referencing the 
different schools of law. What has become evident throughout this research is 
that classical Muslim jurists were engaged in a rich debate about how to 
derive, and at times, create ḥadd rules in an authoritative and determinate 
fashion in accordance with their conceptions of the divine will and the 
purpose of the divine law. This critical interest of the fuqahāʾ in elucidating 
the underlying purpose, even of areas of the law which by consensus are 
considered particularly resistant to human reasoning (that is, the 
muqaddarāt), is noteworthy. 
The answers given by Sunnī classical jurists cannot possibly satisfy the 
expectations of contemporary advocates of human rights and of a fair and 
balanced criminal law; this would be asking too much from them. As 
premodern thinkers they will never fully meet the demands of modernist 
thought. Nevertheless, the subtleness and flexibility of classical legal 
discourse may well serve as a reminder that Islamic law is not as inflexible 
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